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Abstract
The purpose ofthis thesis is to investigate various governance alternatives for
National Tourism Organizations (NTOs), and how they can be used to create positive
incentives and working conditions for NTOs. An ideal governance scenario can
enhance NTOs' market orientation, allow NTOs to adopt a long-term planning
perceptive, and give NTOs operational freedom to work on their required tasks. We
believe these aspects will have significant importance for NTOs' market performance
and the performance of the tourism industry NTOs promote.
Based on the analyses of a 14-country survey including NTO, NTA, and industry
representatives; researchers and consultants; along with a comprehensive theory
review, we have attempted to make policy recommendations that we think will be
usable for both NTOs and National Tourist Authorities/Administrations (NTAs). We
are quite confident that these recommendations will be of interest for the formation of
tourism policy in most OECD countries, and other countries interested in these issues.
We have also included some suggestions for further research on NTO governance and
for similar organizations and settings.
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Preface
The international travel and tourism market is a market with an impressive growth
over the past few decades, providing much valued profits, employment, tax revenue,
and investments for many countries. At the same time the international tourism
market is a volatile market with increasing competition among countries and regions.
Thus, efficient and effective use of the National Tourism Organizations' (NTOs')
resources is of utmost importance for countries that have ambitions to perform well,
and reach other important goals of the organization and its stakeholders.
In this thesis wei will discuss how governing stakeholders (i.e., the government and
the tourism industry) can provide NTOs with the right incentives and working
conditions to make NTOs become as effective and efficient as possible. First of all,
since NTOs are in fact marketing organizations, we believe NTOs need to be market-
oriented and have a market focus. Secondly, NTOs need a long-term perspective to be
able and willing to engage in long-term planning, projects and activities. Lastly,
NTOs need some degree of operational freedom, allowing NTOs to craft their own
professional strategies and carry out activities without undue intervention and
pressure from stakeholders and interest groups.
In this thesis we will argue theoretically, as well as provide some empirical evidence
that how NTOs ' budgets are determined (activity/behavior-based); from which source
NTOs are financed (industry vs. government); and who owns/controls NTOs
(government vs. industry/stockholder); will have an impact on these incentives and
working conditions. These are important premises for NTO operation that can be
designed to set the stage for improved market performance ofNTOs.
Personally, I would specifically like to thank my colleagues Professor Sigurd Villads
Troye and Associate Professor Einar Breivik. They have both made strong effort with
the initial project this thesis is based on, and I truly appreciate their help and guidance
along the way with the thesis work. In addition, I would also like to thank Associate
Professor Erik W. Jakobsen at the Norwegian School of Management for his useful
comments and suggestions, and Eric Lofquist for help with proofreading the text.
We are also very grateful for the financial support of The Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Trade and Industry made available through the Norwegian Research Council, and
for the support of the project partners in Canada, Denmark and Japan. Without the
support ofthese countries much of the data collection would not have been feasible.
Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Alain Dupeyras of the OECD Tourism Committee
and our project contacts in the participating countries for their assistance in setting up
project interviews and recruiting respondents, as well as our international respondents
who have taken the time and effort to participate in the project. Needless to say, the
project could not have been conducted without their assistance.
Bergen, October 2003 Eivind Farstad
I In this thesis the author will, for the most, part use the plural noun "we" since some parts ofthesis
contains contributions of my colleagues involved with the original OEeD-project this thesis is built on.
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1.0 Introduction
In this chapter we will describe the background of the thesis and the research context,
state the research questions, explain our research approach, and provide an overview of
the thesis.
1.1 National Tourism Organizations 12
Almost every nation in the world has a national organization officially responsible for
tourism marketing, often operated as a part of the national government or as a special
independent body created by a legislative act. These are often referred to as National
Tourism Organizations (or Offices) (NTOs). Generally, these organizations playa
leadership role for tourism in their respective countries; drawing together fragmented
pieces of the industry and the often loosely coordinated national, regional, and local
government bodies. According to one source (Choi, 1993) there are about 175NTOs
worldwide, employing between 500-700 branch offices abroad.
National Tourism Organizations are set up in virtually every country in the world that has
a tourism industry of any significance. The NTOs' main roles are to market their nations
abroad as tourist destinations in order to attract international visitors. Many ofthese
NTOs have both international and domestic responsibilities in tourism policy, planning,
development, and international marketing. These activities often require substantial
budgets, several of them surpassing 100 million Euros in budget size, and have large
staffs. For instance, the Greek NTO maintains a staff of more than 750 full-time
employees. NTOs are traditionally organized and controlled by the national government
through a department or ministry responsible for tourism matters, often referred to as the
National Tourism Authority (NTA).
NTOs are in many regards similar to other non-profit organizations in other industries
formed to market or promote an industry, business interest, or cause on behalf of an
industry or group of businesses. Some other examples of such similar entities are national
marketing organizations for the export ofseafood (Norway), kiwi or wool products (New
Zealand); or domestic industry marketing organizations for meat, poultry, or diary
products (Norway, USA etc).
NTOs' main purpose is to market their country's travel industry's products and services,
and facilitate the sale ofthese to incoming tourists. Considering that NTOs are first of all
marketing organizations, it is beneficial for the tourism industry and other involved
stakeholders that NTOs spend the majority oftheir resources in the most efficient and
effective way to market their country as a tourist destination in order to attract
I Adapted from Morison, Braunlich, Kamaruddin, and Cai (1995).
2 Adapted from: "Towards New Forms of Public-Private Sector Partnership - The Changing Role,
Structure, and Activities of National Tourism Administrations", World Tourism Organization - Special
Report, January 1996.
international tourists'. Ideally, one would want to avoid a situation like the case of the
World Health Organization, which is an international organization formed to promote
worldwide health. For the WHO, 35% of the budget goes to supporting the organization's
headquarters, and another 40% to running regional offices. The remaining funds are then
leaving only one and a half cent (0.015 US$) for health per person in the various targeted
regions (Peabody, 1995). In the case ofNTOs, one would want to avoid that resources are
wasted on excessive administration, lobbing activity, and justification efforts rather than
productive tourism marketing effort. It is therefore crucial that the bulk ofNTOs'
resources are spent on tourism marketing, and not on supporting the internal operation of
the NTOs and other non-productive activities.
Paradoxically, at the same time when governments' recognition oftourism's importance
to national economies is probably at an all-time high, many governments are questioning
the rationale for their continued involvement in tourism. This is particularly the case in
Europe and North-America.
Given the increasing constraints on public sector budgets generally, governments are
concerned about how they can continue to justify the use oftaxpayers' money to support
and promote tourism when there has generally been a decline in support for such funding
in other industries.
A number of countries are also concerned that the effects of governments assuming a
promotion and marketing role - one which in other industries has been seen as a private
sector responsibility - may be a misallocation of government funds. Moreover, they
admit that it can also result in a marketing organization (NTO) that is less responsive,
efficient and entrepreneurial than it should be.
As a result, tourism administrations are looking more and more to the private sector to
take on some of the promotion and marketing functions traditionally assumed by the
government, usually in some kind ofpartnership with the public sector. Consequently, it
is quite possible that a larger portion of the budget of the NTOs will have to be funded by
the private sector in the future. This generally results in private enterprises having a
greater say in the development of the NTAs' tourism policy and NTOs' operational
strategies, as well as how NTOs' budget funds are spent.
Shifting the responsibility for funding and control of the NTO, more from the
government towards the tourism industry, could have some desirable, as well as,
unwanted consequences. Despite the great responsibility and considerable size of the
budgets of many NTOs, they have not been subject to much academic research to date,
especially with respect to their international operations as well as the governance ofthem.
As Choi (1993) has pointed out, very few studies have attempted to analyze NTOs and
3 Some NTO are also marketing the country's tourism industry to domestic tourists to retain this business
within the country. These activities are also beneficial for the country's domestic tourism industry, and can
be considered "favorable" from an NTO efficiency and effectiveness standpoint.
NTOs have also have roles and tasks in addition to promotion and marketing in general, but international
marketing is their most important activity. See also Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 for a more comprehensive
overview oftypical NTO activities and goals.
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their operating environment in particular. Even fewer, if any, have studied the different
fund ing- and control principles used for NTOs and their potential consequences.
1.2 The purpose and focus of the thesis
The research problem we study in this thesis stems from our casual observations of a few
NTOs and how they seem to behave and operate in the real world. For instance, these
observations were made through direct contact with NTOs, through news media features,
promotional material and other information from the NTOs themselves, as well as
presentations regarding NTO matters on business seminars and academic conferences.
It is important to emphasize that NTOs are first of all marketing organizations. They are
operating in an environment where they market products and services that face
competition in the marketplace from e.g., other NTOs and commercial tourism marketers.
Let us for now and for the sake of argument assume that the NTOs are operating in a
competitive environment, where organizations need to be truly concerned about
efficiency and effectiveness to survive and prosper in such an environment. Under such
circumstances one could maybe expect that a typical NTO would strive to be market-
focused, e.g., focusing on market research and adapting the organization and the products
it promotes to the tourism market, and move swiftly to counter the actions of any market
competitors or competing destinations. They could also be expected to engage in both the
kind of short-term, as well as long-term, plans and activities needed to have success in a
competitive market. Moreover, they would be expected to craft their own strategies
relatively autonomously based on their supposedly unique professional expertise. It is
then puzzling to observe that some NTOs do not seem to be particularly market-focused,
and their planning- and activity-level seems to be mainly of more short-term character.
Furthermore, some of the NTOs we have observed also appeared to be somewhat focally
oriented towards their sponsors and owners and their products and agendas, and prone to
spend time, money, and other resources on lobbying and justification efforts. That is,
many NTOs seem to have aproduct-, owner-, or sponsor focus rather than a market
focus. At the same time some NTOs are complaining about the restrictions put on them
by these sponsors and owners - which again are hampering NTOs' abilities to do what
they consider optimal from a business perspective. These observations do not correspond
well with our expectations of an ideal NTO as being market-focused, have a long-term
perspective, and autonomous and dislodged enough from its owners and sponsors to
make professionally sound decisions. We believe those positive organizational traits
would be characteristic of an efficient and effective marketing organization, which is
perceived necessary to survive and to be successful in a competitive market.
We then began to wonder what might cause such sub-optimalism on the part of some
NTOs. For instance, is there anything that differentiates NTOs from commercial
companies operating in a competitive environment? First of all, it became obvious that
most NTOs are financed and governed in a way that differentiate them from commercial
organizations; they are predominately non-commercial organizations owned and financed
by non-profit-maximizing owners (the governments), and their budgets are not
predominantly performance-based, i.e., dependent on sales of products and services in a
competitive marketplace.
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One could then question the competitive-environment assumption. Is there anything in
the way NTOs are financed or governed that effectively shelters them from market
competition, allowing them to survive and expand regardless oftheir apparent sub-
optimal operation? Furthermore, we began to question the assumption ofNTO
management discretion and (beneficial) decision autonomy. Are NTOs somehow enticed
or forced to be product/sponsor/owner-focused rather than market-focused? Are their
incentives and working conditions set in a way that they are forced to focus on short-term
activities and plans? Are their sponsors and owners influencing or forcing the NTO to
accept agendas different than what is professionally sound? Are NTOs, at the same time
as they are operating in a business world, governed based on a political agenda rather
than business agenda? These questions altogether raise at least one fundamental question,
a question that will be the main focus of our study: Are there ways to finance and govern
NTOs that will reduce the probable impact of politics and self-interest, and motivate and
allow the NTOs to be more business-oriented, effective, and efficient?
We will start our abductive research approach (as explained in detail later in Section 1.5)
by looking at the decisions the governing stakeholders will have to make when they
create and govern NTOs. We believe the outcome ofthose decisions will influence
NTOs' incentives, abilities, and behaviors. When a given nation or state wants to
organize a new National Tourism Organization or reorganize an existing one, the people
responsible will have to make a few important decisions: First of all, the organizers will
have to decide on how the organization's budget should be determined, that is, to
determine the financing mechanism for NTO's budget. Should the budget be based on
some kind ofmarket-performance (NTO's results), should it be based on the estimated
cost of the activities the NTO is set to carry out, or the goals to be achieved (NTO's
behavior), should the NTO simply be allocated a lump-sum payment each year (fixed-
sum transfer), or any other criterion?
Furthermore, they will have to decide on how to fund the NTO or i.e., finance the budgets
of the organization, since it is not a type of organization likely to generate enough funds
on its own to be self-sustained. This is, for the most part, due to the commonlcollective
goods problem of generic tourism marketing (as we will discuss in Chapter 2). The issue
is then to determine what source the organization should get its funding from. Should
financing the NTO be a government responsibility, a tourism industry responsibility, or
should the money come from a combination ofthose two sources?
A third issue is what entity should have ownership or the formal control of the NTO.
Should the NTO be organized as a government bureau or agency, an industry-led non-
commercial organization, or simply a commercial operation owned and controlled by its
shareholders?
These three issues, budgeting,Junding source and ownership/control are all very
important. We believe that the outcome ofthose decisions, i.e., which governance
principles are applied, will have an impact on how the organization is likely to behave, its
organizational focus, its efficiency and effectiveness - and in tum, its ability to generate
the desired tourism influx. Through the use of an ideal combination of these three
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variables, we believe the organizers can stimulate the organization to achieve better
market performance.
First of all, we hold that this combination of principles will influence the organization' s
ability and willingness to have a strong market focus. There is already quite a lot of
empirical evidence from previous research showing that strong market orientation is
beneficial for an organization's performance (e.g., ref. Appendix 1).
Second, we believe the organizational principles applied will influence the organization's
ability and willingness to adapt a long-term perspective in its operational strategies, in
addition to its evident short-term planning and operations. This will allow the NTO to
make strategic plans and engage in long-term activities and projects, which is necessary
in the kind of work an NTO is carrying out.
Third, we believe that the principles applied will influence the organization's autonomy,
or its operational freedom. We reason that an organization like an NTO will need to be
sheltered from undue intervention from stakeholders with strong self-interests. In that
way the NTO could be left free and uninhibited to make operational decisions on a
professionally sound basis. We will later discuss how an NTO will be more efficient and
effective if it is allowed (under certain restrictions) to make its own decisions about how
to invest its resources and to organize and carry out its tasks.
It is thus conceivable that how NTOs' budget are determined, from what source budgets
are allocated, and by whom the organizations are owned or controlled - will have an
impact on the organizations' focus, planning time-horizon, and operational freedom,
which in turn is likely to impact the NTOs' market performance.
Therefore, the main purpose of the thesis is to evaluate how different principles for
organizing and governing NTOs can affect the likelihood of improved market
performance ofNTOs. By the term "market performance" we refer to the degree of
ability ofNTOs to positively impact the level ofincoming tourism, and to function
optimally given the resources they have available. That is, the means of governance the
government and/or the tourism industry can employ to control and motivate NTOs. We
believe that these aspects can somehow impact the ability of the NTOs to reach the
market-performance goals they need.
The reader should be aware that we are not primarily concerned with the internal
organization ofNTOs in this study, as outlined in Figure 1.1 later in this section. Of
course, there are also operational decisions other than the ones we have mentioned, which
are relevant in the NTO context. For instance, practical issues like: who should be the
NTO manager; how many employees to hire for the NTO; what background and
compensation system staff should have; what kind of headquarters, branch offices, and
equipment the NTO should have; and the nature ofinternal structure of the NTO; etc. are
also important decisions that will have to be made. However, we will not discuss these
internal issues here - getting into all the operational decisions and details would clutter
our discussion in principle. We also believe that the factors we are concentrating on here
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will have strong influence on how NTOs will behave and thus make their internal
structure and operational decisions as listed.
1.3 Research problems of the study
In the following section we will outline the research problems addressed in this thesis and
briefly introduce the variables we believe have an impact on the NTOs' incentives and
working conditions. In turn, we believe that optimizing these incentives and working
conditions will be important for effective and efficient NTO operation, and to assure that
all NTOs' overall stakeholders' interests are safeguarded in the best possible way.
As mentioned earlier, a few crucial decisions will have to be made when the tourism
authorities (NTA) and/or its industry constituents want to set up or reorganize such an
organization. The decision alternatives outlined in Figure I.l below can be formalized in
various principles for NTO-governance, which in different combinations will have
varying effect on the organization's incentives and working conditions.
The principles we assess later in this study differ with respect to the following aspects:
• what are the principles for determining the budgets of the organizations Le., are the
budgets to some extent tied to the NTOs' (i.e., industry's) market performance, or
based on some other criterion?
• who owns the NTOs (government vs. private sector)?
• what is the source of income (public vs. private sector)?
The issue we address is to what extent these aspects may influence the NTOs' market
performance indirectly through their impact on the organizations':
• Market Focus", i.e., NTOs' willingness to take the market as a premise for their
actions
• Long-Term Perspective of plans and activities
• Operational Freedom, i.e., its ability to make decisions based on own professional
judgments
We propose that these decisions and their actual implementation will influence the
NTOs' incentives, focus, and abilities. Because the budgeting principle mayor may not
give the right incentives for Market Focus and optimal production, we believe the
budgeting principle or ownership constellation will be important for the NTOs'
organizational focus; that is, its tendency to focus on marketing tasks rather than, for
instance, counter-productive sponsor-lobbying, shirking, and budget-maximization
behavior. Furthermore, the budgeting principle and funding source may influence NTOs'
stability ofbudget size and control thereof. In turn, that will impact its ability to plan and
operate with a Long-Term Perspective, which is necessary to achieve sustainable market
performance. Finally, we believe that the budgeting principle.funding source and
ownership/control constellation can influence NTOs' Operational Freedom. For instance,
4 From this point on we will use italics to denote the independent variables and Capitalization to denote the
dependent variables when these are mentioned in the text.
6
performance-based budgeting may lessen the need for sponsors and/or owners to
intervene in NTO activities and plans. We believe the NTO needs to have some degree of
autonomy to make professionally sound decisions, and to motivate the NTO toward
optimal participation and initiative, and entice the NTO to assume responsibility for its
own actions. Consequently, we believe these factors have an impact on the motivation
and ability of the organization to solve its marketing tasks efficiently and effectively.
Figure 1.1
Factors believed to drive market performance
Sources of control NTO-Characteristics
(Independent variables
i.e., Governance alternatives)
FUNDING
PRINCIPLE
FUNDING
SOURCE
ORGANI-
ZATIONAL
OWNER-
SHIP/
CONTROL
Assumed drivers of performance Performance
(Dependent variables
i.e., Performance-enhancing factors)
Organizational
incentives & working
conditions
OTHER FACTORS that may
influence NTOs' performance
(Not the focus ofthis study):
• Organizational structure
• Human capital
(professionalism)
• Internal incentives
• Financial resources (in
absolute size, and relative
to NTOs' tasks, country
size, and competitors)
• Organizational
"experience"
• Networks/inter -
organizational relations etc.
MARKET
FOCUS
LONG-TERM
PERSPECTIVE
OPERATIONAL
FREEDOM
EXTERNAL FACTORS
• KEY MARKET
CHARACTERISTICS
• PRODUCT VALUE
CHARACTERISTICS
• INDUSTRY
PROFESSIONALISM
• POLITICAL
CONDITIONS
• COMPETITION
• ECONOMIC CYCLE
~-----------------~---------------------- REWARD/"PUNISHMENT"
(Incentives linked to performance)
= Focus ofthis thesis '---------------------'
MARKET
PERFORM-
ANCE:
• Number of
visitors
• Economic
value of
tourism
• Other
societal
goals &
object-
ives
Following the discussion above we arrive at the first research problem ofthis thesis:
Thefirst research problem of this study is to evaluate how different principles for setting
up and governing National Tourism Organizations can affect the market performance-
enhancing incentives and working conditions of NTOs, and thereby the NTOs ' ability to
influence their countries' tourism market performance positively.
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This leads us to the first ofthree research questions:
l. Which governing principles can be considered "best "for NTD operation?
As Figure 1.1 depicts, our focus is on the three/actors on the left and how they may
influence NTOs' working conditions and incentives; so that NTOs will be enticed and
allowed to have a Market Focus, adapt a Long-Term Perspective, and enjoy Operational
Freedom (shaded boxes right/center) under certain restrictions. We believe this will be
positive for NTOs' market performance, as depicted on the rightmost box in the figure.
The budgeting principle mayor may not feed back incentives through market
performance (dotted arrow). Other factors and characteristics ofNTOs (white box on the
left/center) may also influence NTOs' abilities, focus and behavior; as well as external
factors somewhat beyond NTOs' control (white box on the right/center) that probably
will also have an impact on NTOs' market performance. The latter will not be discussed
in this study, but may be relevant for further research on NTO governance and
administration, as we outline in the final chapter ofthis thesis.
To summarize the discussion ofthe first research problem we can then state the
"discovery" of the following prepositions:
1. We believe the budgeting principle will have an impact on NTOs'
• Market Focus
• Long-Term Perspective
• Operational Freedom
2. We believe thefunding source will have an impact on NTOs'
• Market Focus
• Long-Term Perspective
• Operational Freedom
3. We believe the ownership/control arrangement will have an impact on NTOs'
• Market Focus
• Long-Term Perspective
• Operational Freedom
4. We believe that
• Market Focus
• Long-Term Perspective
• Operational Freedom
in turn will have a positive impact on NTOs' market performance (NOTE:
although measuring market performance is beyond the scope ofthis thesis).
Out of the three dependent variables we study in this thesis we have chosen to emphasize
the importance of Market Focus of the NTO, because we believe this aspect will
contribute the most to safeguard the interests of all stakeholders to the extent it is
practically possible. (We will explain this in more detail in Section 3.1 and 3.2 later). We
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admit, however, that market performance may not be the only goal for some NTOs.
Market Focus, and thereby a strong market performance, may in some instances be in
conflict with the pursuit of other societal goals such as e.g., sustainable tourism, regional
development, cultural values, etc. However, an important premise ofthis thesis is that
market performance, which we define to be the ability to generate incoming tourism
traffic, will be a very important criterion for judging the overall performance of the
majority ofNTOs.
For clarity and better understanding, we should already at this point bring to the reader's
attention the particular nature ofthis thesis. The abductive research approach we have
chosen is based on the discovery oftheoretical prepositions through review of relevant
theory and any theory recommendations derived thereof, as well as discovery of decision-
makers' espoused theories and theories-in-use5•
The chosen research approach entails to look into different areas oftheory to find out
what existing theory and empirical research described in academic literature can
recommend in terms of the issues at hand, as well as consult theory experts. We will then
try to find out how the decision-makers think and reason about the issues mentioned
(espoused theories), and to compare this with what they and their colleagues actually end
up doing in terms ofNTO governance (theories-in-usej.The recommendations from
theory, and the evaluations by theory experts, will be compared with the decision-
makers' espoused theories and theories-in-use to find out to which degree all these are
congruent. We compare all this in two separate gap-analyses, as explained in detail in
Sections 1.4-1.5. If congruence exists, that is a good argument to preserve status quo. If
not, that may call for revisions in pre-existing theory and/or current NTO governance
practice.
We are then looking to establish the following in our second research problem:
The second research problem ofthis study is to investigate whether current NTO
governing practice is consistent with practitioners' espoused theories and with
recommendations from theory.
Thus, the second and third research questions ofthis thesis are as follows.
2. Are the ways the governing stakeholders of NTOs think and reason consistent
with current theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence?
3. Do these stakeholders actually practice according to their own "theories"?
(In other words: does the "terrain match the map '')
Ifwe through this study can answer positively to both questions, this may indicate that
current academic theory is "true" and applicable in the context ofNTOs - or simply that
the stakeholders are in fact "doing it right". However, ifthere is a mismatch between: a)
the theoretical recommendations and the respondents espoused theories, b) and/or a
5 We will define and discuss the consepts of espoused theories and theories-in-use in more detail later in
this capter in Section lA.
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mismatch between the respondents espoused theories and their theories-in-use in current
practice, there will be a need to
a. try to explain why this is the case
b. either develop new theory or readjust current theory, or try to change the theory-
in-use by offering recommendations to the stakeholders more in line with current
theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence (See also the research design as
outlined in Figure 1.2 later in this chapter).
A more detailed explanation ofwhy we address these specific issues and why we have
chosen this particular research approach will be provided in Section 1.5 below and in
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 later in this text.
1.4 Theories-in-use: Practitioner's theories
An important point in this study is to find out how stakeholders influencing NTOs think
and reason in terms of the governing principles we have stated earlier. We want to
investigate whether what NTOs' governing stakeholders actually end up doing. with
respect to choosing the governing principles for NTOs, is congruent with what a sample
of the same stakeholders think should be done. Another research issue is the degree to
which current practice is consistent with recommendations that can be derived from
written theory and theory experts. We therefore look into the concepts of espoused theory
(i.e., what the stakeholders express ideally should be done with respect to NTO
governance) and theories-in-use (i.e., what is done in practice) developed by Argyris and
Schon (1974). We will discuss how these theories evolve to learn more about this kind of
decision process.
1.4.1 Practitioner's theories and how they evolve6
Theories are predictive statements ofwhat causes what, and why. Many managers and
other decision-makers view themselves as practical men and women and do not view
their actions as being guided by theory. But every plan that a decision-maker produces
and every action that a decision-maker takes are, in fact, based on some theory in his or
her mind - a beliefthat certain events or actions will result in particular outcomes. "Ifwe
cut price, more people will buy more" is an action predicated on a theory. "Ifl give her a
performance-based financial incentive, she will work harder and more productively" is
another. "If I outsource this subsystem to a supplier that does the job more cost-
effectively than we can do it in-house, we'll be more competitive" is a third example.
These theories serve as mental maps guiding the everyday actions decision-makers take.
Too often, though, decision-makers are not even aware ofthese powerful mental maps-
beliefs about cause and effect - that they employ when making plans and taking actions.
Still, the maps are there, somewhere in the decision-makers' minds. Every decision-maker
is, therefore, in fact a theory-driven decision-maker to some extent.
6 Adapted from Clayton M. Christensen's foreword in the book "Leading Strategic Change: Breaking
Through the Brain Barrier" by Black, J. Stewart and Hal B. Gregersen (2002)
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Most theories that decision-makers use were formulated through experience - and
because members of decision-maker teams experience many things in common, they end
up employing similar theories, consciously or unconsciously, as they make decisions.
Edgar Schein, a noted Massachusetts Institute of Technology scholar of organizations,
has shown how these shared theories develop and come to comprise an organization's
culture (Schein, 1992). He notes that, in the earliest days of every organization's history,
there came a point when a group of people had to get something done. Confronted with
that task, they put their heads together and figured out how they would approach the
challenge. Iftheir efforts failed, then the next time that task arose, they would be inclined
to devise another way to get the job done. 1fthat method proved successful, then the next
time the task arose, the group would be inclined to use the same method to get the job
done. 1fthat method proved successful again when the same task arose, they would be
even more likely to address the task with the same approach when it arose again, and so
on.
Ultimately, if a group of people have successfully worked together in particular ways to
address recurrent tasks again and again, they come simply to assume that this is the way
they should do things. When this happens - when people begin adopting ways ofworking
by assumption, rather than by explicit debate and decision - that process becomes part of
the organization's culture. This is what an organization's culture is: ways of getting things
done that a group of people have used so successfully for so long that they simply come
to assume that doing things the same way is the only way to get the needed result. As a
consequence, the more successful the organization is, the stronger will this unconscious
consensus about cause and effect become. Another way to put it is that, because theories
are statements ofwhat causes what and why, an organization's culture is actually a
collection oftheories-in-use. These theories provide valuable guidance to decision-
makers as they make plans and take actions, because they build on what individuals in the
organization have learned from their collective experience. In fact, organizations with
strong cultures or theories-in-use become in many ways self-managing, because decision-
makers in disparate parts of the organization can be trusted to make decisions
autonomously that are consistent with what the organization has learned will work. [This
could also be true in an inter-organizational context, where governing stakeholders make
decisions that will affect the relationship between entities or organizations or between
organizations and the public and society in general.]
All ofthis is good, of course, except when things change, e.g., when market competition
increases drastically or resources become increasingly scarce. Then the widely shared
maps that decision-makers have unconsciously used to predict what events and actions
will produce the needed results may no longer hold true. The theories-in-use can then
change from being effective heuristics to becoming dysfunctional obstacles to needed
organizational change.
11
1.4.2 Theories of action: espoused theory vs. theory-in-use"
Argyris and Schon (1974) argue that people have mental maps with regard to how to act
in situations. This involves the way they plan, implement, and review their actions.
Furthermore, Argyris and Schon assert that it is these maps that guide people's actions
rather than the theories they explicitly espouse. What is more, fewer people are aware of
the maps or theories they do use (Argyris, 1980). One way of making sense of this is to
say that there is split between theory and action. Argyris and Schon suggest that two
theories of action are involved. The distinction made between the two contrasting
theories of action is between those theories that are implicit in what we do as
practitioners and managers, and those on which we call to speak of our actions to others.
The former can be described as theories-in-use. They govern actual behavior and tend to
be tacit structures (Argyris & Schon 1974: 30). The words we use to convey what we, do
or what we would like others to think we do, can then be called espoused theory.
When someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the
answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is
the theory of action to which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he
communicates to others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is
this theory-in-use. (Argyris and Schon 1974: 6-7)
Making this distinction allows us to ask questions about the extent to which behavior fits
espoused theory; and whether inner feelings become expressed in actions. In other words,
is there congruence between the two? Argyris (1980) makes the case that effectiveness
results from developing congruence between theory-in-use and espoused theory. A key
role of reflection, we could argue, is to reveal the theory-in-use and to explore the nature
of the "fit". Much of the business of supervision, where it is focused on the practitioner's
thoughts, feelings and actions, is concerned with the gulfbetween espoused theory and
theory-in-use, or in bringing the later to the surface. This gulf is no bad thing. If it gets
too wide then there is clearly a difficulty. But provided the two remain connected then the
gap creates a dynamic for reflection and for dialogue.
Where the consequences of the strategy used are what the person wanted, then the theory-
in-use is confirmed. This is because there is a match between intention and outcome.
There may be a mismatch between intention and outcome. In other words, the
consequences may be unintended. They may also not match, or work against, the
person's governing values. Argyris and Schon suggest two responses to this mismatch,
and these are can be seen in the notion of single- and double loop learning.
Learning to change underlying values and assumptions is the mantra in double loop
learning theory developed by Chris Argyris (1976). The focus of the theory is on solving
problems that are complex and ill structured, and which change as problem-solving
advances. An important aspect of the theory is the distinction between an individual's
espoused theory and their "theory-in-use" (what they actually do); bringing these two into
7 Adapted from M. K. Smith's (2001) internet-published article "Chris Argyris: theories of action, double-
loop learning and organizational learning", The encyclopedia of informal education,
www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm. A more detailed discussion of the concepts theories-in-use, espoused
theories, and single- and double loop learning can be found on this web site.
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congruence is a primary concern of double loop learning. Typically, interaction with
others is necessary to identify the conflict. Double loop learning involves applying each
ofthese steps to itself. In double loop learning, assumptions underlying current views are
questioned and hypotheses about behavior [or cause-and-effect relationships] tested
publicly. The end result of double loop learning should be increased effectiveness in
decision-making and better acceptance of failures and mistakes (Smith, 2001).
1.4.3 Theories-in-use in the NTO context
The set-up ofan NTO can be considered as a kind of "intervention" (Calder, Phillips and
Tybout, 1981) in which the governing stakeholders ofNTOs apply their "theories" or
insight into how organizations work to make decisions. We thus believe that the
principles that govern the establishment and operation ofNTOs are not arbitrary, but
reflect the theories-in-use of the stakeholders, whether these theories are explicit or not,
or whether or not they are consistent with scientific theoretical frameworks.
An important purpose ofthis study is to elicit how the stakeholders think and reason
when they make decisions about NTO matters, and ifthis reasoning is actually congruent
with what ends up as implemented principles in current practices. In fact, this research
process can be described in terms of Argyris and Schon's (1974) notion of discovery of
espoused and theory-in-use.
From his research Argyris has developed two important principles:
I. Effective problem solving about interpersonal [and inter-organizational] or technical
issues requires frequent public testing oftheories-in-use.
2. Double loop learning requires learning situations in which participants can examine
and experiment with their theories of action.
Double loop learning is a theory of personal change that is oriented towards professional
education, especially leadership in organizations. It has been applied in the context of
management development, but can be applied in an inter-organizational context as well.
Following the discussion earlier in this section, it is also likely that stakeholders with
influence on governing NTOs are guided by their theories-in-use. There is also reason to
believe that these theories-in-use have evolved through the years of collective decision-
making by the governing stakeholder-actors in the NTO context. For the sake ofthis
discussion, it is interesting to compare the often non-commercial context ofNTOs with a
competitive commercial environment. First, there is the issue of executive choice. A
manager in a commercial organization is assumed to have a certain degree of decision
autonomy granted him by the board of directors or shareholders. The decisions he makes
will be guided by his theories-in-use as described earlier. In the NTO context, however,
the situation may not be the same in terms of the governing stakeholders' decision-
making. The stakeholders may not only have to make governing decisions based on what
is rational from a business perspective, but also have to consider e.g., political concerns
budgeting regulations, public agency/bureau laws, and bureaucratic procedures. So the
decisions they make about NTO governance may not reflect their own theories-in-use
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solely based on their professional judgments, whereas their practices are the executive
outcome oftheir professional judgments under the restrictions put on them in the NTO
context. Furthermore, it should be noted that in the empirical part ofthis study we use
only a sample ofpotential decision makers and influencers ofNTO governance. Thus, the
existing practices in NTO governance of the countries we sample are probably not solely
decided on and influenced by the people we have included in our practitioners' sample,
but also their colleagues in the respective countries who are not included in our sample of
practitioners. In the following we ask the reader to keep this in mind when we refer to the
practitioners' theories-in-use.
Secondly, there is the issue of the virtual absence ofmarket-disciplining mechanisms in
the NTO context. The survival-of-the-fittest-condition of a competitive commercial
context will in many cases discipline managements' decision-making. Companies (and
their managers), which do not adapt their decision-making when their business
environment changes, will probably go bankrupt or otherwise subdue. In many cases, the
market forces will then act as a corrective mechanism enticing managers to change their
theories-in-use when they prove to no longer produce the needed results. The ones that do
not will probably succumb. However, in most cases NTOs are not subject to the same
kind of market competition as commercial companies are. Decision-makers involved
with the creation and governance ofNTOs will not be punished in the same way by the
market forces ifthey continuously make sub-optimal decisions in NTO-matters.
Theories-in-use successfully applied in the past, will in many cases be able to stand
unchallenged, and could perpetuate in the NTO contexts' inter-organizational culture.
NTOs' stakeholders may have only weak incentives to change existing practices. The
administrative systems, and the principles applied therein, are then probably able to
remain unchanged through time. We therefore believe that it is particularly important to
elicit and investigate both the espoused theories and the theories-in-use of the decision-
makers with real influence on how NTOs are set up and governed.
In this thesis we will then seek to present and implement a new method for discovering
both the espoused theories and the implicit theories in-use ofNTOs' stakeholders. These
underlying theories are the ones NTOs' governing stakeholders have learned to trust in
the course of creating and governing NTOs, as well as influences due to political
concerns, procedures, and tradition in the NTO context. We believe these theories must
be understood explicitly before new ones can be adopted in times of change.
In line with Argyris and Schon's research, we want to contribute through this study so
that the theories-in-use ofNTOs' governing stakeholders and their underlying
assumptions are discovered, made explicit and put under public scrutiny. We believe that
in this way NTO governing matters could be made subject to healthy public debate, and
eventually, that any inefficient or obsolete practices are abandoned.
1.5 Research approach
In order to assess how the governance decisions should be made, it could be fruitful to
investigate whether established theory can provide any recommendations as to how
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NTOs should be set up and governed. Through the application oftheory one can learn
more about whether, and to what extent, any of the suggested decision alternatives or
principles are expected to lead to the desired consequences or not. These decisions call
for a somewhat pragmatic application of established theory, rather than the more
common approach in academic research, which is applying and testing theories through
rigorous falsification procedures. We will explain the choice of research method in more
detail in Chapter 4.
1.5.1 Abductive versus inductive or deductive research approach"
To the American philosopher Charles Pierce abduction is a logic reasoning-form along
with deduction and induction. He argued that one would use abduction when one
experiences something peculiar about which one lacks knowledge of. One would then use
a hypothesis to explain that peculiarity which follows deductively from the hypothesis.
Pierce holds that it is only abduction that can generate new ideas. Induction can never
generate an idea, just confirm hypothesis. What separates induction and abduction
fundamentally, is whether those constructs one is working with, and which then becomes
the essence ofwhat one finds, is given immediately from the data itself.
Induction as a process goes from empirical observations to theory, while deduction goes
from theory to empirical data. Both inductive and deductive research approaches have
testing of a theory' s degree of truthfulness as the overarching goal (Troye, 1994).
However, both induction and deduction create a dilemma: Induction can not give
knowledge that is qualitatively new. It cannot give a type of knowledge that one has not
had in advance. Induction requires that one has to know the constructs one utilizes as
measures in the induction process. Deduction can, on the other hand, give us sure
knowledge, but also here the constructs are assumed known. An important question is
whether there exists a method for collection of data that can provide new knowledge,
which one can later refine, affirm, and develop through induction and deduction.
Abduction can be seen as a reaction on the limitations of induction and deduction, and as
an interactive process between the inductive and deductive approach (Hanson, 1959).
Through abduction, the thought process is enriched with new material in the form of
ideas that are included as new possible ways of understanding whatever is studied
(Kirkeby, 1994). These ideas can be stated as an assumption which later on can be tested
against reality. Thus, Pierce holds that the research process entails the three logic forms:
abduction, deduction and induction. Abduction is therefore perceived as the first step in a
universal scientific procedure comprised of three steps (Fann, 1970):
l. Abduction; the fist step where the hypothesis is discovered
2. Deduction; the next step wherefacts are deduced from the hypothesis
3. Induction; the final step where the empirical validity ofthese predictions are
falsified through testing of the theory.
Abduction and induction can be termed each other's adversary. Abduction is the first step
in scientific thought, while induction is the final step. Abduction seeks theory, while
8 Adopted from "Essay i Teori og forskningsevaluering" av Hans Jørgen Lund (2002).
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induction seeks facts (Fann, 1970). Hence, the abductive approach does not serve the
same purpose as induction and deduction when it comes to testing theories. The theories
could rather be perceived as tools to extract information from observations ofreality. The
focus is directed at discovering aspects, traits, and qualities in the empirical reality, which
is studied with theories as idea-generating tools, and then in tum suggests theories that
can explain such discoveries. Guiding constructs are in this regard more open to the
empirical reality than pre-defined constructs. Such guiding constructs have the ability to
add new dimensions. They can be utilized to guide the research process towards certain
aspects in reality, but they are not so precisely defined that they narrow the perspective so
much that nothing but pre-defined constructs can be discovered (Patton, 1990).
Theoretical models or constructs from one research area can in this manner work as
"heuristic tools" for theory development in another area (Troye, 1994).
In terms of our research approach we have used an abductive process. As explained
earlier in Section 1.1.2 we have observed a behavioral pattern of some NTOs that were
not expected according to our own reasoning ofhow they ought to behave. We have thus
"experienced something peculiar ofwhich one lacks knowledge about", and we use
theory to discover (although not test) new hypothesis or prepositions as we phrase it. For
the most part, the theoretical constructs (i.e., possibly apart from the market-orientation
construct) we use to explain NTOs' behavior are not pre-defined in theory, and serve to
add new dimensions that can be tested empirically in future research.
1.5.2 Research design
We have approached our first research problem stated earlier in four ways, as shown in
Figure 1.2: First, we analyzed the issues at hand by applying a number of alternative, and
partly overlapping, bodies oftheory to build a theoretical framework. The purpose was
to examine each of the theories' relevance and implications for the research question
stated earlier. We therefore asked ourselves: From given theoretical perspectives, how
should we expect NTOs' decision-making, in terms ofits Market focus, Long Term-
Perspective and Operational Freedom, to be affected by how budgets are determined, by
whom it isfunded, and by whom it is controlled or owned? Do alternative theories
suggest that the various aspects of organizational control and funding we have named
will have any bearing whatsoever on the way it operates and approaches its markets? If
so - how should we expect its behavior be affected by such factors?
Second, we complemented our theoretical basis by addressing this research question from
the perspective of experts on theory representing different branches oftheory (e.g.,
marketing, organizational sciences, and public economy). We then attempted to elicit and
describe their theoretical reasoning as to how principles for funding and controlling
NTOs may affect the behavior and performance of such organizations. For this purpose
we used a scenario technique, as explained in more detail in Chapter 4.
Third, we had respondents describe how things are done in practice, which is an
extension of the practitioners' and their respective colleagues' theories-in-use. We asked
our practitioner respondents to rate the degree ofuse each of the principles we have
named, and thus establish to what degree each principle is actually implemented in
current or existing practices.
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Fourth, we addressed the research question from the NTO stakeholders' perspective,
using the same scenario technique. We thus attempted to elicit and describe our
practitioner respondents' "theories" as to how the said principles may affect NTOs and
their performance. It is reason to believe that these "espoused theories" will to some
degree influence the decisions made when NTOs are set up, organized, and governed.
However, these espoused theories may not be congruent with the actual existing
practices, i.e., the practitioners' and their respective colleagues' theories-in-use.
Therefore, we addressed the second research problem ofthis thesis: We contrasted the
recommendations derived from the theoretical frameworks and from theory experts on
one side, with the espoused theories of the practitioners on the other side to answer our
second research question in gap analysis # l.Finally, we contrasted the espoused theories
of the practitioners on one side with and the corresponding theories-in-use of our
practitioner respondents and their colleagues on the other side to answer our third
research problem in gap analysis # 2.
1.5.3 The application of theory to address practical issues vs. testing
of theory
An important methodical note regarding the application oftheory is due here. In this
study we will not apply the theoretical frameworks by using some kind offalsification
procedure (ref. Calder, Tybout and Phillips, 1981) to assess their predictive power. We
will rather investigate whether academic theories can be used to derive recommendations
as to how NTOs should be set up to be well-functioning as marketing organizations.
Our research approach brings about some challenges: In order to discuss these practical
issues in a theoretical context, one will have to discuss some theoretical considerations
(e.g., agent and stakeholder risk-sharing, programmability oftasks, budget-maximizing
behavior, the common goods-problem, etc.) somewhat beyond the core, practical issues
ofthis thesis. This is because theory is in itselfricher than the specific practical issues we
are interested in, and "deserves" to be discussed somewhat comprehensively and not only
conveniently as it relates to practical matters. On the other hand, there are clearly some
practical and political considerations in the NTO context that are not fully discussed in
pre-existing theory. Furthermore, the issues at hand also call for solutions that are not
only theoretically sound, but also practically possible, implementable, and politically
acceptable on an international arena as well.
Some readers may feel that the thesis has some amount of redundancy and thus
seemingly unnecessary repetitions of certain aspects in the text. First of all, this may be
the case in e.g., the theory chapter: Several bodies oftheory, when applied to the NTO
context, reach the same or similar conclusions; then there are repetitions ofwhat is earlier
found in one area in the conclusions from another area, etc. However, this is a
consequence ofusing an abductive research approach (explained earlier in Section 1.5.1),
where the idea is not to test any given theory, rather than find theoretical evidence (e.g.,
based on several theories) to build a case - that there is in fact a likely connection
between the variables in question. Viewed from this perspective, repetition is not
redundancy or necessarily something bad; repetition can be good because it strengthens
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the theoretical evidence that the proposed model is correct, or has at least some degree of
scientifical merit.
It is also important to note that the purpose of the theory review is to arrive at well-
founded theory-based recommendations on the issues at hand, rather than to deductively
develop hypothesis that can be used to test the theory. Thus, this thesis will not contain
any explicit hypothesis in the theoretical/conceptual part of the study that will be tested
through a rigorous falsification procedure in the empirical part of the study. Therefore,
we will not resort to the traditional testing-of-theory type of research method.
1.6 Overview of the thesis
The thesis is divided into seven chapters plus seven appendices: Apart from this
introductory chapter, Chapter 2 deals with the general theoretical framework. Within this
framework we will discuss several areas oftheory, each ofwhich offering different
perspectives on issues related to our research problem. From the review of pre-existing
theory and empirical research we bui Id a theoretical foundation for the constructs and
variables we develop and use in the empirical part of the study. We will then investigate
how this synthesis oftheory can offer recommendations on which principles are best
suited for NTO governance.
Chapter 3 incorporates the conclusions made from the theoretical framework into the
particular NTO context. In this chapter we go more into detail about the NTO context.
We then discuss the theory recommendations related to this context, and how they can be
made practically and politically acceptable in terms ofNTO governance worldwide. The
discussion in Chapter 3 eventually arrives at our standpoint in terms ofwhich governing
principles should be chosen and applied - considering both the theoretical, practical, and
political implications. This chapter also describes the general research model for the
empirical part of the study, the variables studied, and the rationale for the choice ofthose.
Chapter 4 explains the choice of research method, and discusses some problems related to
the traditional testing-of-theory-approach in the NTO context. The data collection
procedure and data analysis method is also presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 contains the presentation and discussion of the empirical data. Chapter 5 has
two empirical parts: The first part is descriptive, and identifies the governance principles
in use for our sample NTOs today. In the second part, we describe and analyze how both
the existing and alternative principles for NTO governance were evaluated by a group of
theory experts and 14 the groups ofpractitioner respondents from our OECD sample. We
then arrive at some conclusions about the suitability of the various principles based on the
evaluations, the theoretical framework, and the special considerations of the NTO
context. This chapter also contains the two gap analyses we outlined in Figure 1.2.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the main findings and our conclusions based on these
findings. We also offer some practical recommendations for NTO set-up and governance.
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Finally, in Chapter 7 we list some management implications for practitioners and what
we think this thesis represents in terms of contributions to academic research. We also
discuss some limitations ofthis thesis and provide some suggestions for further research
in this area.
In the appendices (A I-A 7) we have included: a summary of the empirical results from
research on market orientation, an overview of control principles for NTOs derived from
application oftheory, the material used for data collection, as well as the data from the
factor and cluster analysis. We have also included the results of a separate study on the
effect of the funding source on NTOs' organizational focus and market orientation, as
well as some illustrative simulations of the effects ofperformance-based principles on
NTOs' budgets.
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2.0 Literature review and theoretical framework
The purpose ofthis section is to provide a theoretical framework for the discussion of the
applicability of various alternative governance principles for NTOs, as well as to provide
a basis for the empirical part ofthis study. Six bodies oftheory will be discussed in this
chapter:
1. Market orientation theory, which deals with how use of market information can
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations in competitive markets;
2. Agency theory, which deals with the control of contract relationships between a
principal and agent under uncertainty, and how control devices can be designed and
implemented;
3. Transaction cost theory, which deals with contract-related costs. Transaction cost
theory will be discussed only brieflyas it relates to agency theory in terms of the
costs incurred through stakeholders' monitoring structures for the NTOs;
4. Public choice theory, which deals with the design ofpolitical organizational control
for political institutions;
5. Public economy theory, which deals with issues like market failure and control of
monopolies, regulation of government-owned organizations, the effects of private vs.
public ownership of organizations, the common goods problem etc.;
6. Corporate governance/finance theory, which deals with management incentives and
corporate control, which can be usable in a non-commercial NTO context as well.
In practice, the set-up of an governance system for NTOs deals with the process of
identifying and implementing a system that will give the organizations freedom and
incentives to work on the tasks they are supposed to, which is a matter of effectiveness.
An equally important concern is to assure that scarce resources are not wasted, which is a
matter of efficiency. The six bodies oftheory we have listed appear to be particularly
applicable for the NTO context. Figure 2.1 on the following page gives an overview of
the theory discussed and applied in the NTO context and how it relates to the research
problem and the theoretical variables ofthis thesis.
2.1 Market orientation theory
Several studies provide evidence of the positive effect ofmarket orientation on the
market performance of organizations. A partial summary of existing research on the
effects ofmarket orientation is included in Appendix 1. Market orientation theory, as a
theory of the firm and a part of marketing management theory, has a more
microeconomic perspective compared to some of the organizational theory we will
discuss later. There are two main contributions from the 1990s to the definition of the
market orientation concept: Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Narver and Slater (1990) 9.
9 A number of other researchers have also contributed to the market orientation literature, but we will in
this thesis limit our discussion to the main contributions of Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Narver and
Slater (1990).
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Figure 2.1
An overview of the application of different areas of theory
on the main research problem
Market orientation
theory
• Provide a (normative)
definition ofM. O.
• Identify behaviors and
organizational attitudes
that are market-oriented
• Review existing
empiric research on
positive effects of M.O.
• Analyze NTO context
in a market orientation
theory perspective
Industry vs.
government
funding
Industry vs.
Agency theory
• Identify the principal-
agency problem
• Identify control devices
available for principals
• Discuss pros and cons
ofbehavioral- vs.
outcome-based control
• Analyze NTO context
in an agency theory
perspective
Public choice theory
• Identify the control
problem of
bureaucraci es
• Discuss potential
inefficiency of bureaus
and budget maximizing
behavior.
• Analyze NTO context
in a public choice
theory perspective
Market Focus
Long-Term
Perspective
Operational
Freedom
(Transaction-cost
theory)
• Identify control and
monitoring cost in
contract relationships
between principal and
agent
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Public economy
theory
• Review research on the
effects of performance-
contracts in the public
sector
• Discuss pros and cons
of private vs.
government operation
• Discuss alternative
NTO regulation
schemes
• Discuss the common
goods-problem in terms
ofNTO funding.
• Analyze NTO context
in a public economy
theory perspective
Corporate
governance theory
• Discuss alignment of
goals and incentives for
non-commercial arg. .
with many stakeholders
• Discuss incentives for
long-term vs. short-
term planning and for
operational freedom
• Discuss potential pros
and cons of individual
vs. team-based
incentives, performance
vs. promotion and
absolute vs. relative
incentives/compensat.
• Analyze NTO context
in a corporate
governance theory
perspective
Table 2.1
Market orientation theory's relevance for independent and dependent variables
commercial organizations Defines
geting NTOs have few incentives for a Focus activities and attitudes it entails.
prin- Market Focus. A performance- Provides theoretical and
ciple based type of budgeting principle empirical evidence that M.O. is
can provide such an incentive beneficial for organizational
is not on Fig.2.3 Long- For a business cannot 2.1.2 &
ing market performance, the NTO Term avoid a L.T.P. in the presence 2.1.3
source could have undesirable incentives Pers- of competition. An NTO needs
for a funding source/sponsor pective extra incentives for L.T.P.,
focus rather than market focus since it can survive without it, if
not made somehow dependent
on market ance
Owner IfNTO is not dependent on 2.1.3 needs some degree ofO.F. 2.1.3
-ship/ market performance, the NTO (end) ional in order to undertake (end)
org. could have undesirable incentives Free- professionally sound market-
control for a owner focus rather than dom focused activities. Without O.F.
market focus the NTO can be forced into e.g.,
a product orientation rather than
M.O.
2.1.1 Market orientation as conceptualized by Kohli and Jaworski
Kohli and Jaworski developed the following definition of market orientation:
"Market orientation is the organizationwide generation of market intelligence
pertaining to current andfuture customer needs, dissemination of the intelligence
across departments, and organizationwide responsiveness to it" (Kohli and
Jaworski, 1990).
The first dimension of market orientation is information generation, which can be
obtained through systematic gathering ofunbiased and rich information from multiple
sources. Market information is the essence of the organization's marketing activities.
"Without such information the organization will not be able to adapt its strategy and
behavior to the various stakeholders in the market. Consequently, information should
capture the current situation and the future anticipated situation of (current and potential)
customers" (Sandvik, 1998)10.
The second dimension ofmarket orientation is intelligence dissemination. Kohli and
Jaworski argue. that
" ... it is clear that responding efficiently to a market need requires the
participation ofvirtually all departments in the organization - R&D to design
lOWe also subscribe to Sandvik' s (1998) construct of Market Orientation Domainwidth (e.g., information
generation regarding new markets and new competitors).
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and develop a new product, manufacturing to gear up and produce it, purchasing
to develop vendors for new parts and materials, finance to fund activities, and so
on". Kohli and Jaworski (1990)
This dimension deals with the spreading of information from the information-generating
entities in the organization to other parts of the organization that can utilize this
information to adapt the organization's products and services to the customers' needs and
preferences. We will discuss in more detail how intelligence dissemination can be
understood in the NTO context in Section 2.1.3 later.
We then go on to the third dimension ofmarket orientation, namely responsiveness:
" ... which is the action and behavior taken in response to generated and disseminated
market intelligence." (Sandvik, 1998) More specifically, this entails the use of market
information when:
..selecting target markets, designing and offering products/services that cater to
the customer's current and anticipated needs, and producing, distributing, and
promoting the products in a way that elicits favorable end-customer response.
Virtually all departments - not just marketing - participate in responding to
market trends in a market-oriented company. (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990)
According to Kohli and Jaworski "...virtually all of the organization's activities,
including planning and strategy development, should take market information into
account in advance." Thus, a market-oriented organization would base its strategic plans
and actions on the collection and use of market information.
2.1.2 Market orientation as conceptualized by Narver and Slater
Narver and Slater (1990) provide the second main contribution to the market orientation
concept. They focus on the ability to create superior business performance through SCA
[Sustainable Competitive Advantage]:
"...a market oriented business continuously examines these alternative sources of
seA to see how it can be most efficient in creating sustainable competitive
superior value for its present and future target buyers" (Narver and Slater, 1990)
Narver and Slater's (1990) definition ofmarket orientation entails five dimensions. (We
will discuss only three ofthem as they pertain to NTOs in the next sectionll) The first
relevant dimension is customer orientation, which is argued to be "sufficient
understanding of the firms target buyers to create superior value for them continuously -
not only today but also as it will change over time". In order to understand the customer,
the organization needs a constant acquisition of information about the buyer. This notion
is really the core of the marketing concept, according to Houston (1986) (Sandvik, 1998).
II The two other dimensions not discussed here are !nterfunctional coordination and Profitability, which
are both somewhat less relevant in this particular discussion of the NTO context.
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According to Narver and Slater (1990) " ... competitor orientation is the seller's
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both the current and the potential key
competitors". Furthermore, they argue that " ... the analysis ofprincipal and potential
competitors must include the entire set oftechnologies capable of satisfying the expected
needs of the sellers' target buyers". This analysis should include both close and more
remote competitors. However, Narver and Slater clearly emphasize that it is necessary for
a market-oriented organization to balance the market- and competitor orientation, and
avoid selective attention on either dimension. This is also consistent with Day and
Wensley (1988) (Sandvik, 1998).
Finally, Narver and Slater include long-term perspective as related to market orientation.
To overcome the problem that market activities can be costly, a market-oriented firm
should consider the impact ofmarket activities on profitability, or market performance-
in the NTO context, in the long run as well as in the short run.
"For long-term survival in the presence of competition, a business cannot avoid a
long-run perspective. To prevent its competitors from overcoming whatever
buyer-value superiority it has created, a business must constantly discover and
implement additional value to its customers, which necessitates a range of
appropriate tactics and investments." (Narver and Slater, 1990)
According to Sandvik (1998), Narver and Slater have in recent studies treated Long-Term
Perspective as a consequence of market orientation, rather than a part of the market
orientation concept. One can argue that the opposite is the case as well, that a long-term
perspective is a prerequisite for market orientation. We will not get into a further
discussion on that issue here. In this thesis we choose to treat Long-Term Perspective as a
separate factor 12.
2.1.3 Market orientation in the NTc context
The term "superior customer value" in Naver and Slater's (1990) first dimension of
market orientation is interconnected with the second dimension, competitor orientation.
In order to create "superior value", this "value" must be superior relative to some "other
value". Assuming a situation other than perpetual monopoly - and that the customers will
choose the products and services [or resources; - man-made 13 or natural] best suited to
their needs and preferences, this "other value" is the value of the products and services
offered by competitors in the target market. This competition may consist of other NTOs
promoting products/services of other countries, foreign private tourism businesses, or any
12 Long-Term Perspective is treated as a separate variable because of the following: In our research model
the factors theorized to influence the construct are exogenously given by stakeholders external to the
organization (e.g., budgeting principle, funding source etc), and are not solelyamatter ofNTO
management discretion, which is a more common situation in a commercial context.
13 This also includes any current or potential travel and tourism infrastructure such as transport vehicles and
facilities; accommodation facilities; food and beverage service, public services; and other man-developed
natural based resources e g., ski lifts, scenic roads, beach facilities, camping grounds, etc.
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substitute tourism products and services available in the international tourism market.
NTOs should then contribute to create superior customer value relative to competing
destinations. For instance, selecting target markets, developing its country's destination
image, providing advice to the industry with regards to capacity increases/decreases and
on product and services development, etc. requires input of market information and
competitors' offerings and actions. Likewise, use ofmarket and competitor information is
crucial when coordinating destination promotions, e.g., securing message consistency
across target markets, choosing differentiating strategy, and selecting media channel and
media magnitude appropriate for each target market.
A contextual challenge with respect to the market orientation literature in general is that it
assumes that the unit of analysis, the organization or firm, both produces, owns, and
markets its own products or services. Often the organization is assumed to possess and
control all functional departments e.g., as is common in a manufacturing company.
Usually, NTOs neither produce nor own the products and services they market. Of
course, NTOs rarely have manufacturing departments, physical R& O laboratories, or
purchasing departments etc., typical in a manufacturing companyeither. The NTOs have
in fact only direct control of the Promotion-parameter out of the four P's (Promotion,
Product, Price and Place/distribution) commonly referred to in marketing strategy
literature. However, the NTO can influence the application of the other parameters
through advice to the industry, which controls these other parameters. Therefore, for
NTOs, which are not themselves in direct control of the tourism industry's products and
services, intelligence dissemination then deals with passing the gathered information on
to the producing tourism industry as a part of the organization's advisory role. We will
discuss the NTOs' activities and roles in more detail later in Section 3.1.
NTOs are, first of all, international tourism marketing organizations. Furthermore, they
are usually closer to the international markets than most oftheir national tourism industry
constituents. Ideally, NTOs should then continuously gather international market
information and disseminate it both internally in the organization itself and externally to
the domestic tourism industry. It is important that the information about the target
market's needs and preferences is passed along to the tourism industry, because the
industry is the entity that controls the tourism products and services. In that way the
industry can use this information as an input to new product and service development or
improvement. For instance the NTO could do so by advising the industry so that any
expansions and investments in new travel and tourism capacity (supply) will be matched
with the actual needs and preferences of the market (demand). This is also the case in the
process of modifying or repositioning of existing travel and tourism products and
services. Systematic market research and other kinds of information generation are
needed to uncover these needs and preferences. Communication and information
dissemination to its tourism industry constituents is necessary to make the market
information available to the industry, so the industry can adapt its tourism products and
services to the customers' current and future needs and preferences.
A problem with the work on market orientation by Kholi and Jaworski and Narver and
Slater is that they for the most part provide normative definitions of market orientation
only. Moreover, market orientation is viewed in an intra-organizational perspective,
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rather than in an inter-organizational perspective, which is the focus in this thesis. Little
is said about what processes or incentives are involved to foster market orientation, or
how to intervene or otherwise facilitate so that organizations become (more) market
oriented. For our purposes, application ofmarket orientation theory deals with where
NTO has its main focus, whether it is on the market - or its sponsors or owners. Thus, we
are not particularly concerned with which market-oriented activities the NTO should
undertake; we willleave that to the NTOs' management. The focus will be on finding
ways to provide the NTO with organizational incentives for pursuing a market focus, first
of all.
Another problem is that most of the previous research of the effects of market orientation
has been conducted on commercial organizations. Although important knowledge can be
gained from the study offor-profit organizations, the results ofthese studies may not be
fully generalizable to NTOs. Whereas most commercial organizations have one market
arena, NTOs have several, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. This is one reason why previous
findings with respect to market orientation may not be completely valid for NTOs. Unlike
commercial organizations, non-profit NTOs are not dependent on the direct income from
the tourism market. Therefore, one cannot take for granted that the market will be the
most important focal point for an NTO, since other arenas may be more important for its
organizational survival and growth.
Figure 2.2
A comparison of NTOs and commercial organizations
Commercial Context
Marketing effort/
"Lobbying" )
NTO Context
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Market orientation and proper focusing ofNTOs should be a long-term, continuous
process. True NTO market focus requires investment of considerable resources, planning,
and industry coordination efforts over time. When an organization like an NTO is not
made dependent on the market for its income, it has few real incentives to spend or invest
the majority of its resources on activities directed at the market. It stands to reason that
the more a rational organization is dependent on a given source of revenue, the more
attention will be devoted to the source. Its organizational focus and its orientation toward
its market should thus reflect the degree to which the NTO is dependent on e.g., the
government for its economic resources.
The double-pointed arrows in the Figure 2.3 illustrate that the relationships between
source of income/funds on one hand, and organizational focus and market orientation on
the other, may be two-way. An NTO that deliberately pays attention to a given
stakeholder may also as a consequence receive more resources from the same
stakeholder. On the other hand, a given stakeholder that provides an important part of the
NTO's resources will also require more attention and influence on the organization.
Figure 2.3
The relationship between organizational focus and market orientation and the
importance of different sources of revenue
Organizational focus
Market Government Industry
~".,
Relative importance as
source of income/funds
of the
• Market (-dependent)
• Government
• Industry
~,.,
Information Information M.O. Domain- Information
Generation Dissemination width Responsiveness
Collect information about Distribute/exchange Make efforts to identify Change tactics and
the market, competitors, information within the and respond to new strategies as markets,
and the business NTO and the industry markets, new segments, competitors, and business
environment and new competitors environment change
Dimensions of Market Orientation
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Byfocus we refer to market-, industry'" -, or government-orientation as the dominating
strategic focus of the NTO in question. In Figure 2.3 organizational focus and market
orientation are treated as separate factors. This illustrates that although organizational
focus and market orientation probably are related; a focus on e.g., government or industry
does not preclude a strong market orientation. It is not impossible that e.g., government
or industry requires a strong market orientation of the NTO as a condition for financial
support. We use the term market focus in this study to encompass an organizational focus
on the market, including market-oriented activities. So by the term market focus we mean
that the organization's main focus is first and foremost on the market as opposed to the
financial sponsors or owners. Such a focus also includes the organizational activities and
attitudes described in the market orientation literature.
However, ifthe NTO has few or weak incentives to focus on the market through a
performance-based principle that rewards market results, it could instead have stronger
incentives to focus on gaining support from its owners. Aside from financial support as
discussed earlier, such support can be of more political character to retain legitimacy or
goodwill, or support for NTO management or employees' career aspirations or personal
agendas. So without a market incentive, the NTO could be more susceptive to spend
resources to cater to its owners rather than investing resources on market-oriented
activities.
The market orientation theory has been centered on commercial organizations. The
discussion in this body oftheory also assumes that the management of the organization
has the discretion to set its own goals and decide on its strategies and activities. It may
very well be so that the owners would not be market-oriented themselves, and try to
influence the organization to perform activities that run counter to a market-oriented
strategy. For instance, the owners may have a strong product focus rather than market
focus, and would try to force or influence the NTO to promote certain products or special
interest. In order for an organization like an NTO to be able to be market-oriented, the
organization will need at least some degree of autonomy and discretion without undue
interference from owners. In other words, an organization like an NTO needs some
amount of Operational Freedom in order to be capable of deciding on strategies and
activities that are in line with a true market focus.
2.1.4 Conclusions from market orientation theory
Market orientation research generally suggests that organizations should assign more
resources to market-oriented activities and adapt the organization to facilitate market
orientation. This williead to better performance for the organization, and thus should be
implemented (Sandvik, 1998). Narver and Slater (1990) also emphasize the importance
of a long-term focus as related to market orientation, and that long-term focus will be
beneficial for the organization's performance. The majority of empirical studies
conducted on the effects of market orientation support the notion that market orientation
has positive effect on organizational performance.
14 By the term industry we refer to non-government business stakeholders with interests in the tourism
sector (i.e., tourism, as a demand-based phenomenon, cuts across many traditional industries).
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Unlike commercial companies NTOs have no direct financial incentive to invest
resources in market oriented activities, because it is not directly dependent on market
performance for survival and prosperity of the organization. From a governance
perspective, it may be necessary to introduce an incentive for market focus by making the
organization somewhat dependent on the country's market performance. This may
encourage NTOs to reduce their focus on the sponsors and/or owners of the organization,
and turn more of its attention towards the market. It may also encourage NTOs to try to
influence the industry to become more market-oriented, and induce NTOs to provide the
industry with market-oriented advice on e.g., the application of the four P's of marketing.
NTOs would then benefit from a market-oriented industry as well, because NTOs' budget
would depend on the industry's market performance. All ofthese aspects call for the use
of outcome-based budgeting principles i.e., budget resource-rewards based on market
performance. As shown in Table 2.2, a behavior-based budgeting principle e.g., budgets
based on plans and activities, may not alone provide the desired incentives for market
focus ofNTOs.
Table 2.2
Conclusions from application of market orientation theory
company
Market orientation NTOsmust YES Outcome-based
entails information be motivated budgeting normally dependent on
Market generation. to use the market, incentives are
orient- dissemination, and market to collect information
ation information about
Market orientation NTOsmust NO YES Outcome-based Market competitors are
also entails customer be motivated budgeting not NTOs' real
orientation to achieve to focus on "competitors",
SeA, and appropriate the market competitors may be other
competitor orientation and on bureaus/agencies or
market marketing organizations
for funds
Long-term operation is NTOs must YES YES Both outcome- It is a short-term focus
considered vital for a be motivated and behavior- under most current
market-oriented focus to adopt a based budgeting budgeting regimes;
long-term & joint funding budgets are determined
perspective (ref. Section from one year to another.
2.5.5 later) Lobbying and
negotiation incentives for
NTO.
Market orientation theory is important in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness issue
of organizations involved in marketing activities. Market orientation theory provides
substantial theoretical grounds and empirical evidence that market oriented organizations
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are, in general, higher-than-average performers in terms of business profitability or other
measures of market success. Market orientation theory then is useful to identify what
market oriented behavior is, and what organizational activities it entails, which can be
applied when pointing out the activities an NTO should enact in order to perform well in
a competitive market. So this has value as normative theory. However, market orientation
theory does not really explain what makes organizations become market orientated, e.g.,
what factors foster market orientation. This question is one of the key aspects in this
study. Furthermore, market orientation theory typically assumes a commercial context,
where market control will provide an "automatic" incentive for market focus (at least
from a Darwinist or evolutionary point of view). In other words, organizations that are
not market-oriented are probably assumed to perish sooner or later faced with market
competition. However, most NTOs are not commercial organizations, and do not face the
threat of bankruptcy present in a commercial-competitive context. Thus, NTOs may very
well survive and grow without being market-oriented at all. Considering this, we draw
the conclusion that existing market orientation theory is quite useful, but far from
sufficient, to address all the important issues ofthis study.
2.2 Agency theory
We will now leave the somewhat microeconomic perspective ofmarket orientation
theory, and attempt to add some inter-organizational perspectives derived from parts of
organizational theory. The parts of organizational theory we will discuss, namely agency
theory and public choice theory, deal with the hierarchical control of organizations. Two
sub-parts of agency theory will be discussed here as it relates to the NTO context. Those
are common agency and "traditional" agency theory.
2.2.1 Common agency
A special form of agency is analyzed in this thesis, namely common agency, which is the
case where one agent relates to several principals, or what Meyer (1979) denoted as a
situation when public officials [or organizations] serve dual masters. NTOs responsible
for international marketing on behalf of a country's tourism industry can be classified as
an agent subject to multiple stakeholders'". Stakeholders in the NTO context range from
national to local level government, public and private national and local trade
organizations, and public and private businesses within or with interests in the tourism
industry. This is a different situation than what is often assumed in traditional agency
theory (e.g., Conlon and Parks, 1988; Anderson, 1985; Eccles, 1985; Eisenhart, 1985,
1988, 1989; Kosnik, 1987), where the typical unit of analysis is the hierarchical
relationship between one principal and one agent. The principal-agent relationship is also
usually implicitly assumed formalized in some sort of explicit contract between the
parties.
15 In this context we have chosen to use the tenn stakeholders instead of principals, since not all parties
with interest in the organization actually compensate the organization for its services, and thus are not
principals in the exact meaning of the tenn as used in traditional principal-agent theory. (See Figure 3.3
and 3.5 for an overview ofNTO stakeholders).
31
The inter-organizational relationship in the NTO context between several stakeholders,
who may consist ofboth sponsors and non-paying beneficiaries/clients/constituents, and
a national generic marketing organization, can be considered a common agency. NTOs
can be organized as a public agency/bureau, a private industry-led organization, or some
combination or hybrid of the two. Not all relationships between the organization and its
various stakeholders are governed by formalized contracts, not all stakeholders
compensate the organization directly for the benefit of its services, and not all of the
stakeholders are readily identifiable. Neither do all important stakeholders necessarily
possess the formal and legitimate control of the agent, such as in a hierarchical relation
typically assumed in traditional agency theory.
Table 2.3
Agency (and transaction cost) theory's relevance for independent
and dependent variables
I) Information asymmetry could
geting result in moral hazard and adverse Orien- organizational resources. Due to
prin- selection. Goal conflict between taion unobservable behavior, an NTO
ciple agent and stakeholders can occur, could be able to avoid being
and NTO can "get away with" market-oriented, and use too
less than optimal effort due to many resources on shirking and
unobservable behavior. non-marketing activities, unless
2) Stakeholders can either 2.2.3.1 the NTO is controlled by its
monitor the NTO through stakeholders. Probably the best
behavior-based budgeting thing to do is to introduce
(Monitoring structure # I) or seek 2.2.4 performance-based budgeting
alignment of goals via transfer principles to motivate the NTO
risk through performance-based for increased M. O. In this way
budgeting. Risk-transfer also has 2.2.5 marked results are tied to
some costs and benefits. rewards and punishments for
3) Both Stakeholders and NTO 2.2.3.4 the NTO, which gives
incur transaction costs as control incentives to focus on the
and monitor cost and market.
maladaptation cost when
behavior-based control is used.
Fund- The stakeholders can influence 2.2.3.3 Long- The long-term nature of 2.2.5.5
ing the NTO and "purchase" Term contract relationships between
source information about NTOs' Pers- NTO and its governing
behavior through a role as pective stakeholders should reduce the
financier. need for outcome-based
(Monitoring structure # 3) contract (i.e., performance-
based
Owner I) The common agency-situation 2.2.1 Operat- monitoring 2.2.3
-ship/ with one agent (NTO) and (ref. also ional structures such as behav ior-
arg. multiple stakeholders could create 3.1 and Free- based budgeting (Monitoring
control problems in terms of vague Fig 3.2 in dom structure # I), ownership
authority and goal establishment. Ch.3) control (Monitoring structure #
2) The stakeholders can monitor 2), and funding influence
the behavior of the NTO through 2.2.3.2 (Monitoring structure # 3) limit
ownership/control (Monitoring NTOs' Operational Freedom.
structure # 2). (This is not necessarily a bad
thing, as long as intervention by
stakeholders is professional and
market-oriented in nature.
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For instance, the tourism industry or taxpayers may not have such formal control when
the NTO is government owned and funded (se also Figure 3.3 and 3.5 for an overview of
stakeholders). Thus, some ofthese stakeholder-agent relationships can be quite blurred.
The NTO may not be fully aware ofwho its real "masters" are. This makes comparisons
with the typical common agency situation somewhat difficult.
Furthermore, the agent (NTO) may not know exactly who the ruling coalition of
stakeholders is, its preferences or resources, or the "true" price of the NTO's operation
and existence (cf. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, there might even be contlict
of interests among stakeholders. This can be make both the NTOs and their stakeholders
question whom NTOs should relate to in terms of authority, what this "authority" really
wants, and how many resources NTOs really need. All ofthese particular NTO-related
circumstances make the situation far more complicated than in single dyad contract
relationships between one agent and one principal as often assumed in traditional agency
theory. These special agent-stakeholder relationships in the NTO context will be
discussed in more detail later in this chapter and again in Chapter 3.
2.2.2 "Traditional" agency theory
Despite these challenges, agency theory raises a few issues useful for our discussion and
has some traits and that can be applicable, at least to some extent, in the NTO context.
Agency theory (ref. Baiman 1982, 1990; Eisenhart 1985, 1988, 1989; Levinthal, 1988;
Moore 1981; Scapens 1985, for reviews) is about organizational control under
uncertainty in general, and deals with the efficient organization of information and risk
bearing cost in contract relationship between the agent and principal. Common problems
addressed in agency theory, are the existence of asymmetric information, adverse
selection and opportunism. Asymmetric information is the situation where some actors in
the transaction process have access to more information than others. Opportunism may be
defined as self-interested behavior unconstrained by morality (Milgrom and Roberts,
1992). Agency theory directs attention to the possibility that some agents could behave
opportunistically and utilize asymmetric information, but not that every agent will do so.
Even though not all relationships between the stakeholders and the NTO are formally
controlled by explicit contracts, (at least some of) the stakeholders have licensed
activities to the organization in return for funds allocated/contributed to finance these
activities and the operation of the organization. These contributions may exist in the form
of direct contributions, or indirectly through public funds from taxpayers 'money. The
agreement, that the organization will perform marketing activities in return for budget
allocations/contributions from the stakeholders, can then be considered an agency
relationship, regardless ofwhether this agreement is formally stated or implicitly made.
Formally, an agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one or more
persons/entities (the principal(s), engage another person/entity (the agent), to perform
some service on their behalf, which involves leaving some decision-making authority to
the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The discussion ofthese agency relationships
between the principals (stakeholders) and agent (NTO) may be applicable both in terms
of profit organizations, government/public agencies, and non-profit organizations, since
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important decision agents do not necessarily bear a close share of the outcome oftheir
decisions (Farma and Jensen, 1983).
Agency theory can be quite useful to understand how the relationships between the NTO
and its stakeholders best can be governed. The "contract"-relationships within the NTO-
context are all subject to the same problems as outlined in traditional agency theory: 1)
the potential goal conflict between stakeholders and agent; 2) the difficulty and expenses
on the part ofstakeholders associated with monitoring the activities of the agent; and 3)
the problems with risk-sharing and differences in attitudes toward risk between principal
and agent (e.g., in terms of compensation, regulation, leadership, impression
management, etc.) as outlined by Eisenhart (1989).
As we will discuss later in Section 2.2.3.4, transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985, et
al) can be useful to identify some of the various organizational costs related to the
different alternative administrative systems that are set up to govern these contract
relationships.
2.2.2.1 Goal conflict
Most organizations exist for a purpose - and inherently have some goals for their
existence. In general terms these goals are mainly of two kinds: external and internal.
External goals reflect the needs and interest of the organization's external constituency
and are tied to the achievements of the organization that result from interaction with its
business environment. Such goals may be in terms ofprofitability, welfare of the various
stakeholders, or the promotion or advocacy of some cause or interest of groups of people
or organizations. External goals are often explicitly expressed in mission statements of
organizations.
The internal goals on their side may be quite different from the external goals, and
sometimes even be in conflict with the latter. Internal goals may e.g., be to ascertain the
survival, prosperity and growth of the organization; to ascertainjob security (and career
paths) of employees; to secure the welfare of the employees (including management) or
even to take advantage of resource slack for consumption in leisurely activities
(shirking). In agency theory, these goals are subsumed in the term self-interest of the
agent.
A problem arises when these internal and external goals are not aligned, i.e., that there is
an implicit incentive for the agent to maximize self-interest on the expense of the
stakeholders' interests. Given the problem ofself-interest of the agent and differences in
goals, the stakeholders are faced with a monitoring problem ifthe stakeholders cannot
determine ifthe agent has behaved according to the interest of the stakeholders. In other
words, the information problem is that the stakeholders do not know the activities,
efforts, output or slack in the agent organization.
In the context of the NTO, the NTO may not have overlapping interests with the NTA
and other stakeholders. For instance, it may be so that the NTO would want a high budget
or payment for a low effort. In a situation where the principals could easily evaluate the
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NTOs effort, this would only be a minor problem. The principal-agent-problem arises
from at least three information difficulties:
I. Effort: The stakeholders, e.g., NTAs and/or industry/public, cannot directly observe
and monitor NTOs' actions, or it would be very costly to obtain such information.
2. Outcomes: It is difficult, or at least very costly, for the stakeholders to measure the
quality and the quantity ofNTOs' production of marketing services.
3. The relationship between effort and outcomes: The outcomes, e.g., level of incoming
tourism traffic, do not solely depend on NTOs' effort, but also on other aspects more
or less beyond NTOs' control, such as international market conditions, political
situation, currency exchange rates and so on. It can be hard to determine to what
degree the outcome is a result ofNTOs' behavior or other external aspects.
These information problems will be discussed in the following sections.
2.2.2.2 Unobservable behavior
Organizations responsible for international generic tourism marketing face a complex
marketing task. First of all, the NTOs do not have the direct control of the products
themselves nor the sales closure process related to the exchange ofthese products, which
increases the uncertainty ofNTOs' market-performance outcome. Even ifthe
organization "does everything right", the industry could deliver low quality products or
put in insufficient effort, which then could influence NTOs' market-performance
negatively. Furthermore, the organization will have to identify, gain consensus on
internally, and get endorsement from various stakeholders with regards to a few common,
communicable tourism product characteristics. This can be difficult, considering the
many heterogeneous tourism products and services made available from a number of
domestic suppliers, who all would like to have their particular products and services
promoted. We have also mentioned before the problems associated with conflicting goals
among the various types of stakeholders. Furthermore, the market communication of the
various product characteristics will have to be made somehow differentiable in relation to
competitors' products. Multi-market international tourism marketing is a demanding task
because of the distance both geographically and culturally between the businesses in the
industry, the NTO, and the various customer markets. It may not be readily identifiable
what the customers' preferred bundles of product characteristics are - preferences that
may be different from one key market to the other. Therefore, it can be very difficult for
the various stakeholders to determine exactly what organizational actions would be most
effective to generate increase in the demand for the various types of tourism
products/services in question. This should in fact be the very reason why one has an NTO
in the first place, since the agent (NTO) is supposed to have more special competence
than the stakeholders related to this particular marketing task. The marketing task can be
so complex that it is not easily assessable for the stakeholders what would be the best
courses of action. The task-assessment problem can make it hard for the stakeholders to
detect whether the agent puts forth the assumed/agreed upon effort or not. This control
problem is referred to as moral hazard in agency theory (Eisenhart 1989, p.61).
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Considering this task complexity, it can also be difficult for the stakeholders to judge the
competence of the NTO and its human resources, and thus whether any alternative
marketing channels would be more effective or efficient. Such alternative channels can
for instance be local or international tourism marketing organizations or private
marketing companies. In the NTO context, the stakeholders have licensed marketing and
other operational activities to the agent organization, which is itself in a superior position
to evaluate the activities delegated to it. This situation can cause adverse selection of the
marketing agent (ref. Eisenhart 1989, p.61) in favor of alternative marketing activities or
organizations, or the industry stakeholders' own marketing efforts. In a situation, where
the behavior of the agent is uncertain or unobservable, agency theory predicts that an
outcome-based contract could be attractive to the stakeholders. It will make the agent
more likely to behave in the interest of the stakeholders i.e., limit its expenses and
increase effort, since rewards for all parties depend on the same outcomes.
Ouchi (1979) asserted that the principal monitors behavior if outcome is uncertain, or
monitors output if behavior is uncertain. In an agency relationship under uncertainty and
asymmetric information, it could be rational both for the stakeholders to monitor the
agent, and for the agent to bond its expenditures, in order to minimize the residual
welfare loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The NTOs' stakeholders are faced with the
problem ofunobservable behavior on the part of the NTO due to possible moral hazard
and adverse selection, and have in general two different options:
1) Investment in information systems that reveals agent behavior (behavior monitoring),
such as behavior-based budgeting systems, boards of directors, reporting procedures,
and additional layers of management.
2) Transfer ofrisk (outcome monitoring) through outcome-based contracts (i.e.,
performance-based budgets).
2.2.3 Stakeholder control through investment in information systems
(Behavioral monitoring structures)
Information systems in the NTO context can be categorized in three types of monitoring
structures available for the stakeholder coalition. These are monitoring through behavior-
based budgeting-principles, through direct organizational control, or through indirect
influence by way ofbeing thefunding source.
2.2.3.1 Monitoring structure #1: Behavior-based budgeting principles
The stakeholders can monitor the actions of the organization by investing in several
forms of information systems. For instance, this is possible by using behavior-based NTO
budgeting principles. One way is to use a procedure where the stakeholders participate"
in the decision process for the organization's marketing plans and activities for a given
time period, and then determine the organization's budget on the basis of the expected
16 By the term "participate" is meant that the stakeholders will have an active role in determining the
organization's plans and activities, or goals and operational objectives. The more control/discretion in this
procedure the stakeholders possess, the more the budgeting principle will take on the characteristics of a
behavior-based contract.
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cost related to the activities to be performed. Another way can be to base the budgets of
the organization on contract-specific projects, where sponsoring stakeholders specify the
content and activities to be performed in the project. A third way can be for the
stakeholders to outline some broad and general goals and activities through negotiations
with the NTO and allocate a fixed sum to the organization's budget each period based on
these goals and activities. This is analogous to salary-pay on the individual person level.
Common for these three behavior-based principles mentioned above is that the
stakeholders can after the fact evaluate whether the NTO has carried out the actions as
agreed upon and reward/"punish" the NTO accordingly. All these three budgeting
principles i.e., plan and activity-based, project-based or negotiated fixed sum, are in
principle behavior-based. They are all designed to gain some control of the behavior of
the organization through information systems that reveal agent behavior.
These three principles represent a kind of input control through traditional budgeting
negotiation processes. Wildavsky (1986) argued that this form of budgeting continued as
the dominant form despite the availability of more "advanced" management controls such
as planning, programming and budgeting systems (PPBS), and performance
measurement. According to Wildavsky, as the traditional budgeting process does not
score the highest judged by the criteria a manager could put forward for a management
control model, for instance simplicity and information about output, the traditional
process still matches these criteria best in total. A large budget in a large and complex
organization may therefore call for the use of the traditional (input control) processes
rather than control through performance measurement (Johnsen, 2000). NTOs can
sometimes be large, complex organizations including domestic and foreign branch units
with numerous tasks, sizable budgets with many line items; several outputs; and many
stakeholders (see also section 3.1). This may partially explain why so few NTOs are
subject to performance-based budgeting principles, despite the merits of such principles.
2.2.3.2 Monitoring structure #2: Organizational control
A second form of investment in information systems is to assure that the coalition of
stakeholders maintain the organizational control of the organization. Organizational
control is defined as the theory which specifies the difference between executive choice
in an organization and the decisions actually implemented (Cyert and March, 1963/1992).
Control has also been defined as any process in which a person, a group of persons, or
organizations determine or intentionally affect the behavior of another person, or group,
or organization (Tannenbaum, 1968). Organizational control comes from the knowledge
that someone who matters to somebody in an organization pays close attention to what is
going on and tells the latter ifthe behavior is appropriate or inappropriate (Pfeffer, 1997).
This kind of control allows stakeholders to closely monitor the actions of the NTO, and
functions as an information system that reveals agent behavior. Organizational control
processes encompass recruitment and selection, training and socialization, organizational
design as decentralization, leadership, planning and implementation, accounting and
auditing, use of incentives, and monitoring and evaluations. The ruling coalition of
stakeholders can gain representation on the organization's board, so that the stakeholders
can influence the actions and decisions of the organization. According to Eisenhart
(1998) "the richness of information can be measured in terms of board characteristics
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such as frequency ofboard meetings, number ofboard subcommittees, number ofboard
members with industry experience, and number of board members representing specific
(interest- or) ownership groups". Thus, the access to this kind of information system
through organizational control is likely to reduce stakeholders' need for outcome-based
contracts.
2.2.3.3 Monitoring structure #3: Influence through funding
The World Health Organization (WHO) has many features similar to an NTO (as we will
discuss in more detail later in Section 2.5.1). In a critical study of the WHO (Peabody,
1995) it was reported that Member States demanded, in exchange for political support
and financial contributions, a countryman or woman in a particular position. Not
surprisingly, Member States who pay a large percentage of the regular budget, or donate
to special programs, secure many of the senior positions in the WHO (Peabody, 1995).
Thus, the WHO case exemplifies that influence on a supposedly neutral, non-profit and
ideal organization can be "bought" through organizational funding. (Please note that this
is not to be confused with outright corruption, which is not to be discussed here.) It is
also likely that a financial sponsor of the NTO could demand influence or positions in the
organizations Board of Directors. We can call this means of organizational influence
financial authority.
Ifwe revert back to the discussion on agency theory, this theory views information
systems as apurchasable commodity (Eisenhart, 1989 p.59). Information systems often
represent limitations on the organization's decision autonomy. The agent organization
would probably require some form of compensation in exchange for giving up this
potential autonomy. In the NTO context the stakeholders can to some extent "purchase"
information systems by contributing funds or financing the organization, in exchange for
influence on planning of activities or goal establishment. Furthermore, the sponsoring
stakeholders can control the organization's behavior by introducing reporting procedures
so that the organization will have to report on its activities and related expenses to the
stakeholders on a frequent basis. Such investment systems also reveal the agent's
behavior to the stakeholders, and the organization is more likely to behave in the interest
of the stakeholders. Even ifprovision offunds does not necessarily give the sponsor
access to formal control e.g., through board representation it is still likely that the
organization would either be required or feel obligated to inform the sponsor on its
activities and its operation. Thus, the sponsor will have some legitimate influence on the
organization's behavior. The sponsor or financer will probably require the agent to keep
him informed on the actions and resource-expenditure of the organization, unless the
organization will keep the sponsor informed voluntarily. Roles as sponsor and
organizational-controlling entity often overlap, but it is not necessarily always so. The
role of a funding sponsor may therefore allow influence over the organization without
formally controlling it through organizational ownership.
2.2.3.4 The cost of information systems
Transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985) identifies the cost associated with this
kind ofbehavioral control through alignment-of-interests-processes. In the process of
determining the next period's budgets for the organization based on any of the behavior-
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based budgeting principles, bargaining is necessary to safeguard the interests ofboth
stakeholders and the agent. The amount of goal conflict among stakeholders, between
stakeholders and agent and the frequency of bargaining are all factors likely to increase
the transaction cost of behavior-based budgeting control.
In transaction cost theory the investments in information systems are termed control and
monitor cost. These are the resources spent to monitor whether transactions' are consistent
with the principal-agent contract. In the NTO context, these are the costs incurred by the
stakeholders to monitor that the organization performs activities and behaves in the
interest of the stakeholders, as well as the costs associated with budget negotiations. On
the part of the agent NTO, costs are incurred by the organization itselfto promote its
interests to its stakeholders. This includes both justifiable transaction-efficient bargaining
activities, as well as more resource inefficient behavior related to lobbying, justification-
for-existence and impression-management efforts directed at the controlling and/or
funding stakeholders.
Even ifthe stakeholders may invest considerable resources in information systems, these
systems will still produce some information that is invalid and imperfect as input in the
decision process. In transaction cost theory this is referred to as maladaptation cost,
which represents the communication and coordination failures between the stakeholders
and the organization. These costs reflect resources used to produce information that is not
absorbed by the other part of the transaction (Williamson, 1985).
2.2.4 Stakeholder control of the agent through transfer of risk
An alternative to behavioral control of the agent through information systems is the
transfer of risk from stakeholders to the agent. In the NTO context, this could be
achieved through introduction of performance-based budgeting systems. In agency theory
this is referred to as outcome-based contracts.
2.2.4.1 Benefits of risk transfer to the agent
Risk can be understood here as the way possible losses and gains can be derived from an
action (Clark and Montgomery, 1986). Agency theory suggests that an outcome-based
contract motivates alignment of preferences, because rewards for both stakeholder and
agent depend on the same actions, which will curb agent opportunism. This will shift the
risk of outcome from the stakeholders to the agent. It means to "reward or punish" the
organization on the basis of the outcome of its actions, and not on its behavior. The
purpose ofrisk transfer through performance-based budgeting is to align stakeholder and
agent goals through common dependence on the same outcome. A major advantage is
that it reduces the stakeholders' need to monitor the agent. Thus, it reduces the
stakeholders need to control the organization through information systems, including the
stakeholder and agent transaction cost of such systems. For instance, it reduces the
importance of maintaining monitoring structures number I, 2 (and 3).
By the same token, acceptance of higher risk by the NTO may also be traded for
increased operational freedom, which means a relaxation of the stakeholders' control
through any of the information systems we discussed earlier. It gives the agent increased
decision autonomy, which in turn will increase the organization's control of its own
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operation, and thereby decrease its perceived uncertainty of outcome. This may reduce
propensity for the NTO to demand a risk premium in the form of higher budgets.
Furthermore, it may reduce the potential efficiency losses due to constraints imposed on
the NTO by the ruling coalition of stakeholders.
2.2.4.2 Risk-transfer devices
In practice, risk-transfer can be done by basing the budget of the organization on what the
country achieves in terms of incoming tourism. A desired increase in tourism is a
beneficial outcome for the stakeholders. Such budget principles assume that the increase
or decrease in tourism traffic can be somewhat attributed to NTOs' actions. For instance,
the sponsor coalitions could base the "reward" (i.e., an increase in NTOs' budget amount)
ofNTOs on the absolute increase in number of incoming tourists or tourism receipts, or
as a portion oftourism-related tax revenue (See Appendix 7 for an illustration). This is
analogous to sales-commission payment at the individual person level. Another
alternative, which also serves the purpose ofreducing the perceived risk of the NTO
agent, is stakeholders to base the agent's compensation relative to the performance of
other NTO agents. In the NTO context this would be to base the compensation on a
measure relative to the performance of other "comparable" NTOs or countries. The
performance-measurement determining the reward as the budget amount can be made
relative to the market performance of other comparable countries that are subject to
similar market conditions and have similar tourism products (see Table 5.1 for a more
detailed explanation).
In this way the role of chance events can be reduced, since both the agent in question and
other agents are all exposed to roughly the same chance events. This is a performance
scheme sometimes referred to as tournaments (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). A similar
procedure is known as benchmarking through the DEA-model for public sector efficiency
measurement (see Johnsen, 200 l: 14 for details).
A hybrid solution between behavior-based and performance-based principles is also
possible. This can be done by allowing stakeholders to participate in the establishment of
specific goals and operational objectives (behavioral component), and then base the
budget of the organization on the achievement ofthese goals and objectives (outcome
component). This procedure is similar to the human resource management technique
known as Management By Objectives (MBO).
2.2.4.3 Potential negative consequences of transfer of risk
Transfer of risk through performance-based budgeting may be valuable as an incentive
for the NTO to be more market-oriented and a catalyst for resource efficiency. But this
transfer of risk may also create some problems: An NTO is faced with a number of
business environment conditions that are likely to influence the outcome of the
organization's actions. Factors such as: sudden change in government policies or other
stakeholders' actions, economic climate, competitor actions, and tourism product
characteristics could generate more or less uncontrollable variations in outcome for the
NTO as an agent. In addition, NTOs have only limited or no direct control of the
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product/service, price, and distribution parameters of the marketing mix. Furthermore,
since most NTOs are not actually handling the sales transaction of the tourism product or
service to the end-user, it is difficult for the NTOs to ensure appropriate sale closure, e.g.,
so that the tourist actually purchases a flight ticket or hotel room that will assure their
arrival. This responsibility is left to the businesses or service providers in the tourism
industry. Since the commercial or industry operator is left with the direct control of the
product and sales, it decreases the controllability of the NTOs' business environment. In
other words, it is hard for NTOs to control that the industry actors are doing their part of
the job in getting tourists to visit their country. Therefore, it may be hard to determine if
the outcome in terms of market performance can be attributed to the actions ofNTOs or
by any ofthese uncontrollable conditions, because cause-and-effect relationships are
ambiguous (see also section 3.1 later for further details). Thus, neither the organization
nor the stakeholders will not know for sure that a given activity or behavior will lead to
the desired effects. This has at least two consequences 1) Developing valid measurements
and measuring the direct effects ofNTOs' behaviors may be difficult or costly. 2) It
introduces outcome uncertainty, and consequently limits the organization's ability to pre-
plan.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer to what they term "the certainty effect" (prospect
theory). This theory states that individuals tend to want to avoid risk in choices involving
sure gains. This knowledge can be applied to organizational behavior as well, since
management teams of organizations are made up by individuals who are faced with
decisions under uncertainty. Transposed to the stakeholder-agent context, this should
predict that the agent would favor behavior-based contracts in the form of behavior-based
budget principles when uncertainty is high, because these contracts will yield "sure
gains". Such sure gains can be in the form ofpredetermined income, such as budgets
based on a fixed sum each period or any other behavior-based budgeting-principles. It
will also predict that organizations will resist acceptance of risk as uncertainty increases,
and it will become increasingly expensive to shift risk to the agent despite the
motivational benefits to behave in the interest of the stakeholders. In other words, the
agent would probably demand some kind of compensation in order to accept higher risk,
for instance in the form ofhigher budgets. Agency theory predicts a risk premium to the
agent, because the principal will have to increase the agent's overall total compensation
in order to protect the agent from risk (Stroh, Brett, Baumann and Reilly 1996).
Another consequence of shifting the risk of outcomes to the agent is that it is likely to
decrease the agent's willingness to take on additional operational risk. Operational risk
means that in this case a risk-averse agent will seek to minimize activities that are
perceived to increase risk, while attempting to engage in activities that are less risk-laden.
Within models of business competitiveness (Day, 1994), there is a recognition that
constructive risk-taking is an important factor in stimulating entrepreneurism (Miller,
1987) implicit in market opportunity-seeking behavior (Baird and Thomas, 1990). As
risk-aversion increases, the organization is likely to resort to activities known to have
been beneficial in the past, while restricting activities associated with greater uncertainty
of outcome, such as new product development, entrance into new markets, investments in
brand building etc. The danger of shifting risk to the agent is that the agent will restrict its
marketing attention to existing customers and competitors and become subject to the
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"tyranny of the served market" (Hamel and Praha lad, 1991, p.83). Focusing on existing
markets and competitors can be perceived by the agent to be more "safe", at least in the
short run. For the agent, market-oriented behavior represents investments of resources in
activities with an uncertain outcome, and thus has an element of risk attached. "Despite
the fact that businesses' [NTOs'] gains and losses may be high from new product
introductions serving both new and existing customers, market orientation requires that
firms [NTOs] are tolerant to risk and accept possible failures (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993).
Consequently, transfer of risk to the agent may reduce the agent's willingness to engage
in entrepreneurial activities and the more risk-laden activities of market-oriented
behavior.
2.2.5 Disadvantages of outcome-based contracts
Thus, for the stakeholders there is clearly a trade-offbetween a) the cost/benefits of
measuring behavior through investment in information systems and b) the cost/benefits of
measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent NTO.
2.2.5.1 Risk aversion of stakeholders and agent
To get a better understanding of different situational contexts it may be fruitful to relax
the assumption of a risk-averse agent (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1979). For instance in the
case where the agent is wealthy enough to easily absorb any negative consequences of an
undesirable outcome, the agent is likely to become less risk-averse. Likewise, the agent
may become less risk-averse ifhe perceives to be able to control the business
environment and possess resources, e.g., human capital, organizational experience,
networks, technology, etc., which enables the agent to better control the outcome of
activities. Thus, outcome uncertainty will be reduced, and so will the perceived risk by
the agent.
As the agent becomes increasingly less risk-averse, it becomes more attractive to pass on
the risk to the agent using outcome-based contracts. Conversely, as the agent becomes
more risk-averse, it is increasingly expensive to pass risk to the agent (Eisenhart, 1989:
62). Thus, behavior-based contracts become more attractive. Similarly, it becomes
increasingly attractive to pass on the risk to the agent ifthe stakeholders are risk-averse.
NTOs are, with a few exceptions, not particularly wealthy organizations with large
discretionary budgets and savings to buffer NTOs in hard financial times. Likewise, they
face a business environment that is highly uncontrollable, while cause-and-effect
relationships are ambiguous, and uncertainty of the outcome from their actions is fairly
high. Generally, this would cause these organizations to become quite risk-averse.
Furthermore, the collective risk of the stakeholders is distributed across a large number of
individual stakeholders, so that no single stakeholder or group will alone have to bear the
negative consequences of a potential negative outcome. Such a negative outcome could
be the result of e.g., a poorly performed major marketing campaign by NTOs or any other
strategic or operational mistake. In addition, industry stakeholders often invest resources
in other marketing channels such as: own marketing activities, local-level tourist
organizations, trade associations, private marketing firms, etc. Under these circumstances
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NTOs will only constitute one agent in a portfolio of several agents or risk-objects. This
will reduce the stakeholders' perceived risk attached to the single agent NTOs represent
among all agents or risk-objects. Furthermore, in cases where the government is a major
stakeholder, e.g., being a major funding source, which is often the case, government
funds spent on NTO budgets will not have the same strict requirements for return on
investment as private funds do. This could in sum suggest that we are dealing with a
stakeholder coalition with a fairly moderate collective risk perception. However, the
degree ofrisk-aversion ofthis group is unknown, since risk aversion is a personality trait
or "organizational" trait.
Therefore, one can probably argue that stakeholders in the NTO context are only
moderately exposed to risk in the agency relationship with the NTO. Assuming then, a
high agent risk-perception and moderate-to-neutral stakeholder collective risk perception;
behavior based-type contracts become attractive as opposed to outcome-based contracts
in the relationship between the stakeholders and the NTOs.
2.2.5.2 Relaxation of the assumption of goal conflict
It can also be fruitful to relax the assumption of goal contlict between the stakeholders
and the agent. Agency theory has been criticized for exaggerating the degree to which
individuals (and organizations) are work-averse (Perrow, 1986). This might occur in
situations where self-interest gives way to selfless behavior. For instance, when the agent
employs highly professional human resources genuinely interested in their work; or when
these employees are strongly motivated by non-monetary rewards such as recognition
from stakeholders groups - the agent might act according to the interests of the
stakeholders. This could happen even though the agent could have "gotten away with"
less than the assumed or agreed upon marketing effort. In other words, even ifthere is a
potential moral hazard in the relationship between the marketing agent and the
stakeholders, the agent may very well refrain from adversely exploiting its position to
evaluate the activities delegated to it. Management and employees' professional "pride"
and motivation from rewards other than benefits through shirking can reduce the moral
hazard problem. It seems safe to assume that such underlying motivations may have a
positive impact on the more "selfless" actions of the agent, particularly since most of the
NTOs are non-profit organizations - and therefore are not necessarily dependent on
maximizing own monetary utility. According to Eisenhart (1998: 62), as goal contlict
decreases, there is a decreasing motivational imperative for outcome-based contracts.
Under such circumstances behavior-based contracts become more attractive, and there is
a lesser need to transfer risk to the NTO by imposing performance based budgets.
However, it is sometimes hard to ex ante assess the NTOs employees'/management's
degree of motivation and "professional pride" ensuring that they will act in the interest of
stakeholders and give up self-interest.
2.2.5.3 Goal conflict among principals
In agency relationships where there are several principals or stakeholders, goal contlict
among principals can result in outcome uncertainty. Complex organizations such as
government agencies (e.g., NTOs), hospitals and educational institutions are
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characterized by multiple demands from both inside and outside the organization (Tusi,
1990). In such settings, variations in outcome may reflect multiple goals rather than
effort-aversion. Only under high levels of agreement about efforts and outcomes among
principals and/or between principals and agent is it possible to define precise standards
for performance eval uation (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). In the NTO context, such
agreements are less likely, which is reducing the attractiveness ofperformance-based
contracts. On the other hand, potential disagreement among principals and/or between
principals and agent on prescribed optimal agent behavior makes precise behavior-based
contracts difficult to design as well, as explained later in section 3.1.
2.2.5.4 Measurability of outcome
Another task characteristic is the measurability of outcome (Anderson, 1985; Eisenhart,
1985). Some tasks require: a long time to complete, involve stakeholder and agent joint
effort, or produce soft outcomes - outcomes that may be difficult to measure within a
practical amount of time. For NTOs such task may involve: brand or product/service
image building, repositioning ofproducts/services, new market venture, new distribution
channel development, and new product/service development, etc. When outcomes are
measured by difficulty, behavior-based contracts are more attractive (Eisenhart, 1989:62).
Because of the lack of direct measurability ofNTOs' behavior - supported by the fact that
NTOs often face a number ofuncontrollable factors that will influence the outcome of
their activities, measurability difficulty will make behavior-based contracts attractive in
the NTO context.
2.2.5.5 Length of contract relationship
The length of the relationship between the stakeholders and the agent should also have an
impact on the contract form chosen, according to Eisenhart (1989: 63). In long-term
relations the stakeholders williearn about the agent (e.g., Lambert, 1983) and will be able
to assess the behavior of the agent more readily. Conversely, the information asymmetry
is likely to be greater in short-term relationships, making outcome-based contracts more
attractive. In the NTO context, these relationships are often of a long-term character. The
relationship with the government, which often is a dominant stakeholder, is usually long-
term, and may last for decades. Thus, the long-term nature ofrelationships will tend to
make behavior-based contracts attractive in relationships between the government and the
NTO. The same can be true with dominant, wealthy industry stakeholders involved in
long-term relations with the NTO. Conversely, relationships with other, less dominant
industry partners are often of a more short-term character, such as in the case of specific
time-definite projects.
2.2.5.6 Proqrammabllity of tasks
Another consideration made by Eisenhart (1989) is the programmability oftasks to be
performed by the agent. As defined by Eisenhart, programmability is the degree to which
appropriate behavior by the agent can be specified in advance. According to agency
theory, task-programmability will be positively related to the use ofbehavior-based
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contracts (e.g., fixed-sum budgeting) and negatively related to the use of outcome-based
contracts (i.e., variable compensation). In the NTO context, some of the operational tasks
are highly programmable, while others are not. Some administrative and non-marketing
tasks are to a large extent programmable. Programmable tasks can be e.g., public
information and PR, distribution of promotional material, information services,
representation/seminars/presentations, education services, and simple marketing research
tasks such as travel statistics collection, and collection of other trade information. Other
tasks are substantially less programmable, for instance acquisition and use of new
technology, new product development, development ofnew markets, tactical and
technical innovation, advanced market- and competitor research, strategic planning etc.
According to Eisenhart (1989) the more programmed the task; the more attractive are
behavior-based contracts. Very programmable tasks reveal agent behavior, and the
situation reverts to the complete information case. In cases where NTOs are assigned
typically programmable tasks only, one can expect presence of behavior-based contracts.
Many NTOs are in fact not typically formally assigned the non-programmable tasks
mentioned, which is in many cases considered to be the responsibility of the industry the
NTO is promoting products/services for". To the extent it occurs, the less programmable
tasks are often undertaken on NTOs' own initiatives, and thus not formally tied to a
behavior-based contract. In some cases, NTOs may assume those tasks in connection
with specific projects. Such projects often have a stronger than usual outcome focus and
agent-stakeholder shared risk.
2.2.6 Conclusions to be drawn from agency theory and transaction
cost theory
The main aspect of this study is to find ways to give the NTO working conditions and
incentives to behave in a way that will increase the chances for better market-
performance. In other words, this is a matter of identifying the best combination of
control and incentive mechanisms for the NTO. The principals may use those in order to
induce the NTO to behave in a desirable way, as described above. The context of
organizational control and incentive mechanisms as means to control behavior - lends
itselfto agent-principal theory. Agent-principal theory is very useful (for the principal) to
understand when to use performance-based contracts and when to use behavior-based
contracts as means to control the behavior (of the agent). Concepts such as asymmetric
information, unobservable behavior, moral hazard, risk-sharing, etc. are useful to
enlighten agency problem in the NTO context. The concepts of common agency (Meyer,
1979) and transaction cost (Williamson, 1985; i.e., agent behavior monitoring cost) are
also useful concepts in this discussion.
From a simple agency theory perspective the NTO context would call for an outcome-
based type of contract due to the potential problems associated with goal conflict between
principals and agent or the stakeholder and the NTO in our case. The probable inability of
the stakeholders to observe the behavior of the NTO could lead to problems with moral
hazard and adverse selection. Under a behavior-based contract regime, the NTO would
17 We found some evidence for this in the empirical part ofthis thesis e. g., in the focus group sessions
including both stakeholders and NTO, as well as in written documentation on NTOs activities.
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also be more susceptible to lobbying efforts from different stakeholders who would want
different outcomes. The goal-alignment benefits of an outcome-based contract would
favor a performance-based budgeting-principle. Under such an arrangement, both the
stakeholders and the NTO depend on the same outcome, e.g., increased tourism influx.
The choice of an outcome-based type of contract is also supported by transaction cost
theory, since outcome-based contracts would reduce monitoring and controlling cost,
bargaining cost, and maladaptation cost.
However, several factors particularly important in the NTO context could reduce the
attractiveness of outcome based-contracts, namely stakeholders' accessibility to
information systems, high agent and low stakeholder risk perception, the relatively high
cost of risk-transfer, low outcome measurability, and the long-term nature of
relationships, etc. The latter may also partially explain the strong presence of behavior-
based type of principles in the existing NTO-stakeholder relationships, as shown in the
empirical part of the thesis in Chapter 5, Table 5.1.
When viewing the problem from the perspective of agency theory, and taking the above
considerations into account in the NTO context, theory implications ofwhat controlling
device to use, e.g., behavior-based budgeting and other monitoring structures as opposed
to outcome-based contracts, appear to be somewhat inconclusive.
Agency theory in general assumes the principal's perspective, and thus the principals'
legitimate right to achieve its ambitions through the behavior and achievements of the
agent. It also assumes rational principals with common clear, undisputed, and legitimate
goals, and that corresponding clear goals and undisputed compensations can be specified
for the agent. In the NTO context, however, one may have a ruling coalition of
stakeholders i.e., government and/or industry that are not exactly sure what they want the
organization to do (ref. Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3). In addition, some important stakeholders
e.g., society and the market (ref. Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3) may not have the type of
legitimate influence on the organization as the principal is assumed to have in agency
theory.
Contract forms or principles taking only the interests of principals with legitimate powers
(i.e., funding/controlling principals) into account are probably not sufficient to safeguard
the interests of all the important stakeholders in the NTO context. For instance, it is
probably possible to construct control devices that favor the principals with legitimate
powers, without taking other important concerns such as market focus and long-term
planning and operation into account.
A second problem with agency theory is that, as a theory of performance, it attributes
variations in outcome or performance solely to variations in the agent' s effort. Less than
optimal output is solely attributed to "shirking" by the agent, i.e., lack of appropriate
effort by the agent (Nilakant and Rao 1994). We have pointed out that the NTO faces
some factors more or less beyond its control that may influence the outcome in terms of
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Table 2.4
Conclusions from application of agency theory & transaction cost theory
YES YES NO
YES YES NO premium, reduced
M.O. and innovative
kinds of behavior
Outcome uncertainty YES YES NO Many uncontrollable
factors, difficult to
preplan long-term
activities
Resistance to on YES YES NO Behavior-based Outcome uncertainty,
high risk on the part of cause-effect relation
the
Risk neutral
C stakeholders
o ization11)
-5 Goal contl Depends on and NO YES Professionalism, non-
>-.u stakeholders and agent both the monetary rewards,c:
11) NTO and its exaggerated work-OJ)
< aversion
Goals and means YES and NO YES and NO Both types of Hard to agree on
contlict among principles performance measures,
stakeholders but also on appropriate
behaviors
Task programmability Both types of Traditional tasks are
program- principles programmable.
mabie tasks innovative and venture
and non- type of efforts are not
program-
mabietasks
Outcome measurability NO (Yes, YES (and NO (and Both types of Hard outcomes can be
indirectly) NO) YES) principles easily measured, but not
(hybrid) soft, cooperative, or
outcomes
YES YES NO Behav ior-based long-term
Trans- High monitoring YES NO YES Outcome-based monitoring,
action Itransaction cost for and maladaptation cost
cost both and
market performance. (We will also revert to the issue of shirking by the agent in the next
section.)
For our purposes, agent-principal theory/transaction cost theory is not sufficiently
developed in terms of dealing with cases when:
a) there are many principals with potentially conflicting goals
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b) (some) principals and the agent are not necessarily protit-maximizing entities, which
often is a common assumption in agency theory
c) it may not be clear to the agent whom the ruling coalition of stakeholders is; that is,
who the principals/stakeholders/clients reallyare and whom to report to
d) the demands from stakeholders are conflicting, and thus the goals of the agent (NTO)
are made ambiguous
e) cause-and-effect relationships are unclear or subject to discussion
f) feasible (direct) performance-measures are difficult to attain, costly and/or subject of
discussion
g) market competition exposure of the agent is weak to non-existent as a control device
h) financial bonuses or other types of rewards for good performance/punishment for the
agent cannot easily be paid out or invoked like in a commercial situation
i) there are no alternative agents, i.e., only one NTO in a given country that has a virtual
monopoly, thus the agent cannot easily be dismissed
Although important considerations can be derived form application of agency theory, it is
not in isolation a body oftheory sufficient to comprehensively address all the issues we
are interested in. A somewhat more applicable body of theory can be found in public
choice theory, which is to be discussed next.
2.3 Public choice theory
Public choice theory is strictly speaking a "subspecies" of agency theory, which focuses
on political institutions in particular. However, for the sake ofthis thesis we have chosen
to discuss Public choice theory apart from traditional agency theory. Public choice theory
adds an important non-commercial and societal perspective when considering the NTO as
a public agency (which it often is) created to also serve the interests of the public rather
than only the interests of profit-maximizing owners or any other sponsoring commercial
principals. This is opposed to traditional agency theory's somewhat implicit assumption
of a commercial principal and agent. Public choice theory is defined as "the economic
study ofnon-market decision-making", or simply the application of economics to
political science, and also as the economic analysis of political institutions (Mueller,
1989).
2.3.1 NTO as a public institution
NTOs are typically non-profit and (semi-) political institutions, at least partially funded,
controlled by, and responsible toward the government. The usual government connection
and public institution character are revealed trough the commonly used names ofthese
organizations. Along with the nation's name, "Tourism" or "Tourist" is followed by
"Board", "Council", and "Committee", "Commission" etc. The control problem posed by
such political institutions, where market competition does not constitute an additional
organizational control. is that the agent can make more effort than necessary, which costs
resources, or does other tasks than desired from a societal viewpoint. Effectiveness and
equity are then reduced, and agents can shirk on resources such that inefficiency emerges
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and hence effectiveness and [overall stakeholder] equity are also reduced (Johnsen,
2000).
Table 2.5
Public choice theory's relevance for independent
and dependent variables
l) Due to information asymmetry With no performance
geting the NTO can engage in budget- Orien- measurement tied to market
prin- maximizing behavior. Both the taion results, the NTO will have weak
ciple NTO-management, politicians incentives to focus on the
and some industry beneficiaries market. There are probably
can benefit from a larger budget stronger incentives for a
than socially desirable. budget-maximizing focus rather
than a market performance-
focus.
Fund- I) government operation, 2.3.3 Long- Privatization of the NTO, or 2.3.3
ing the residual control and rights are Term commercialization through a
source separated. Then NTO Pers- Limited corporation, might
stakeholders have no financial pective reduce the budget-maximizing
residual rights, thus this problem and inefficiency
additional control device is not in problems linked to the
effect. Shirking and diversion of bureaucracy. On the other hand
resources can occur. the NTO might then be enticed
2) Costs of the NTOs' operation 2.3.4 or forced to focus on short-term
are spread out among many demands from profit-seeking
taxpayers, while relatively small short-term oriented commercial
groups benefit from higher NTO shareholders.
budgets. The expected gains from
forming pressure groups are
greater for the gainers than for the
losers, and these groups can put
politicians under pressure to
2.3.1 Operat- Under public operation as a 2.3.5
-ship/ ional government bureau/agency the
arg. Free- NTO has incentives to lobby the
control dom government in the budget-
organizational control. This negotiation process in order to
creates both an efficiency and maximize budgets. This takes
effectiveness control-problem. focus away from marketing
activities.
In agency theory organizational hierarchical control is dealt with through two issues
simultaneously. The first is the issue of effectiveness, which is to let the agency work on
the tasks it is supposed to do (Johnsen, 2000). In the NTO context this is to allow the
NTO to turn its attention toward working with the market, and at the same time to give
the agent some degree of operational freedom and decision autonomy to do so on a
professionally sound basis. The second issue is to ensure that the agency is doing the
tasks as efficiently as possible (Johnsen, 2000). In practice, this means to assure that the
organization has an incentive to perform only the activities required to solve its
marketing tasks, and de-emphasize efforts on non-marketing tasks.
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2.3.2 Budget-maximizing behavior
In public choice theory the terms bureau and sponsor are often used instead of agent and
principal respectively. Niskanen (1971) proposed the hypothesis that bureaucrats or
employees in political institutions were budget-maximizers, and Migue and Belanger
(1974) amended this to the assertion that bureaucrats were maximizers of discretionary
budgets. Due to the bureaucrats' asymmetric information on production, the bureaucrats
(the NTO bureau) could profit from their information advantage relative to the
representatives (NTA in our case) and demand a larger budget and a bigger output than
what is socially desirable. Niskanen modeled bureaus as expense centers where the
budget was negotiated between the bureau and the sponsors. The bureau provides most of
its output to clients such as the tourism industry, society and tourists, many ofwho do not
have to pay for the services directly. The clients then may have no incentive to compare
the cost of services with the value provided. Furthermore, the bureau may obtain support
from the clients ifthe sponsor were to cut down on the budget. The bureau may also
threaten to cut down on the most valued services rather than reducing services of more
marginal value during budget negotiations (Johnsen, 2000). Actually, this can put the
government sponsors under pressure from two sides in the budget negotiating process:
One from the NTO itself, often being the sole agent officially designated to perform the
international tourism marketing task and in a virtual monopoly situation; another from the
tourism industry and other stakeholders, which would benefit from a larger budget
without actually having to pay for it directly. Even ifthe industry contributes parts of the
budget, such as in a matching principle, the industry would benefit from increased
budgets available for matching purposes because their marketing effort would be
subsidized by a matched part from the government. This can swell budgets beyond what
is socially desirable.
Not only may the bureaus shirk in the budget negotiations due to asymmetric
information, but also the sponsors could shirk through cooperation with the budget-
maximizing bureaus. The representatives in the sponsoring committee i.e., NTA or other
stakeholders may get increased support from their voters and constituents by an increased
or constant bureau output; that is, more than what would be desirable from the society's
point ofview. We will discuss this in detail later in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.3 Lack of a financial residual
Private ownership of a resource entails that the owner has all residual rights, both
residual control and residual rights (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Residual control
means that one has decision authority over any use of the resource that is not illegal or
transferred by contract to other parties. Residual right means that ifthe government or
any contract partners have been compensated, one has the right to keep the profit from
the use of the resources, The problem is when the residual control and residual rights are
separated. If the decision authority of a resource is transferred to an agent that does not
own it, the agent has no incentive to maximize the residual profit (Johnsen, 2000). This is
the main reason why bureaus can be inefficient, namely the lack of a financial residual.
Agency theory usually employs the term residual when organizational control in firms is
analyzed. Residual is the difference between the stochastic inflow ofresources (income)
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to the principal as the result of the agents' activity and the compensation promised to the
agents (Farma and Jensen, 1993). Organizational control can be enhanced by letting the
agents share some of the residual (profit), which means that the agent will also have a
stake in the same outcome as the principals pursue. Political institutions, on the other
hand, usually have no financial residual. The budget is to be balanced against the
expenses. The residual, the net benefit, is often directed to constituents who do not pay
marginal prices.
Bringing this consideration into the NTO context, the NTO may feel tempted to direct its
residual resources towards gaining increased support from the government, special
interest groups or other powerful stakeholders such as a large airline company or hotel
chain. This kind of misallocation of funds can occur instead ofNTOs investing the
residual resources in additional marketing effort, which NTOs are supposed to do from a
socially desirable standpoint. The consequence may be that NTOs will over-prioritize
promotion of products or interests of sponsors who have contributed significant funds to
NTOs' budget. The NTOs could also spend too many resources on lobbying activities
directed at special powerful interest groups in the industry; or spend too many resources
on lobbying government sponsors, as shown in Table 2.6 on the next page.
"The presence of slack is similar both in firms and in public institutions, but firms have
financial claims as additional organizational control, while political institutions have not.
Performance measurement may on this reason be relatively more important in political
institutions than in firms, because interest groups [e.g., powerful stakeholders] may
compete for the residual claims on the net benefits" (Lapsley and Mitchell, 1996).
The absence offinancial residual claims may increase slack in political institutions. Slack
can be explained as the difference between the minimum costs for providing some
amount of service and the amount the agents/bureaus actually use in providing the
service. Slack consists ofpayments to coalition members in excess ofwhat is required to
maintain the organization (Cyert and March, 1962/1992). This may be used to
compensate stakeholders for policy support, subordinates for compliance, extended
quality and new equipment, or as personal consumption or "on the job consumption".
"Slack is only possible where inefficiency exists" (Niskanen, 1971). NTOs may use slack
to take on tasks that are not really their responsibility, hire or maintain more staffthan
necessary, employing consultants in excess ofwhat is required to solve its marketing
tasks etc. The NTO may i.e., use consultants when in-house personnel could have done
the job sufficiently, spend resources on extensive "business" travel, or participate in fairs
or trade shows with only marginal value in solving the supposed tasks of the
organization. In addition, slack may be used to finance activities used, symbolically
rather than instrumentally, as proof of quantifiable activity and to show visibility, e.g.,
through distribution of vast amounts of printed promotional material/brochures, holding
seminars directed at gaining support from stakeholders etc., and thus to sustain legitimacy
and resources.
Sl
Table 2.6
Some examples on how NTOs can spend excess resources
Condition NTO"incentives What to do with Possible eenseqaeaees
(ifuncheckedl excess resources? i
I A) Non-profit NTO: Make as little Use it to compensate Low market effort, overall
Market performance is not marketing effort as coalition members industry will suffer in
generating income for the possible and/or as (powerful competition with other
NTO. Unused portions of inexpensively as stakeholders) for countries. Powerful industry
budgets will be reclaimed, possible to maximize budget support. stakeholders may be over-
or budgets will be cut level of residual Overspend resources prioritized.
accordingly the following resources. within the NTO.
period. Do as much "visible" Spend excess Inefficient market effort,
market effort as resources on highly overall industry will suffer in
possible to spend the visible (potentially competition with other
entire budget (i.e., expensive and countries. Powerful industry
minimize residual). expense-inefficient) stakeholders may be over-
activities to display prioritized and less powerful
visibility and achieve ignored.
justification.
2) Non-profit NTO: Market Do as little as possible Save resources for the Low current market effort,
performance is not and/or as future regardless of overall industry may suffer in
generating income for the inexpensively as current need. competition with other
NTO. Unused portions of possible to maximize countries.
budgets can be transferred "savings" for the
for use in the future. future.
3) Non-profit NTO: Market Use resources as Balance resource Efficient market effort, overall
performance is generating efficiently and usage between current industry will benefit in
income for the NTO. effectively as possible and future needs. Curb competition with other
Unused portions ofbudgets to achieve current and spending on non- countries both short-term and
can be transferred for use in future market market activities and long-term.
the future. performance. (Given compensations.
that they believe in
what they are doing)
4) Commercial NTO: Use resources as Pay dividends to Efficient market effort. In
Market performance is efficiently and stakeholders, or some cases the stockholders'
generating income for the effectively as possible possibly reinvest interests may be over-
NTO. Unused portions of to achieve current and resources for use in prioritized on the expense of·
budgets are either paid to future market the future. overall stakeholders' interest.
stockholders as performance. NTOs' Long-Term
compensation or transferred Perspective depends on
for use in the future. stockholders and their
representatives' willingness to
reinvest profits in the NTO.
Use resources to Pay dividends to Short-term activities may be
maximize short-term stakeholders. over-prioritized on the
gain directly from Compensate NTO expense of a long-term
market performance or management for perspective. Shareholders may
to try to maximize (short-term) pressure NTO to maximize
short-term stock price. performance short-term gain. (Ref. Section
2.5.5 later.) ..Note: These are only a few examples on NTOs' potential distribution of excess resources. Other ennditions and
combinations are conceivable and may occur.
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One possible solution to the problem, associated with lack of financial residual claims as
an organizational control-mechanism in the NTO context, is to privatize the NTO and its
services. Stakeholders could do so by organizing the NTO as a commercial
organization/limited corporation with shareholders. The NTO could then be held more
accountable for its actions by its shareholders. The shareholders would then have such
financial claims on the residual, which may reduce the potential for shirking in NTOs. A
problem with this solution is that the stakeholders may force the NTOs to resort to over-
focus on short-term activities and/or activities benefiting the shareholders
disproportionately more than the overall industry or any important societal concerns. We
will revert to this issue later in Section 2.5.5.
2.3.4 Inefficiency of bureaucracy"
Patrick Gunning (1998) explained why budget maximizing behavior is likely to occur.
We have used some ofhis argumentation to explain why NTO's budgets might get higher
than socially desirable, and thus how NTOs can be inefficient from a societal viewpoint.
According to Gunning, Niskanen's model of demand and supply is what economists call a
bilateral monopoly. The bureau [NTO] is said to be a monopolist seller of government
services. The combination of the executive and legislature, as expressed through the
budgeting process, is said to be a monopolist buyer. Gunning's model is widely used in
public choice theory, and it helps express the general pressure to maximize the budget, as
discussed below:
Gunning considered many reasons why one would not expect bureau budgets to be
optimal from the consumers' point ofview. For instance, Gunning pointed out that there
are several reasons to believe that the budgets demanded by the politicians will be higher
than the one that is optimal from the consumers' standpoints. First, incumbent politicians
ordinarily favor higher budgets because the higher budgets can be partly used to help
them or their parties in their election campaigns. Second, because national taxes are used
to supply local public goods [e.g., demand for local tourism products, and employment
and local infrastructure stemming from increased local tourism traffic etc.], the benefits
of large budgets that are used to supply such goods, are concentrated in relatively small
groups, while the costs are spread about among all of the nation's taxpayers. Other things
being equal, the expected gains from forming pressure groups [e.g., tourism industry
lobbyists and trade organizations] are greater for the gainers than for the losers. As a
result there is asymmetric pressure on politicians to favor a higher than optimal budget.
Third, members of the collective can be easily fooled about the burden they must bear in
financing bureaus. Fourth, there is a bias among voters who supply resources [both to the
NTO itself such as: consultants, marketing firms, transportation etc., and suppliers to the
tourism industry such as: labor-force, support services, and other supplies]. Those who
supply resources to bureaus [and to the tourism industry] are more likely to know how
they will gain from a higher bureau budget than those who supply resources to private
firms are likely to know how they lose from higher taxes.
18 Adapted from Patrick Gunning's book: "Understanding Democracy - An Introduction to Public Choice".
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According to Niskanen, the bureau management also wants a budget that is as high as it
can get. Given this desire, the question is: How high a budget can the management
persuade the legislature to give it?
To answer this question Gunning points to Niskanen, who focused on information
asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats. There are two types of relevant
information in a bargaining situation: information about costs of supply and information
about demand. Consider a situation that is somewhat like the relationship between the
bureau management and politicians in the budget negotiation. The bureau management
who wants to maximize its budget does not want the politicians to know its true costs;
and the politicians do not want the bureau management to know their true demands. But
the bureau management has an advantage. Consider first the information about a bureau's
costs. The bureau management and other bureaucrats know better than anyone whether a
particular style of desk, vehicle, office location, working environment, employee, foreign
office etc. is worth buying in relation to the alternatives. Politicians are at a distinct
disadvantage. Their ability to find out whether a bureau is wasting money is limited.
Even the "experts" who advise the politicians seldom know as much about the technology
and costs of resources as the bureau chief and other bureaucrats.
According to Gunning, Niskanen also recognized the propensity for the heads ofbureaus
and other bureaucrats to be secretive. These people deliberately attempt to increase the
information asymmetry beyond what it would otherwise be in order to make monitoring
more difficult. Secrecy has long been recognized as a characteristic ofbureaucracy.
The next issue is information about demand. A bureau management can easily learn
about the politicians' demands for bureau services since the legislature's meetings and the
chief executive's policies are typically open to the public. The bureau management has
access to the newspapers, television, etc. In a typical constitutional democracy, the
politicians cannot keep their demands a secret.
Considering these factors, there appears to be information asymmetry. The bureau
management has information about politicians' demands but the politicians lack
information about the bureau's costs. Suppose that the bureau management is able to
exploit its position to the fullest because of information asymmetry. This can happen
when there is so much information asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats that
the bureau management can persuade politicians to approve the highest possible budget.
Moreover, because the method of financing conceals the costs of the budget expansion,
consumers would not realize their losses.
One can readily imagine what would happen if all bureaus could succeed in this way.
Bureau managements, competing for status, prestige, promotions, or whatever would
expand their bureaus to the max. Voters and taxpayers would probably be worse offthan
ifthe bureaus did not exist. And massive amounts ofresources would be diverted from
the private sector into a bloated public sector. There would be plenty of government
services, of course, but this would not be good from the standpoint of consumers and
society as a whole.
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Applied in the NTO context one can assume that a similar pattern could be present for
NTOs as well. The NTA (department dealing with tourism) could benefit from a higher
NTO budget because it could bring prestige and power, as well as increase chances that
supporting politicians would be re-elected, and department bureaucrats keep their jobs
and secure their carriers. This is especially the case for representatives from regions
where the tourism industry has great local importance.
Furthermore, the NTO-management would want as high a budget as possible, because
this would give the NTO more prestige and excess resources. We have pointed out earlier
that it is very difficult for stakeholders to estimate what the cost of the NTO services
should be, because of information asymmetry. The NTO management could then be able
to persuade the politicians in the NTA to approve the highest possible budget. In a worst
case a manager, unrestricted by morality, could spend a disproportionate part ofthese
resources pursuing pet projects, engaging in personal on-the-job consumption, allowing
the NTO to grow in size beyond what is desirable, and on lobbying politicians for even
more resources.
2.3.5 Resistance against performance measurement
Apart from the fact that performance-measurement will deter the possibilities for budget
maximization, there is another reason why the NTO and some principal stakeholders may
want to avoid performance-measurement. According to Markus and Pfeffer (1983) and
Argyris (1990), it is likely that actively involved stakeholders in political organizations
will resist implementation and use ofperformance measurement that may cause
embarrassment, unless such systems are used for externallegitimization only, or there is
so much ambiguity that embarrassing information from the performance measurement
does not affect the ruling coalition (Baier, March and Sætren, 1986). In fact, this potential
embarrassment can cause implementation and use of performance measurement to be
resisted both by the political institution/bureau itself and the sponsor e.g., the government
throughthe NTA. Itmay reveal inefficiency, which obviously can be embarrassing for
the institution itself, but also for the public sponsor who is supposed to be at least
partially responsible towards its constituents for the agency's (mis)behavior. Thus, when
performance-based principles of organizational control are evaluated by stakeholders,
who may be subject to embarrassment from such performance-measurement, one could
speculate that these principles are evaluated less positive than from an objective
standpoint.
Due to asymmetric use of information, politicians may want to monitor a bureau in order
to avoid strategic behavior. Even imperfect monitoring [e.g., imperfect performance
measures such as tourism market performance] may reduce the bureau's ability to
deceive the legislature (Bendor, Taylor and Gaalen, 1985). However, monitoring of the
agent/bureau could be costly, as explained earlier. Another means in organizational
control is to let constituency groups, such as interest groups, monitor the agencies. The
interest groups can then communicate the results directly to the politicians rather than
through a formal organizational control system (Banks and Weingast, 1992). This can be
in the form of access to board representation for interest groups or formalized reporting
procedures accessible to such groups. For NTOs this could be e.g., periodic mandatory
presentation of the bureau's activities and achievements. (This seems to be a quite
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common form of indirect control in the NTO context, as reported by our respondents in
the focus groups). The interest groups then bear some of the monitoring cost but they also
have more information and industry expertise necessary to evaluate the information than
the politicians do. Furthermore, they receive benefits from NTOs' output directly. This
means that performance measurement may have substitutes and compliments in interest
group monitoring behavior and in the news media and trade press.
2.3.6 Conclusions to be drawn from public choice theory
Public choice is very useful in the NTO context because it adds an important non-
commercial and societal perspective, which traditional agency theory usually lacks.
Concepts such as budget maximizing behavior, lack of shareholder financial residual
claims and public agency resource shirking, are important considerations in a situation
where market competition is unavailable as additional organizational control. It also
applies when the agent/bureau (NTO) has some non-sponsoring/funding societal
stakeholders, such as tax-payers, some tourism businesses and other beneficiaries.
In conclusion, public choice theory suggests that political institutions are more
susceptible to slack than profit-maximizing firms are because both the agent and the
principals may have an incentive to shirk due to absence of financial residual claims.
Furthermore, budget maximizing-behavior and selective attention to special interest
groups or other powerful stakeholders is more likely. This makes performance
measurement relatively more important in political institutions than in firms. However,
due to the potential embarrassment as a result of unfavorable information from
performance-measurement, one can expect resistance to the use of such measurement
both from sponsors and the NTO itself. This could explain in part why performance
measurement is rarely used as a disciplinary mechanism to control NTOs. Our empirical
data (see Table 5.1 in Chapter 5) show that performance-measurement through
performance-based budgeting principles is uncommon for NTOs worldwide.
Furthermore, stakeholders such as the government, private sponsors and industry clients,
may perceive that they can control the organization and reveal the agent's behavior
through interest group and media monitoring, which reduces the perceived stakeholder
need for direct performance-measurement.
The theory of public choice tries to explain inefficiency and growth in the public sector
by assuming that bureaucrats would want a larger discretionary budget than they would
need, and that they to a large extent are able to do so (Blais and Dion, 1991). It is not
unreasonable to believe that any public or private agency would like to have slack in the
organization, and that this can be achieved through the budget negotiations. There are,
however, some weaknesses in Niskanen's theory and similar explanations on public
overspending: First, the effect of any disciplinary mechanisms in the public sector is
overlooked, while the trust in disciplinary mechanisms in the private sector is very strong
(Boyne, 1998: 698). For instance, according to classical bureaucracy theory, the
promotion opportunities discipline bureaucrats in a way that it would make it attractive to
assure cost effective operation rather than to pursue shot-term selfish interests (Weber,
2000). Bureaus can also be under pressure from interest groups that can form a
disciplinary mechanism. Second, considering the private sector, the problem with
Niskanen's theory is that he implicitly assumes that profit-motivated owners and
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competition between suppliers will deter the possibilities for the employees to pursue
self-interest contrary to the owners' interests in cost-efficiency. This may not be an
entirely safe assumption. A third weakness is the assumption that politicians have weaker
incentives than private owners to assure that public services are brought about to the
public (Johansen, 200 l).
Table 2.7
Conclusions from application of public choice theory
maximization
YES NO YES Outcome-based
Outcome-based Non-paying clients,
public funds, pressure on
political representatives
from constituents and
YES
Resistance to
performance
measurement
interest-
group monitoring
Overall, this body of theory supports the notion that market-related performance-
measurement may be necessary to avoid inefficiency and budget-maximization and to
create incentives for a market focus of the organization. This is probably particularly
important in countries where the NTO is funded and responsible toward the government
alone and the NTO is a purely government -owned/controlled and government-funded
bureau.
However, there are some potential weaknesses in public choice theory which one should
keep in mind when this body of theory is applied. These weaknesses are due to
Niskanen's assumptions about the lack of disciplinary mechanisms in the public sector
and probable over-confidence of the corresponding mechanisms in the private sector.
Moreover, while very useful for our study, public choice theory as well has a few
shortfalls in light of covering all issues of this study comprehensively. The rather
complex NTO context does often have some elements of a commercial market, and may
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very well have important commercial principals/stakeholders who depend on the NTOs'
market-performance. Nor does public choice theory address the issues of a) the effect of
public vs. private ownership/control, and b) the issue of funding source - sufficiently for
our purposes. So public choice theory fits the NTO context quite well, but is far from a
comprehensive theory for all facets in this study.
2.4 Public economy theory
Public economy theory or social economics theory deal among other aspects, with the
issues ofmarket failure, which may call for the government to intervene. In this section
we will also discuss: the consequences of public versus private ownership of the NTO,
the impact ofperformance-based contracts on state owned firms' performance, and the
need for regulations to avoid monopolistic behavior by the NTO. Finally, we have
included a discussion about the problem of common/collective goods and how this relates
to the question of public versus private funding.
2.4.1 Ownership of the NTO - Does it matter?
First we will address the issue of ownership, or more specific - governance control of the
organization. In this section we willlook at what expectations one can find from
economic theory about cost-efficiency and other societal concerns in terms of public and
private operation of an organization like an NTO.
From empirical research on private versus public ownership there is strong empirical
support that private owners operate companies or organizations in competitive
environments more efficiently than the government. In several countries there have been
made comparative studies of public versus private operation (e.g., Borcherding, 1992). It
seems to be a consistent finding in the results from those studies that in areas where there
are private alternatives parallel to public operation, the unit costs are higher under public
operation. However, the cost-differences are clearly lower in areas where public entities
are faced with active market competition. It therefore seems to be empirical evidence that
the competitive situation has a major importance for the cost discipline both in public and
private operation (Hagen, 1992).
The argument that ownership does matter, is that in the case of for-profit commercial
operation in e.g., a limited corporation, the production will be more effective. This is
because the profit from the organization's operation will be granted individual owners.
Because shares can be sold, the owners would want to maximize current and future
income, by assuring cost-efficient operation. In the NTO context this consideration is
most applicable when the NTO is organized as a commercial company, which is unusual,
yet conceivable. The owners of the NTO would favor cost-efficient operation because it
could pay dividends or profit from sales of shares. Furthermore, the owners are likely to
be at least partially made up of people representing firms that have a commercial interest
in the tourism industry. Private owners would benefit from a cost-efficient NTO, which at
the same time is effective in generating tourism traffic, since these firms would benefit
from more incoming tourist customers and thus higher sales.
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Table 2.8
Public economy theory's relevance for the independent
and variables
I) Performance contracts include rewards
geting and penalties that could motivate staff to exert Orien-
prin- more effort, particularly in entities under public taion
ciple ownership. Budget increases should be linked to be more marked-
better performance. oriented and
effective, since the
2) Soft performance measures should be avoided, 2.4.2 owners from the
and relative performance measures in the form of industry are more
benchmarking can help reveal the true cost of dependent on
NTOs' operation. market performance
than the
3) A performance-based budgeting system will 2.4.3 government, and
motivate the NTO to tailor its production to the would put stronger
organization' s true cost. pressure on NTO to
show market results
4) Behavior-based budgeting can in some than the government
instances motivate the NTO to under-produce on 2.4.4 would do.
quantity and quality.
2) Without a "take- 2.4.5
5) Performance-based budgeting gives incentives 2.4.5.1 care-responsibility",
for higher production, stronger incentives for the NTO could
undesirable selection, as well as it does not resort to focus on
provide incentives to reduce the production to 2.4.5.2 existing markets
meet the balancing (non-profit) restriction. only and ignore
important markets
6) A ..take-care-responsibility" may be needed, 2.4.5.3 that require more
and a combination of per-unit and fixed-sum efforts.
principles can thus give better incentives for 2.4.5.4
optimal production. A combined alternative will
distribute risk between the producer NTO and the 2.4.5.5
which is beneficial as well.
ment as a funding source can provide a .1 Long- I) Large private
ing stable source of income over time, and thus Term firms with large
source beneficial in terms of long-term planning, unless Pers- investors might
budget cuts are done arbitrarily. pective pressure the NTO to
under-provide
2) Private funding might be more unstable over quality and ignore
time. and depends on sponsors own budget Long-Term
situation and willingness and ability to commit to Perspective or
funding of Nf'Os' long-term activities. otherwise
shortchange the
3) The common goods-problem makes it difficult 2.4.6 NTOs' other
to obtain funds from the private sector for generic stakeholders
marketing and NTO activities. Performance- because oftheir
based budgeting may increase the private sector's likely single-minded
willingness to sponsor the NTO, since it transfers focus on short-term
some of the risk of the outcome from the profits.
sponsors to the NTO. 2.4.5.2
2) Pure-per unit
budgeting can give
undesirable
incentives to focus
on short-term gains.
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l) Some researchers argue that the production
would be more efficient under a commercial
org. limited corporation operation than non-profit
control public operation.
Free-
dom
l ) Performance-
based budgeting
should allow the
stockholders lp give
theNTO more
autonomy, because
it reduces the need
to monitor and
control the activities
of the NTO.
Section 2.1 earlier in this chapter provides some theoretical and empirical evidence that
market-oriented firms are more successful and profitable than others are (ref. Sandvik,
1998). Private ownership could entice the NTO to become more market-oriented, because
effectiveness through market focus could help increase incoming traffic, which would be
in the private owners' interest. One could then argue that a commercial NTO organization
would have a stronger market-orientation incentive than a non-commercial NTO
organization. For instance, this can be due to pressure from profit-oriented owners
motivated by profit from either higher sales in own business or by income from NTO
dividends or share sales.
Politicians would not have as strong incentives as
private owners to assure cost-efficient operation.
2) Others argue that concentrated private 2.4.1
ownership/control can be used to redistribute
wealth (or benefits), or force the NTO to focus on
special private interests, on the expense of weaker
stakeholders (e.g., society. smaller industry actors
etc.).
3) Again some scholars argue that the
inefficiency often associated with public
operation does not serve the public the best,
whereas private operation would improve
efficiency and thus benefit all stakeholders.
4) World Bank study found that the greater the 2.4.2
participation of private agents in ownership and
management, the better performance of the
organization.
5) A non-profit NTO asked by its owner to 2.4.5
balance budgets will have other production
incentives than a profit-maximizing owner
Limited ('m-nn,r"tinn)
We have discussed earlier in Section 2.1.2 that a Long-Term Perspective is desirable. A
commercial NTO organization could, however, have speculative owners that would want
to boost short-term gains from current NTO dividend payments or sales of shares on the
expense of longer-term operation (see also Section 2.5.5 later). A privately owned non-
commercial NTO would probably provide somewhat weaker incentives for this kind of
undesirable owner behavior, where maximization of short-term profits from shares sales
or dividends is unlikely, while the cost-efficiency incentive would probably be stronger
in a commercial type ofNTO organization.
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With public ownership, however, the benefits from cost-efficient operation would not be
granted individual owners in the same manner as in the private-ownership case
(Johansen, 200 I). Politicians and the bureaucrats in the NTA would not have as strong
incentives as private owners to make sure that the operation is cost-efficient, or purpose-
effective for that matter.
There is little doubt that the leading scholars in this field, particularly in the US, have
emphasized the arguments for privatization the heaviest (Johansen, 200 I). There are,
however, some counter-arguments to this notion. This body ofresearch seldom focuses
on the societal interests public ownership is supposed to safeguard (Johansen, 200 I). A
plausible one is that an important purpose of public operation is that one should consider
other concerns beyond maximizing profits. We have discussed earlier the danger of the
NTO becoming overly industry-oriented or in other ways subject to undesirable pressure
to over-prioritize powerful owner-stakeholder groups, which may not be socially
desirable. For instance, the needs and interests of small businesses in rural areas or small
sub-sectors of the industry may be overlooked. This could happen, ifthe private NTO-
owner-coalition was dominated by, for instance, severallarge city hotel chains or large
international airlines.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large investors [e.g., large private sponsors/owners
of the NTO] and thereby concentrated ownership will have some obvious benefits, at
least theoretically. The large investors have both the interest in getting their money back
and value for their investment, and the consensus and power to demand it. Again, the
problem with concentrated private ownership is that the large investors/sponsors
represent their own interests, who may not coincide with the interest of other smaller
sponsors, NTO employees or management, the government, society, or other
stakeholders. In the process of using his control right to maximize his own welfare, the
large investor/sponsor can redistribute wealth -in both efficient an inefficient ways- from
others.
Thus in some situations, according to Shleifer and Vishny, concentrated private
ownership e.g., by one or a few firms may not be optimal. This is because non-
shareholder constituents such as: managers, employees, small stakeholders, and
consumers are left with too few rents (or net benefits), and thus too little incentive to
make relation-specific investments. Relation specific investments can be e.g., financing
of a long-term co-project between a small and large stakeholder, or a long-term
destination brand-building campaign by the NTO. For instance, large private firms with
large investors might pressure the NTO to under-provide quality and ignore a long-term
perspective or otherwise short-change the NTOs' other stakeholders because oftheir
single-minded focus on short-term profits. This logic has been used to explain why health
care, child care, and even retailing are sometimes provided by cooperatives, even
consumer cooperatives. (It is for example conceivable that one could organize the NTO
as a cooperative or some kind of other non-profit organization). A similar argument has
been used to justify government ownership of firms or organizations (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Where monopoly power, externalities, societal or other distributional
issues raise concerns, privately owned profit-maximizing firms, which a commercial
version of an NTO could be, may fail to address these concerns. A publicly spirited
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politician or NTA bureaucrat can then improve efficiency by controlling the decisions of
such firms. Social welfare arguments underlie the traditional ownership ofrailroads,
electricity, prisons, schools, health care, and many other activities (Laffont and Triole,
1993; Sappington and Stiglitz 1987). In addition there is the issue of the
common/collective good problem, which creates a free-riding incentive, and
consequentially, problems with under-funding. This may explain why we encounter so
many government-owned NTOs (see Table 5.1 later). With a few exceptions of activities
where the argument for state ownership is feasible, such as police and prisons (Hart,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) the reality of government ownership is broadly inconsistent
with this efficiency argument. First, state firms do not appear to serve the public interest
better than private firms do. For example, in many countries state enterprises are much
worse polluters than private firms are. Indeed the pollution problems are worst in the
former communist countries that were dominated by state firms (Grossman and Krueger,
1993). Second, contrary to theory, state firms are typically extremely inefficient, and their
losses result in huge drains on their countries' treasuries. Some government owned NTOs
possess budgets in excess of US $100 million annually, much ofthis financed by
taxpayers' contributions. One can only imagine what the potential inefficiency-losses of
such large government-owned NTOs can do to taxpayer's money in a given country. As
Shleifer and Vishny put it: "In their frequent disregard of social objectives, as well as
their extreme inefficiency, the behavior of state firms (or organizations) is inconsistent
with the efficiency justification of their existence" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
The recognition of enormous inefficiency of state firms, and the pressures on public
budgets have created a common response around the world in the last few years, namely
privatization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the case ofNTOs we can see a
corresponding tendency of increased government pressure for private sector NTO
funding and control (World Tourism Organization, 1996). In most cases privatization
replaces political control with private control by outside investors. At the same time,
privatization in most countries creates concentrated private cash flow ownership to go
along with control. The result ofthis switch to these relatively more efficient ownership
structures is typically a significant improvement in performance of privatized firms
(Megginson et al, 1994; Lopez -de-Sialnes 1994).
In terms of Long-Term Perspective as it relates tofunding source, one could argue both
ways. A change in the national budget situation or a change in political power, which in
turn may change priorities, could make the governments cut NTOs' budget arbitrarily
from one year to another. "Arbitrarily" is defined here as regardless ofNTOs'
performance. As a consequence, the NTOs may have to cancel long-term programs such
as destination image building or work with new markets. Such sponsor behavior would
make the long-term budget situation uncertain and impede long-term planning and
operation for NTOs. Obviously, for government ownership to be beneficial for the
organization, such behavior must be avoided. On the other hand, private sponsors may
also decide to pull or reduce their sponsorship arbitrarily due to political or tactical
reasons or simply the businesses' own budget situation. Such behavior could also reduce
the predictability ofNTOs' budget situation and reduce the ability for long-term planning
and operation. From the empiric results ofthis study presented later in Chapter 5 it
appears that our practitioner respondents seem to believe that government funding
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provides a more stable source then private funding. As we will point out later in the
recommendations chapter, performance-based budgeting principles will probably reduce
the impact offunding source, since it limits the sponsors' ability to cut budgets
arbitrarily. This is of course given that sponsors are fully committed to the liabilities
vested in the principle.
In sum there are some strong arguments that NTOs would be more cost-efficient,
effective, and more apt to be market-focused under private ownership. On the other hand,
some will argue that government NTO ownership could help safeguard societal interests
beyond cost efficiency and owner profit maximization, but this has not yet been proven
empirically. On the contrary, some evidence suggests that government ownership does
not guarantee that societal interests are best served. In terms of desired Long-Term
Perspective ofNTOs, government funding/and or control could be beneficial for the
organizations' long-term operational perspective. However, this notion will only be valid
under a steady NTO budget policy and no or few arbitrary budget cuts, which may not be
the case in all countries. In countries where budget policies are unstable, governments
change often, and frequent budget cuts occur, private funding/and or control may be
better for the Long-Term Perspective and operational ability of the NTO.
2.4.2 Performance-based budgeting for the NTO - What makes it
work and what doesn't?
In a World Bank study of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in developing countries (World
Bank, 1995) one found that the greater the participation of private agents in ownership
and management, the better performance of the organization, which is in line with
Shleifer and Vishny's arguments in the preceding section. The study also found that
performance-based contracts had little impact on performance. This is explained by the
fact that these contracts did not improve the incentive structures facing government SOE
managers. They did not reduce the managers' information advantage; instead the
managers were able to use their knowledge of the firm to negotiate multiple soft targets
that were easy for them to reach.
The World Bank also pointed out that the performance contracts encountered in the study
rarely included rewards and penalties that could motivate staff to exert more effort.
Where cash bonuses were offered they had little effect because they were not linked to
better performance. Other promised incentives such as greater managerial autonomy,
where often not delivered, and penalties, such as firing and demotion, were seldom
applied.
For the purpose ofthis thesis, we have thus not included performance-based principles
based on soft measures in our independent variables. Soft measures could be, for
instance, indirect measures such as: knowledge of the country in target markets, number
of activities initiated, service satisfaction among clients/users etc. Instead we have used
hard targets such as increase in number oftourists/receipts (absolute performance) and
increase number/receipts oftourists relative to comparable countries (relative
performance). (See also Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 for an overview of the
principles/independent variables). We have included the relative performance principle
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(P2), for another reason as well. This kind of benchmarking principle can act as substitute
for market competition, since the NTO will be awarded or punished relative to the
performance in terms oftourism traffic of other comparable countries. By comparing a
given NTO with its neighboring NTOs on "hard" performance, one can find out what is
reasonable to expect from that NTO in terms of resource efficiency and effectiveness. It
can help reveal the "true" cost of effective and efficient NTO operation. This can help
reduce the NTO's information advantage over its stakeholders. This may prevent that
NTO management is able to negotiate unreasonably high budgets, which often produces
socially undesirable resource slack in the organization and resource-inefficiency through
shirking or other types of resource misallocation or waste.
The internal organization, operation, and incentive structures ofNTOs are somewhat
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it should be clear that performance-based
budgets ought to have consequences for how management and employees are rewarded
and penalized as well as for the NTO itself as an organization (see also section 2.5.2 for
details). Performance-based budgets should be linked to management and employees'
bonuses; a greater budget as a result of good performance should give room for such
bonuses. Weak performance over time should be linked penalties, such as firing and
demotion. This should be a part of the NTOs' internal incentive structures in order for
performance budgeting to have any effect on the NTOs' behavior whatsoever.
Most important for our purposes here is the issue ofmanagerial autonomy. Performance-
based budgets should in theory give the stakeholders less of a need to monitor NTOs, and
should give NTOs more Operational Freedom. (See also section 2.2.3.2, 2.2.3.3 and 2.5.2
for more detailed explanations.
A final problem why performance contracts had little effect pointed out by the World
Bank study is that governments demonstrated little commitment to the terms of the
contracts, frequently reneging on key promises. This increased managers' incentive to
use their information advantage to negotiate soft targets. For performance-based
budgeting to have an incentive effect on NTOs, it is crucial that promised budget rewards
are awarded as promised. This can be challenging for some governments or other funding
stakeholders, because it makes the governments liable to come up with extra budget
funds ifNTOs achieve increases in tourism traffic. The governments will not know for
sure how much they will have to payout in NTO budgets the following year, which may
be problematic in the public budgeting process. The governments will also loose their
discretion to cut NTO budgets arbitrarily. The public budgeting problem can be mitigated
by linking the performance budgeting process to tax revenue from tourism (Principle 7
and 8, see Table 5.1). The governments' increased NTO budget liabilities as a result of
increases in tourism traffic can be offset by higher hypotecrated tax revenue from the
same increases in tourism traffic.
Furthermore, the increased risk for NTOs associated with implementation of performance
based-budgets should be compensated by greater Operational Freedom, e.g., in a more
"hands off' approach by the governments or other controlling stakeholders. In practice,
this means to relax some of the control devices mentioned under monitoring structure # 2,
(see Section 2.2.3.2) in order to give NTO managements greater autonomy. This can
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make performance budgeting more acceptable to the NTO, and at the same time reduce
stakeholder transaction cost associated with monitoring and negotiating with the NTO.
2.4.3 Market failure - governing stakeholders' alternatives
A lot of the academic discussion in public economy theory regarding privatization is
under the assumption that private operation, probably subject of some kind of regulation,
in most cases is more efficient than public operation (Olsen, 1992). Assuming a
normative view, and thus assuming a government that is interested in furthering the
interests of the public and society, it will under perfect information (no information
asymmetry) be so that the three forms ofpublic intervention - public operation,
regulation, and taxation - are all equivalent. (Taxation of the organization itself as means
of organizational control is a more indirect form of intervention and not relevant for our
purposes.) We have discussed earlier (e.g., in Section 2.2.2.2 and 2.4.2) that it probably is
some degree of information asymmetry between the NTOs and the NTAs or other
principal stakeholders in our case. Along with information asymmetry, we have a
situation of market failure. In general, market failure occurs when there is:
a) lack of competition, in a commercial context most often caused by economics of
scale or irreversible investments. (In the NTO context there is usually only one
NTO in a given country which has been designated to do international tourism
marketing on behalf of the country!", and NTO has a "monopoly" on official
country representation).
b) external effects, such as employment, infrastructure development, and tax revenue
c) common goods, for instance knowledge gained through research and
development, or generated county image (brand name).
d) information asymmetry in transactions between private actors
That leaves the government with two realistic alternatives in order to respond to a
situation with market failure, as is common in the NTO context: Either public operation
ofNTO as a government entity or private sector NTO operation subject to regulation.
The latter is also known as contracting out.
In fact, NTOs have in most cases been licensed a "monopoly" position in the national
supplier market for international generic tourism marketing. A government may give so
large subsidies to an NTO bureau, or may subject private competitors to such stringent
regulations that other organizations or companies find it unprofitable to compete. Thus,
the task for the government is somewhat similar to that of regulating the production and
pricing ofmonopolistic businesses in the private sector. As we have discussed earlier, a
common problem for the government is that it does not fully know the organization's
technology, assets and costs, and that these are better known to the organization than the
government. Such information asymmetries make it possible for the organization to
191n theory, it conceivable to have more than one NTO so that several organizations offering international
marketing are able to compete on a contract basis. Competition could then reduce NTOs' information
advantage. But economies of scale and other political considerations (e.g, hierarchy of organization, official
country representation, one entity only for clients to respond to etc) make this a less likely scenario.
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strategically better its own position (Olsen, 1992). Without any kind of regulation, this
organization could use its monopoly position to gain unreasonable profit (in the
contracting out case) or consume slack on the expense oftaxpayers and society (in the
public operation case).
Ifthe governments followed a principle of determining the organizations' budget based
on the estimated cost ofNTOs' operation (e.g., principle # 4 and partially P3 and P5 in
Table 5.1) NTOs would have had incentives to exaggerate their cost estimate. When the
true cost is hidden for the governments and is kept hidden [by the NTOs], the production
will not be adapted to these costs; and the resource usage will normally be inefficient
(Olsen, 1992). This means that, if an organization with private information should be
motivated to tailor its production efficiently to the true cost, it will have to get some kind
of reward, also a pure profit. In a commercial NTO context this would be equivalent to
increased operational profits; in a non-commercial scenario this could take the form of or
slack or bonuses/perks. From the government side there is then a trade-offbetween
motivating for efficient production and letting the organization have some level of profit
or slack. This potential profit or slack is a basic rent, and thus a reward that is not a
compensation for productive effort. When the government values the organization's pure
profit less than consumer (society) surplus, the regulation problem becomes to extract
this basic rent (at least to some extent) (Olsen, 1992). The optimal regulatory system
grants the organization operationalfreedom, and has a design that gives the organization
incentives to tailor the production [here: marketing effort] to its true production costs
(Olsen, 1992). The produced quantity [level of marketing effort] will, however, not be
fist-best effective, and the efficiency loss will be greater the higher the organization's true
costs are. Due to the fact that the organization has private information and will use this
strategically, it will achieve a certain information rent - and this profit will be greater the
lower the costs of the organization. We will discuss this in more detail in Sections 2.4.4
and 2.4.5 next.
2.4.4 Incentive-based budgeting principles and asymmetric
mformatiorr"
In this section we will discuss how a governing stakeholder can design incentive-based
budgeting-principle for a national producer of international tourism marketing. In a recent
research report, Bjorvatn, Kjerstad, Sannarnes, and Sunnevåg (2002) discuss how
incentive-based financing systems can be designed for public heath services. Much of
their discussion on financing systems public health services can be applied directly to our
study offinancing and control ofNTOs, as discussed below.
For simplicity we will assume that the government would operate in the role of a
regulator or governing stakeholder and the producer operate as the agent for the
government. In a situation where the government has complete information of the
producer's operating cost, technology, and opportunities for cost-efficiency, the
20 Adapted from Bjorvatn, A., E. Kjerstad, J. G. Sannames, and K. Sunnevåg's research report
"Insentivbaserte finansieringssystemer for helseforetak", SNF, Bergen, Norway.
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government would be able to design a budgeting system that would assure efficient and
adequate production of marketing services. However, the government does normally not
have such complete information. When the producer has more information than the
government, there would be information asymmetry. As-discussed earlier, asymmetric
information can result in problems associated with moral hazard and adverse selection.
Four conditions related to the design of a budgeting principle will be discussed here:
• Incentives for efficiency in the production and investments
• Optimal quality and quantity
• How to avoid undesirable selection of certain markets
• Optimal allocation of risk between the government and the producer of
international tourism marketing
A budgeting principle should give incentives for efficiency in production and in
investments. Efficiency in production has at least two aspects: One is that the costs of
production of international tourism marketing services are minimized by a budgeting
principle that gives correct incentives for cost efficiency. To achieve this, the reward
must be compared to the cost of the cost-reducing activities. This means that the gain
from a cost-reduction should be fully or partially retained by the producer. In this way the
producer will have incentives to cut costs and produce the services in an efficient way.
The other aspect is that the budgeting principle gives incentives to choose an optimal
combination of input resources such as capital and labor. We will not get into discussion
of the latter here.
The objective of efficiency has also a dynamic aspect. A well designed budgeting system
should give correct incentives so that considerations ofwhether to invest in marketing
production equipment or capacity (e.g., IT equipment, staff training and competence,
establishment of new foreign offices, etc.) and other types of investments are done in a
social-economic desirable way. At the same time it should assure that the producer
considers a new investment versus better utilization of existing production equipment or
capacity.
The marketing services should be produced with optimal quality. Examples ofhigher
quality can be a better, yet more expensive, marketing tool such as a new interactive
internet site, or a new foreign office. The quality notion can thus mean both better quality
of the input factors and that the producer employs more input factors to produce the
service. In principle, the degree of quality should depend on cost-benefit analysis where
improved quality is measured against the cost.
However, there is a connection between cost efficiency and quality. Ifthe producer will
be awarded full coverage of costs, he will not assume the costs of increased quality. Then
there will be a risk that the services provided will be ofhigher quality than what is
socially desirable. On the other hand, ifthe budgeting principle gives strong incentives
for cost reductions without special restrictions on minimum quality, there will be a risk
that the producer will not assume higher quality in its production. Ifthe benefits of
improved quality are only allocated to the tourism industry, the tourists and/or the
67
government - and not the producer NTO, the services could end up being produced at
inferior quality.
The budgeting principle should not give incentives for undesirable selection of certain
markets either. For instance, where one has a budgeting principle where the producer
would be paid certain amount unit e.g., per foreign tourist that visits the country (tourist
arrivals), regardless of the cost of attracting the tourists, the producer would have
incentives to try to attract the least costly tourists. For instance, this could be low-
spending one-day visitors from a neighboring country, or only tourists from established
traditional markets. On the other hand, if a budgeting principle is employed where the
producer obtains full cost coverage of the costs associated with attracting each tourist,
there would not be any such selection problems. However, in an NTO context it is quite
difficult to calculate or estimate the exact cost of attracting each individual tourist, since
some visitors may arrive regardless ofany influence from NTOs' production, while other
may arrive as a result ofNTOs' work, or anything in between. Without a large and
complicated survey apparatus for measurement of incoming tourists' purchase decision
process, it is hard to identify the first from the latter. Therefore it is difficult to allocate a
specified cost to each individual or group oftourists, i.e., per-unit cost-pricing is
cumbersome in the NTO context.
2.4.5 How to regulate a producer of international tourism marketing21
In the following we will assume a situation where the government is to design a system to
regulate a producer of international tourism marketing. The producer can in many
instances have a (virtual) national monopoly for production of official international
tourism marketing services. In principle the government is faced with the task of
regulating a producer through either a budgeting system, or through the instructions,
goals, and objectives the government (as the owner of the producer) sets for the producer.
In the following we will discuss whether the budget principle should be based on a
behavior-based principle (e.g., estimated cost of marketing plans and activities) or a
performance-based principle (e.g., per-unit reward) or a combination of the two types of
principles.
2.4.5.1 Behavior-based budgeting
Ifthe producer has a profit-maximizing goal, such as an NTO organized as a limited
corporation (ref. Principle 14 in Table 5.1), it will be important to give the producer the
right signals for optimal production ofmarketing services. A profit-maximizing producer
faced with a fixed sum funds transfer principle (ref. Principle 5) would want to produce
as little as possible, since extra income from increased production would be zero. In such
a scenario the government will have to give the producer additional incentives through
other mechanisms. Examples for such incentives could be to introduce a "take-care-of-
responsibility", where the producer will be instructed to produce marketing services for
certain segments of the tourism industry such as: non-central/rural areas, small
businesses, eco-tourism, or to promote sustainable tourism, etc. For instance, the
21 Section 2.4.5 is adapted from a recent research report (SNF-report no. 34/02) on financing systems for
health services.
68
producer could be given a "take-care-of-responsibility" in the form of certain goals and
objectives that will have to be met (ref. Principle 6 in Table 5.1.) Ifthe producer is faced
with a "take-care-of-responsibility", he could still have incentives to produce as little as
possible with as low quality as possible, as long as the "take-care-of-responsibility" is
satisfied. A similar conceivable budgeting principle could be based on sale and execution
ofprojects with cost coverage ofwork performed on the part of the producer (ref.
Principle 3, Table 5.1). However, as already mentioned, full cost coverage will give weak
incentives for cost efficiency.
Two aspects, that could deter such opportunistic and undesirable behavior, could be that
the producer would want to maintain a good reputation, or as in most cases, is truly
concerned about helping the overall tourism industry.
An alternative to have a profit-maximizing producer is to give him a task to balance his
cost against his income, or achieve zero-profit (ref. Principles 12 and 13). For instance,
this could take form of a principle where the producer is allocated a budget negotiated on
the basis ofhis plans of the activities and efforts he wants to carry out (ref. Principle 4).
In a situation where the "take-care-of-responsibility" is satisfied, the producer would not
have special incentives to prioritize any left-over resources. If so, there could be other
motives that will determine how the excess resources are spent, for instance where the
management or employees have special interests, where there is benefits from lobbying-
effort to win political and financial support, or otherwise act in a way that the services are
not produced as efficiently as they could. Alternatively, excess recourses could be spent
for investments in special equipment, technology, or human resources that would
strengthen the producer's standing in a future coordination with other producers or
bureaus, or when the services are produced with a higher quality than optimal. It can also
come to a situation where the producer faces a conflict between the "take-care-of-
responsibility" and the budget balancing restriction. The "take-care-of-responsibility" is
not easily measurable for the government because the producer has more information
about quality of the services than the government and the efficiency in the production of
those. The balancing restriction is directly measurable through the organization's
financial statement.
It can be difficult to design incentive systems when some of the measurement variables
are more observable, measurable, or verifiable than others. This is because the producer
organizations have a tendency to focus its effort on the observable variables. In this case
that would be the balancing restriction of a non-profit organization. The "take-care-of-
responsibility" can be specified as a minimum standard. In that case it would be focus on
e.g., the number of promotional brochures distributed or number of ads on internet pages
that promote the beneficiaries of the "take-care-of-responsibility" restriction, etc. There is
thus a risk that there would be a focus on measurable aspects and not on less measurable
aspects such as quality and efficiency. It could also be so that the balancing restriction is
perceived as a "soft regulation". Ifthe producer runs with a profit loss, he would turn to
the government and ask for more funds to produce marketing services for. In that case
there is a risk that different priorities are made strategic and that the producer would
choose to run with a profit loss in order to maximize the transfer of funds to the producer
over time.
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2.4.5.2 Performance-based budgeting
An alternative to pure fixed sum budgeting could be a pure per-unit budgeting. For
instance, a measurement unit could be per tourist arrival or per dollar oftourism receipts
(ref. Principle l). Contrary to pure fixed-sum budgeting, where the producer receives a
certain amount unconditionally of the level ofproduction, a performance-based pure per-
unit budgeting principle entails a variable budget income that is to some degree
dependent on the production and 100% dependent on market performance. In a short-
time perspective a profit-maximizing producer would want to produce marketing effort
until the marginal cost ofproduction equals the budget reward per unit. For the producer
to have incentives to commit to investments and long-term planning, he will have to be
compensated for the fixed cost. In a pure per-unit compensation system this must be
incorporated so that the per-unit reward is set somewhat higher than the marginal cost.
However, obtaining tourism influx from new markets or segments, or promote important
tourism products that are harder to sell (e.g., rural tourism, eco-tourism, etc.), may be
more costly than relying on traditional markets that produce tourists at low cost and
effort. A better solution would be to base the reward on the economic value of incoming
tourism (tourism receipts/expenditure), because this could reward the NTO to focus on
higher-spending and longer-stay tourists; that is higher-quality tourists rather than higher
quantities oftourists. More affluent tourists are also likely to be better culturally and
environmentally educated and fewer in number. Higher quality tourists can reduce the
cultural and environmental wear on the host country.
In any case, pure per-unit pricing may give incentives for selection and possibly reinforce
the problem with the "tyranny of the served market". It could also give weak incentives
for investments in long-term engagements and "marketing infrastructure". Even ifthe
per-unit regulated producer is not profit-maximizing, but has a budget-balancing
restriction instead, he will still have incentives for undesirable market selection, such as
easy-access low-cost markets and short-term operational strategies. To meet the
balancing restriction he will, compared to the fixed-sum regulated producer, have
stronger incentives for undesirable selection of markets targeted and products promoted,
and to reduce quality rather than production.
It is foremost these areas that distinguish performance-based principles from behavior
based principles. Performance-based budgeting gives incentives for higher production,
stronger incentives for undesirable selection, as well as it does not provide incentives to
reduce the production to meet the balancing restriction.
A per-unit budget principle could also be combined with a "take-care-of-responsibility"
for certain markets or products. Due to the fact that the per-unit principle inherently
stimulates for production, it will not at the same time stimulate to adequate production.
However, can such limitations in the form of "take-care-of-responsibility" with minimum
standards for quality help to counteract incentives for undesirable selection.
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2.4.5.3 Combined behavior- and performance-based budgeting
It is also possible to combine a fixed-sum principle with a per-unit performance-based
principle. The fixed-sum portion of the budget can then be tailored to represent fixed
cost, whereas the per-unit portion of the budget could be designed to give incentives for
optimal production on the margin. It will be possible to achieve optimal production in
such a system when the per-unit reward is equal to the benefits of the tourism industry's
and society's marginal benefits of the marketing service, while the producer will produce
until the marginal costs are equal to the per-unit reward. In theory this will be more
effective as a budgeting principle because it will on the margin give more correct
incentives for production.
Ifthe producer also is restricted to zero profit and at the same time has a "take-care-of-
responsibility", he will in theory face the same problems as discussed in a pure per-unit
principle as discussed above. To meet the requirement of zero profit the producer will
have incentives to reduce quality and use undesirable selection to save cost. The "take-
care-of-responsibility" will also reduce the incentives that occur due to the per-unit
principle to avoid higher risk markets and products, and possibly take on an undesirable
short-term focus. The combination of per-unit and fixed-sum principles can thus give
better incentives for optimal production. Compared to a fixed-sum principle it is a risk
that, both under the non-profit and profit-maximizing condition, the quality will be
prioritized lower.
2.4.5.4 Budgeting principles and risk-sharing
The budgeting principles have importance for risk-sharing between the regulator and the
producer (i.e., between the NTO and its owner/financer). Risk-assumption has
importance for the producer's incentives. The degree ofrisk on the part of the producer
will affect the incentives for efficiency, quality ofproduction, market focus, and long-
term planning. Transfer of risk to the producer will help give stronger production
incentives, but the risk transfer must be held in relation to the ability to assume risk and
in the areas where the producer can influence the cost.
It can be discussed which actor is more capable of assuming increased risk. Normallyone
will assume that the government is more able than the producer. This is because
differences in ability to bear risk, and differences in ability to diversify from risk. The
government has the most wealth, and would normally be more able to handle variations
in income than a single producer. The government also has a better ability to diversify
from the producer-specific and industry-specific risk.
When designing a performance-based budgeting principle or a combined activity- and
performance-based one, it is important that there is a connection between risk-bearing
and the factors the producer can control or influence. In an NTO context, some factors
affecting outcome will be almost completely beyond the NTOs' control, such as currency
exchange rates and relative price level. Other factors can be more easily be controlled and
influenced. So optimal effort should, in most cases, be strongly related to tourism market
performance, but in some cases not.
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With a full-coverage-of-expenses-based budgeting principle, through for instance a
project sale-based principle, the producer will not bear any risk; all the risk is assumed by
the government or any other project financer. Since the producer will be allowed full cost
coverage, the producer has no incentives for cost efficiency. It is a danger that this can
lead to too high quality and overproduction compared to what is socially desirable. For
instance, the producer will have incentives to constantly generate new projects, resulting
in a potential "overkill" of the market. Cost coverage principles such as this should give
few incentives for undesirable selection, since one will achieve cost coverage for both
high risk/expense and low risk/expense markets or products.
If the producer is financed through a fixed-sum principle without a "take-care-of
responsibility" the producer will not bear any risk. It would give incentives for cost-
efficiency because benefits from any saved costs will be retained by the producer. We
have discussed earlier that pure fixed-sum budgeting can give incentives for too low
production if it is not combined with a per-unit performance-based principle or "take-
care-of-responsibility". With such a combination, the producer will take over some of the
risk-bearing as explained below.
In system with a pure per-unit performance principle, the producer would bear all the risk
of both the cost and the income. It is not possible to ex-ante estimate exactly how much it
will cost to attract a certain number oftourists or achieve a certain level oftourism
receipts. Nor can the producer know for sure what the outcome will be in terms of
incoming tourism traffic, even if the producer does the right things and puts forward
optimal effort and resources. In other words the producer can risk incurring considerable
expenses, while his income is dependent on per-unit market performance. So there is a
risk associated with both the cost ofproduction and the income stemming from market
performance. In a pure per-unit principle the government will have to over-insure the
producer for variations in tourism traffic through a risk premium, a premium higher than
the marginal cost of attracting more tourists. Otherwise the producer will resist the added
risk, and try to insulate itselffrom financial risk by lowering quality (e.g., avoid work
with new, more risky markets, or only focus on short-term engagements and gain).
A benchmark/tournament type of per-unit principle can help reduce some of the external
and less controllable industry-specific risk. A relative performance-principle, where the
producer's performance is measured and rewarded against the performance of
comparable producers subject to similar industry-specific external risk, can help reduce
external risk (ref. Principle 2)
When combining a fixed-sum and per-unit principle, which should be reflecting fixed and
variable cost accordingly, the risk is shared between the government and the producer. In
such a scenario the producer will be relieved from the risk attached to fixed cost, without
weakening his incentive for cost-efficient production through the per-unit production-
related variable cost.
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2.4.5.5 Budgeting principles and implications for NTOs
If left unregulated under a fixed-sum budgeting principle NTOs could, in extreme cases,
do as little marketing effort and produce as lowas possible to keep the costs at a
minimum and extract the profit or consume the slack i.e., shirk on the residual between
allocated budget and real costs. To deceive the stakeholders, NTOs could resort to
inexpensive, yet non-productive activities directed at convincing stakeholders that NTOs'
existence and operating expenses are justifiable and desirable. The NTOs could do so
instead of spending resources on more costly but efficient production in the form of
marketing effort (see also Table 2.6 earlier in this chapter). Such behavior can work as a
"smokescreen" to detract attention from NTOs' real productivity. To any given
stakeholder in government, tourism businesses, or among the public/taxpayers such
NTOs may appear to be efficient, while in reality they are not, because they will not be
using their resources as efficiently as possible to increase desired tourism traffic. For
"clever" NTOs it may be possible to divert attention away from "hard" results e.g.,
increased tourism traffic, to "soft" measures hard to measure accurately, and focus on
displaying high organizational visibility in the media or other high-profile venues. Lack
of hard results may be written off as caused by exogenous factors and chance events such
as e.g., "too low" budget, the weather, price level, currency rates, the tourism industry's
behavior and its quality of products, national and international political conditions, and so
on. The NTOs can then still maintain - or even increase - their budgets through lobbying
efforts and negotiations. This may again produce more budget slack that can be
consumed by the NTOs.
In the other extreme, NTOs' managements could try to create a "crisis" in order to boost
budgets and produce marketing effort well beyond what is truly cost-efficient. For
instance, the NTOs could point at similar organizations in other countries with huge and
bloated budgets, and convince stakeholders that sponsors are under-spending on NTOs'
budgets, and then negotiate increases in budgets. This can allow the organizations to
grow, employ more staff, and do more activities than necessary to generate a desired
level oftourism traffic. This may result in an "overkill" or oversell in the market, and
thus resources wasted. The organizations could then be able to show some "hard" results,
but through lobbying and visibility- and justification efforts manage to divert
stakeholders' attention away from the cost ofproducing those results. The organizations
have weak incentives to really discover and reveal to the stakeholders how much effort is
really needed, i.e., their true costs, to be effective in the international tourism market. If
left unchecked, NTOs may be able to maintain such budget over-spending for years and
years.
The optimal regulation scheme fixes, in a detailed way, the organization's reward based
on its observable actions (Olsen, 1992). In this case it could be the absolute or relative
amount oftraffic NTOs are able to generate. This will entice NTOs to find out through
market research what the optimal is effort and produce it, neither too much nor too little.
IfNTOs put forward too little effort, they will get reduced budgets the next year ifthe
tourism traffic decreases, and will thus be penalized. IfNTOs put forward too much
effort and "overkills" the market, they will not be able to extract a rent in the form of
pure profit or slack because this will cost more than it pays. The increases in budget
stemming from increased tourism traffic will not match the excessive cost - and the
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organizations will be penalized because their increases in expenses will be greater than
their increases in income. This should work as a corrective on NTOs' behavior in terms
of resource allocation and level of production of marketing effort.
One possible practical solution for financing stakeholders is to offer NTOs a "budget-
menu" comprised ofvarious combinations ofa fixed budget component and a
performance-based component. We have included some budget simulations in Appendix
7 for illustration of the impact of such budget menus. For instance, NTOs can within
reasonable limits be given the choice about how big of a component they would want to
have performance-based, e.g., 40% fixed budget and 60% variable performance-based
budget. Market conditions change and the market may be stable or turbulent, large or
small, difficult or easy. We believe that under fair to good conditions, ambitious, self-
confident, and risk-seeking managers acting on the behalf of the organization would then
try to maximize the total budget by choosing a relatively high portion of performance-
budget and low portion of fixed budget. This would also give the manager an incentive to
reduce fixed operational cost e.g., to cut unnecessary staff, non-productive activity, etc.
Variable cost could be increased that a larger part of the budget could be made available
for tourism traffic generating marketing effort such as e.g., promotional campaigns,
country image building, product development, etc. When market conditions are turbulent
more and difficult, and risk is thus greater, a higher portion offixed budget would
probably have been chosen.
On the other hand, an obvious practical problem with such sophisticated regulation
systems is their complexity. The optimal budget menu and the funds transfer process
from the governments or other stakeholders will in a complicated way generally depend
on the governments' access to all relevant data needed for the set-up and execution of the
regulation system. This means that some resources will be consumed by the governments
to design and follow up such systems and for the organizations to understand, familiarize
themselves with, and adapt to the regulations (Olsen, 1992).
2.4.6 Common goods and the free-rider problem
The form of international marketing activity NTOs are responsible for can be
characterized as a common good (sometimes called collective good). Common goods
have the trait that the use and benefits from it can not be made exclusive only for those
who invest in it or pay for it to be made available and maintained (non-exclusivity).
Another trait is that consumption of additional units of the good involves zero marginal
costs of production (non-rivalry) (ref. e.g., Olson, 1965: 14; Nicholson, 1988:729; Elster,
1998). These are a kind of good it is difficult to produce and commercialize in an
effective manner through ordinary market mechanisms (Jakobsen, 1998). Benefits
derived from the marketing effort and services made available by NTOs can be enjoyed
by e.g., tourists, the tourism industry and suppliers to that industry, and the local
population, as well as local and national governments (Farstad, Skaipe and Troye, 2001).
This is regardless of whether all of these actors that are willing to pay for it or not. The
inability to exclude non-paying beneficiaries will make under-investment in this type of
common good likely. There are several reasons why the common goods issue (such as
NTO tourism marketing effort) is especially important in the travel industry compared to
other industries. The demand for typical tourism services such as accommodations,
74
restaurants, transport, and attractions often depend on international marketing effort to
persuade potential tourists to choose a given country as their destination. Moreover,
successful marketing effort by NTOs will be beneficial for businesses outside the travel
industry e.g., suppliers, retail etc., as well as the local population, who benefit from
employment, development of tourism infrastructure, and revenue to the local economy
due to increased tourism traffic. So (moderate) development oftourism can make it more
attractive to live at a given destination. This is because the local population can enjoy the
same development oftourist attractions and infrastructure as the tourists enjoy. Local and
national governments also benefit from increased direct and indirect tax revenue and
legitimate demand for public services. Thus, tourism has many beneficiaries beyond the
travel industry itself (see also section 3.1 in Chapter 3).
The problem with this type of common goods is to draw the line between who really
benefits from the tourism marketing derived goods and who should be responsible for
financing NTOs. This type of financing problem is apt to arise because no single actor
has the exclusive control of the benefits derived from the NTOs efforts. Many others can
take advantage ofNTOs' efforts and act as free riders. This makes it difficult to find one
particular private sector actor or group who would be willing to accept the responsibility
to fund the NTOs. No single private sector actor or group would normally like to pay
single-handedly for services that also benefit a number of stakeholders non-paying
stakeholders. This can explain why there are very few NTOs that are funded solely by the
tourism industry without any kind of financial support from the government. Without any
kind ofregulation or legislation, e.g., through a dedicated marketing fee on the industry, a
hypotecrated tourist tax, etc. that provides a basis for private sector funding, it is hard to
create and operate NTOs that are to be funded by the industry alone on a pure voluntary
basis.
We believe that performance-based budgeting systems can mitigate the common goods
problem somewhat. However, but it will be naive to think that such an arrangement will
rid us with the common goods problem entirely. There is still an incentive for the private
sector actors to behave in an opportunistic way and fee-ride on benefits from the
marketing efforts of NTOs. However, the industry actors may have other motives for
supporting (or not supporting NTOs) than pure short-term opportunistic agendas. For
instance, we could consider the following notion: Ifthe budgets ofNTOs were based on
market performance, the NTOs would have had stronger incentives to make market-
oriented decisions. In turn, this would probably improve NTOs' market performance,
since market-oriented organizations usually perform better, as discussed in Section 2.1
and supported by empirical research. Improved market performance, e.g., higher tourism
receipts, would then again improve the industry's overall profits. The businesses would
then probably realize that well performing NTOs are very beneficial for their own
performance. They would also realize that NTOs' market impact could be enhanced by
more resources, and could try to affect this market impact by investing more of their own
resources in NTOs' budgets. Improved profits due to NTOs' activities would also provide
the businesses with more extra resources that can be freed for investments in e.g.,
international marketing channeled through NTOs. The businesses could then invest their
resources in funding of NTOs' budgets under the certainty that these resources probably
would be used in a market-oriented and efficient way by NTOs. Under an activity-based
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system, they could not have this certainty, and could risk that their invested resources
could be wasted through shirking or other types of misallocations, etc. As Peabody
(1995) pointed out in the case of the World Health Organization (discussed later in
Sections 2.5.1-2.5.3), the problem that seem to deter private sector funding of such
organizations can (at least partially) be traced to the gap between promises and
accountability. A performance-based budgeting system may help close this gap; then
NTOs will be paid budget funds based or real market performance rather than ambitions
and promises about results. Thus, we believe performance-based budgeting systems could
increase the private sector's willingness to contribute to NTOs' funding. Increased
private sector investments could also trigger a greater willingness on the part of the
governments to invest more resources in NTOs' budgets.
Local-level tourism marketing organizations organized and funded by the private sector
do occur more often than privately funded NTOs. It is arguably an easier task to obtain
private financial support for the more specialized type of local tourism marketing
organizations than for NTOs, because NTOs would have to engage in a more generic
type of international marketing activity. On the locallevel it is easier to identify precisely
who would benefit from tourism marketing efforts and easier to determine who should
pay for it. So generic international marketing on the national NTO level is probably
perceived more of a common good type of service than more specialized destination
marketing on the local level. Therefore, the free-rider problem is more substantial with
regards to funding of NTO than with local equivalents. Considering this, the use of
performance-based budgeting may increase the willingness among private sector
sponsors to participate because it can help reduce the sponsoring stakeholders' perceived
risk somewhat. Sponsoring generic international marketing would probably be perceived
as more risk-laden for the sponsors in a cost-benefit consideration than sponsoring
specialized local marketing efforts of more individual business-directed character.
Spending one dollar on generating primary demand for the firm's products or local
destination would probably be perceived as more likely to give "probable gains" than
spending one dollar on generating secondary demand for the nation's tourism products
through NTOs' marketing activity. Thus, performance-based budgeting could be more
beneficial in a private NTO funding scenario, when low private sector willingness to
contribute financially is a concern. This is because such a system transfers some of the
risk for the outcome from the private sponsors (principals) onto NTOs (agents), since the
sponsors would not risk having to pay very much if NTOs' performances are weak. We
will revert to the issue of the potential benefits of performance-based budgets related to
the private sector willingness to engage in NTOs' funding in Section 2.5.3 later in this
chapter.
2.4.5 Conclusions to be drawn from public economy theory
The body ofpublic economy theory we have discussed here is useful for our purposes
with regards to: whether NTOs should be private or public entities; how ownership can
affect the Long-Term Perspective and Market Focus ofNTOs; and whether outcome-
based versus behavior-based budgeting is feasible in terms ofhow it motivates NTOs for
efficiency and optimal production. We have also chosen to discuss the common goods
problem under the public economy section, because of its relevance to the context-related
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discussion on public versus private funding ofNTOs. Much of the theory developed in
the field ofprivatization points to that the fact that private ownership, in most cases, is
more cost efficient than public operation. This notion also has broad empirical support.
The differences in cost efficiency are explained by the fact that the profit from the
organization's operation under private sector operation will be allocated to the owners,
and thus acts as an incentive mechanism for focusing on efficiency, whereas in public
operation this is not the case. We also argue here that private ownership can increase the
NTOs' propensity to be market-focused.
However, in the NTO context there are other societal considerations than cost efficiency
only, which may call for some government intervention through ownership or control and
government funding ofNTOs. Some researchers disagree with this idea (e.g., Shleifer
and Vishny), and argue that government ownership is not a guarantee that public interests
will served in the best possible way. We argue that in some instances, government
ownership could help the NTOs retain a Long-Term Perspective in planning and
operation, provided that governments do not cut NTOs' budgets arbitrarily from one year
to another.
Empirical research by the World Bank on state owned enterprises in developing countries
shows that performance contracts often fail to have the expected effect on performance.
This is because these contracts often fail to reduce the management's information
advantage; seldom provides real performance incentives to managers; and that managers
can negotiate soft targets that are easy to reach. Moreover, the government often fails to
follow up on commitments in the contracts, which reduces the incentive effect. Lessons
can be learned from this study in how performance-based budgets for NTOs should be
designed and used, and what not to do in such a design and implementation process.
In the NTO context governing stakeholders could often need deal with cases of market
failure, e.g., whenever NTOs have something close to a monopolistic position. The
NTOs' information advantages can be used to improve their position on the expense of
taxpayers beyond what is socially desirable. The governments' task is then to try to
motivate NTOs to manage cost efficient production, and at the same time extract some of
the pure rent so that the NTO will not be able to (unreasonably) shirk on excess
resources. The task is also to try to motivate NTOs to tailor production to its true cost.
We believe this can be achieved best through a relative performance-based budgeting
principle based on "hard" measures to motivate for cost-efficiency and combined with a
fixed-sum principle to insulate the NTO from unreasonable risk.
The outcome of the kind of marketing activities NTOs perform are in many ways a
common good, which may explain why NTOs are hard to organize and finance on a
voluntary private basis. Tourism activity has many beneficiaries beyond the tourism
industry itself, and many actors can therefore act as free riders. This will reduce the
tourism industry's willingness to fund NTOs' operation. The government and society
enjoy benefits from tourism as well, which justifies public funding ofNTOs' tourism
generating activity. Introduction of outcome-based budgets can possibly increase private
businesses' willingness to contribute with funding. It transfers some of the risk from the
private stakeholders to the agent NTOs, and thus reduces risk for the stakeholders. It may
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also be easier to "sell" a funding scheme where NTOs "get what they deserves" and are
rewarded upon merit to the private industry, which often faces a similar scheme in real
business life (see also Section 2.5.3 below).
Table 2.9
Conclusions from application of public economy theory
Societal YES N/A YES Where monopoly power,
than cost efficiency and Positive ownership and externalities, societal or
profit outcome funding other distributional issues
benefits all raise concerns, privately
stakeholders owned profit-
maximizing firms, which
a commercial version of
an NTO could be, may
fail to address these
Performance contracts Few so far N/A YES, but Behavior-based W.B. Study: Many weak
(see Table -Hard targets budgeting performance contracts in
5.1) -Real use = no or little effect
incentives on performance
" Commitmento.., Market failure: YES NO YES Outcome-based NTOhas;S
:>. Monopoly situation, budgeting advantage and seeks rent.
E hidden true cost Motivate NTO to tailoroc: to true cost.oo.., Lack of competition YES NO YES Relative Benchmarking and.~z outcome-based relative performance
::l budgeting measurement useful toc,
reveal true cost and
motivate for increased
effort. Chance-event
effects reduced.
Incentives to over- or YES (under (YES) YES Combined Take-care-of-
under-produce on various (fixed sum = To motivate behavior- and responsibility along with
quantity and quality budgeting pos. for for increased performance - combined fixed sum and
schemes) long-term production based relative per-un it-
seems
Common good, YES NO YES Some government
Non-exclusivity, free- ownership and funding and operational
riding problem, low funding control may be
private sector necessary. Risk transfer
willingness to pay for Outcome-based through outcome-based
budgets budgeting & system probably
private funding increases private
willingness to pay (ref.
also set. 2.5.3
The main conclusions from public economy theory are summarized inn Table 2.9. In
sum, our application ofpublic economy theory suggests that private ownership has some
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cost efficiency benefits. However, pure private ownership may be unrealistic due to the
common goods problem and funding difficulties, and could be undesirable due to
important societal concerns. At least some degree of government funding and control
may be needed. On the other hand, pure government operation and funding can yield
inefficiency and budget swelling, so private co-funding and co-control may also be
needed to help avoid these problems. Striking a balance between public and private
control and funding is a challenge, but should not be a problem impossible to overcome.
The exact make-up of private and public influence should of course be adapted to local
conditions. The Canadian NTO, which we willlook closer at in Appendix 5, is a good
example (50%/50% public/private funding).
Several aspects emerging from the application this body oftheory call for a performance-
based system. Notwithstanding, an outcome-based budgeting system has to be designed
carefully for it to have the intended effect on NTOs' performance. Ifnot, it is a waste
time of effort (with reference to the World Bank study).
2.5 Corporate governance theory
Unambiguous incentives are necessary to make organizations work efficiently and
effectively. We believe that NTOs, often being government controlled, bureaucratic, and
inflexible in their form, can be changed into well-functioning marketing organizations
when equipped with the right incentives and control structure. This is mainly a matter of
aligning the incentives ofNTOs' stakeholders, the organizations themselves, their
management, and the employees. Corporate governance theory offers some suggestions
how to deal with these issues, as shown in Table 2.10 below.
2.5.1 Vague goals, many demands, and output difficult to measure
John W. Peabody (1995) published a critical organizational analysis of the World Health
Organization (WHO), which we believe can be applied and adapted to the analysis of
NTOs as well. An organization like the WHO has many features in common with NTOs.
Apart from the fact that the WHO's output is "world health" and NTOs' outputs are
"international tourism marketing", these organizations often face a similar operating
environment. The make-up of stakeholders ofthese organizations are characterized by the
fact that: stakeholders are many and diverse; goals are often vague and sometimes
conflicting; outputs are difficult to measure; the main output is a common or collective
good; the stakeholders actually funding the organizations are not always identical with
the beneficiaries of the organizations' services; national governments are often involved
in controlling, monitoring and funding the organizations, etc. The following discussion is
based on Peabody's analysis of the WHO, and we have applied his findings where
appropriate and adapted them to the NTO context.
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Table 2.10
Corporate governance theory's relevance for the independent
and dependent variables
Increased decision autonomy
geting systems can create procedural Orien- and delegation of real authority
prin- organizations. Performance-based taion for NTOs can increase NTOs'
ciple budgeting can align goals and motivation for information
reduce cross-incentives. acquisition related to the tasks
they are set to do (e.g., acquire
2) Team based- bonuses (here 2.5.6.1 market information), since
rewards through NTO budgets) NTOs need not worry that their
could be more effective as decisions will be overruled by
incentives than individual governing stakeholders. (See
management compensation. also under O.F. below)
3) Performance-based incentive 2.5.6.2
systems appear to be more
effective than promotion-based
incentive systems.
4) Relative performance-based 2.5.6.3
incentives are more efficient than
absolute performance-based
Fund- Lack ofaccountability has 2.5.3 based-budgeting 2.5.5
ing probably widened the gap Term could reduce the need for the
source between payments, promises. and Pers- stakeholders to constantly
performance. Performance-based pective intervene in NTOs' matters, and
budgeting principles can help thereby avoid frequently
close this gap, and maybe changing NTOs' assignments.
increase private sector NTO- Long-term contracts (budget
funding. periods) can increase NTOs'
loyalty to stakeholders'.
interests. When the NTOs'
planning horizon becomes too
short, there could be a bias
towards quick results on the
Owner NTOs' many stakeho .5.1 Operat- 1) Performance-based 2.5.2
-ship/ different criteria for measuring ional budgeting could reduce the
arg. NTOs' success. Each stakeholder Free- need to impose procedural
control with e.g., ownership influence dom constraints on NTOs' activity,
could look to the organization to and thus increase NTOs' O. F.
support its own agenda.
Stakeholders must often evaluate 2) Increases in NTOs' real 2.5.4
an unspecified product, and NTOs authority and decision
must respond to shifting criteria autonomy (i.e., O. F.), could
that measure their success. This is foster NTO initiative,
probably not good forNTOs' participation, and information
Peabody's study of the World Health Organization is useful for our purposes. Like the
WHO, a typical NTO often has a number of more or less vague goals and multiple tasks.
Common for the goals is that they often defy concrete output measure. Consider the
following sample of goals and objectives of a few different NTOs:
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"Promotion of international tourism through efficient and effective provision of
overseas publicity; dissemination oftourist information to foreign tourists;
engagement in other activities deemed necessary to increase the number of visits
by foreign tourists, etc" (Japan's NTO). "Enhance the effects oftourism
promotion activities and the competitiveness of the tour and travel trade by
establishing efficient partnerships with its private sector members." "Escalate into
an organ with the professional responsibility for tourism promotion in the 21 st
century, etc." (Korea's NTO) "The NTO shall contribute to stimulate and
strengthen the travel industry's profitability and competitiveness" (Norway's
NTO).
When does one for instance achieve "effective and efficient publicity" or "escalation into
an organ with professional responsibility for tourism promotion" or "stimulation and
strengthening of the travel industry's profitability and competitiveness"? Since NTOs'
goals are often not concrete, they are open to a wide range of interpretation by different
stakeholders. As we have discussed earlier in section 1.2 (ref. also Section 3.2 and Figure
3.4 and 3.5 in Chapter 3), this legion ofNTO stakeholders have different criteria for
measuring the NTOs' success. Each supporter of the organization, whether it provides
funding or other influence, looks to the organization to support its own agenda. This
cerates an almost incomprehensible enigma; stakeholders must evaluate an unspecified
product and the organization must respond to shifting criteria that measure its success
(Peabody, 1995).
According to Peabody, organizational theories can offer some clarification in such a
situation. Like the WHO, NTOs can in general be viewed as procedural organizations,
defined here as an organization where it is possible to observe what the organization does
but not what it produces. Tasks and behaviors are, therefore, easy to specify but difficult
to evaluate. This means that NTOs' stakeholders can hardly control them unless they set
up procedural constraints on its behavior that the organizations must follow. This process
can result in an ever-multiplying list ofrules, procedures, and demands sometimes found
in NTOs' operational manuals. Procedural agencies like NTOs are vulnerable to
politicians and other governing stakeholders who tell them how to do their job but offer
little help when it comes to evaluating how the job has been done. External criticism can
result in even more elaborate procedural constraints which detract even further from
focusing on specific marketing objectives. NTO staffs could find themselves in a
situation where they spend a lot of time pursuing internal procedures unrelated to
marketing output. The staff supervision by NTOs' managers can easily end up focused on
processes and not on real accomplishments. If criticized, NTOs' staff can then point to
adherence to NTOs' many rules or procedures generated by NTOs themselves or set by
their external stakeholders. This could make NTOs' staffs, focusing on self-survival in an
environment perceived as hostile, e.g., due to external criticism, displace the
organizations' goals with their own self-interests. (For instance, with explanations of
under-performance and failures such as: "It is not my responsibility, I just followed the
rules", and so on). Yet rules and procedures can only serve as ajustification ofprocesses,
not outcomes. In the organizational parlance this makes for looser couplings between the
organization's goals and its daily activities (Peabody, 1995).
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2.5.2 Alignment of goals
To avoid this situation, organizations like NTOs need to develop incentives that align
staffs and managements' individual goals closer to NTOs' real external goals (i.e.,
tourism marketing). Professional staff must be given specific outcome objectives and
thereafter assigned: 1) budget constraints; and 2) policy boundaries. They should be
allowed the autonomy to do their work unimpeded by excessive supervision Evaluation
of staff should focus on these outcomes and avoid deleterious effects of excessive
procedural evaluation i.e., how well the employees follow the organizations' rules and
procedures (Peabody, 1995). This process is critical because it would reorient the
incentives for NTO staff. Using a performance-based principle, where both managements
and staffs are evaluated, rewarded, and made accountable based on output, as the model
for organization - would allow staff to work for their own self-interests and for NTOs' at
the same time. This should also eliminate the problem of cross incentives and goal
displacement for staffs. Such an explicit policy should also reduce the incentives for the
management to over-monitor staff, and reduce the need to constantly generate rules and
procedures.
2.5.3 Structural reform and funding
Finally, structural reform ofNTO governance through performance-based budgeting
principles can also offer a way to increase NTO funding. To do so, the NTO must align
the demands of the many stakeholders with the resources of the few sponsoring entities.
This is a key point and has an important implication: Both the NTOs' managements and
the NTAs or other stakeholder coalitions need to openly articulate a set of detailed
performance objectives that are acceptable, recognizable, and measurable. Once set, they
should be used as the standard to measure and evaluate NTOs and their managements.
One of the probable reasons why many NTOs have not garnered more regular private
sector budget funding is that a lack of accountability has widened the gap among
payments, promises, and performance. Performance-based budgeting principles can help
close this gap.
2.5.4 Operational freedom - why is it important?
Aghion and Triole (1997) found that in an organization, the delegation of formal
authority to a subordinate (agent) will both facilitate the agent's participation in the
organization and foster his incentive to acquire information about the corresponding
activities. They also showed that centralization (i.e., the non-delegation of formal
authority) may jeopardize communication by making the agent concerned bout being
overruled. Performance measurement (i.e., through performance-based budgeting
principles) should reduce the principals' need and incentives to monitor the agent, and
reduce the probability that the principal overrules the agent. This increases the agent's
real authority and decision autonomy, which in our case is analogous to NTOs'
Operational Freedom.
Ifwe apply Aghion and Triole's findings on the organizationallevel in the NTO context,
one could argue the following: Implementation of performance-based budgeting
principles reduces the stakeholders' need and incentive to monitor the NTO agents and
intervene in NTOs' planning and operational activities. Reduced monitoring and non-
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intervention by the stakeholders constitutes delegation of decision authority to NTOs,
which also means a reduction of stakeholders' supervisory control ofNTOs. This is offset
by the potential efficiency gains due to increased NTO initiative and participation, which
is also beneficial to the stakeholders. For instance, it could strengthen NTOs' incentives
to acquire information about what activities that will be needed to undertake to increase
tourism traffic. In other words, it increases NTOs' incentives for market-oriented
activities. Giving the NTOs increased Operational Freedom in exchange for performance-
measurement and budgeting will most likely foster increased (desirable) information
dissemination from NTOs to the stakeholders such as e.g., the NTAs, tourism businesses,
or trade organizations, etc. because NTOs will not need to worry that their decisions will
be overruled by the governing stakeholders. This means that performance-based
budgeting should increase NTOs' Operational Freedom, which in tum could give NTOs
incentives for a stronger Market Focus. This is of course a preferable situation for all
parties.
2.5.5 Long-term perspective as related to performance-based
budgets
Narayanan (1985) pointed out that business managers have often been accused for
working for short-term profits at the expense of the long-term interests oftheir firms. The
explanations ofthis short-term bias falls into two categories: One, the stockholders want
quick profits, and their short-term view is reflected in the managerial decisions. Two,
profit sharing by the managers, i.e., making either whole or part oftheir pay contingent
on performance, tends to make them "quick-profit" oriented. The manager could have
some private information profits that is unavailable to the investors, i.e., exclusive
information about which project to choose or course of action to take that will yield
short-term versus long-term profits. He then might make decisions to yield short-term
profits at the expense of the long-term interests of the organization. Among other things,
Narayanan (1985) shows that the longer the duration of the manager's contract, the lower
the probability that he will choose quicker returns that are sub-optimal. The longer the
duration of the contract, the more benefit to the manager from future cash flows, and
hence reducing his incentive for sacrificing these long-term benefits for short-term ones.
Narayanan's findings have some implications for the NTO context as well. Say we have a
situation with an NTO manager whose budgets or salary is subject to determination based
on performance. The manager also has private information about which activities that
will increase the likelihood ofshort-term tourism traffic and which activities that will
generate long-term tourism traffic. We have discussed earlier (see Section 2.2.2) that
information asymmetry advantageous to the NTOs and their managers, is likely to exist
in the NTO context. At the same time there might be a pressure from the industry to
promote tourism intensively "here and now" so that the businesses could earn short-term
profits. The more difficult the businesses' financial situations are, the stronger the
pressure to generate short-term sales through heavy tourism promotion. Given that
NTOs' budgets and the managements' pay were based on annual tourism traffic
increases, the managers could resort to activities that would boost short-term traffic on
the expense of long-term sustainable tourism. A manager could, for instance, spend
massive resources on promotional campaigns that exaggerate the quality ofhis country's
tourism products and services. This could result in artificially inflated levels oftourism,
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yielding great short-term performance statistics. but evidentially create tourism
congestion, tourism infrastructure and environment wear-out, and hence customer
dissatisfaction. This short-term performance effect would temporarily earn the NTO
higher budgets and increase the managers' bonuses. This would then be on the expense of
the country's long-term attractiveness as a tourist destination, and thus be negative for
long-term sustainable tourism.
Narayanan suggests that to offer long-term contracts can increase the manager's loyalty
to shareholders' interests. This technique is used in Japanese firms with apparently
successful results. In addition, the managers' task assignments or instructions from the
stakeholders should not be changed too frequently. In the NTO context this would be the
same as providing NTOs with greater operational freedom. If assignments are changed to
frequently, which could happen ifmany different stakeholders try to intervene and
control NTOs, the managers' planning horizon becomes too short, and the propensity for
a bias towards quick results increases. This is because the managers' subsequent
reputation would usually depend only on their performance in their new assignments, and
hence, will be indifferent to old assignments. Performance-based budgeting principles
should rid the managers with the problem of frequently changing assignments, since the
managers would have the freedom to decide what actions to undertake. On the contrary, a
behavior based-principle, where the stakeholders are involved in deciding on the plans
and activities, could shorten the managers' planning horizon and incentives for a long-
term perspective.
A solution to this short-term bias could be to offer a budget policy that would reflect a
long-term perspective. Budgets could be determined for a longer period of time,
increasing the usual one-year period to a period of e.g., three years. One could for
instance use a sliding three-year average performance measure to determine budgets; a
system sometimes used in the private sector. This would reduce the incentive for
sacrificing long-term performance for short-term gain. At the same time this can increase
NTOs' ability to plan ahead because their budget situation would be more predictable and
have less fluctuations from year to year so that NTOs can commit to long-term activities.
Performance based-budgeting could reduce the need for the stakeholders to constantly
intervene in NTOs' matters and thus avoid frequently changing NTO assignments.
2.5.6 Incentives and performance compensation
In the following sub-sections we will discuss the issues of individual vs. organizational
compensation, promotion-based vs. performance-based rewards, and relative vs. absolute
performance compensation.
2.5.6.1 Individual versus organizational incentives and compensation
Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) recognize that few decision makers in organizations
are one hundred percent owners of the residual claims, and this layering of agency
problems can induce serious lapses in the incentives of decision makers to devise and
enforce efficient contracts and compensation systems. A literature summary by
Milkovich (1987) in the personnelliterature shows that merit pay and bonuses based on
individual performance are less effective than profit sharing, stock ownership, and team-
based bonuses. A New York Stock Exchange survey indicates that seventy percent of
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firms with profit sharing report that they lead to improved productivity. The NYSE
Office of Economics Research study, summarized by Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987),
concludes that "gain sharing can play an important role in motivation people to be more
productive" (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988).
In the NTO context, there is usually no profit that can be shared. Of course; one could
give the NTO managers individual bonuses based on tourism traffic performance,
assuming that this would have a significant impact on NTOs' productivity and
performance. However, Jensen and Murphy (1988) found that the empirical relation
between top-level executives and firm performance, while positive and significant, is
tiny. When the reward for performance is channeled through the budget ofNTOs, this
reward system may serve as a team-based bonus scheme for NTO employees. Rather than
profit sharing, one would then have residual "resource sharing" among management and
employees. A higher budget, as a reward for increased performance, will give the
organization advantages that can be enjoyed by all employees - not only top management
- and thus have a motivational effect on lower level employees as well as management.
According to the findings by Ehrenberg and Milkovich, this would be more beneficial
than just linking individual management bonuses to performance. Thus, a merit system
that rewards the whole organization through its budget would be preferable to a system
that rewards only top executives.
There are some other reasons why we believe organizational incentives through
performance-based budgets would be more effective as incentives than individual
management merit compensation. First, a budget increase as a result of improved
performance would make the top managers have more resources available, which would
increase the organizations' ability to engage in new projects, start promotion campaigns,
and other marketing activities. Obviously, a bigger budget is desirable for both managers
and employees. By the same token a budget cut would not be desirable from the
managers and employees point ofview, since it would reduce the level ofresources and
thus the activity span. From the managers' point ofview, a budget cut would make their
working situation more difficult, since they may not be able start new projects, and would
possibly have to cut cost and reduce staff, which is normally an unpleasant situation.
Likewise, a budget increase would improve their resource-dependent freedom to act and
they would avoid unpleasant cost cutting. This may be far more important as a motivating
factor than an individual cash bonus, which is shown to have only a minute effect.
Secondly, a budget cut due to poor performance would be visible to all stakeholders and
NTO employees because NTOs' general budget information is usually open to the public.
Executive pay is usually a less conspicuous matter, and of lesser interest to the
stakeholders and general public. So performance visibility through a budget-based reward
system would probably be more motivating to the management and employees, since
both staff and outsiders can easily see how well NTOs are performing when budget
information is made public. Third, when budgets are made performance-contingent it will
probably increase the stakeholders' interest in NTOs' budgets and how resources are
spent. This could increase the stakeholders' interest in monitoring ofNTOs'
performance. Generally, stakeholders are probably more interested in how much financial
resources NTOs get and how resources are spent, rather than how much the top manager
is paid. Stakeholder monitoring could reduce the opportunities for the managements and
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employees to shirk on NTOs' resources undetected. It would, for instance, not be socially
acceptable in relation to monitoring stakeholders and employees ifthe top-managers
would award themselves higher payor persuade the NTO boards or NTAs to grant them
pay rises when the NTOs are performing poorly.
Jensen and Murphy (1988) argue that the apparent anomalies in executive-compensation
contracts may be explained by the strong political forces operating in both the
organization and in the public sector that effectively constrains the type of contracts
written between managers and shareholders. Given that top-management performance
compensation seems to have only little impact on productivity in the commercial and
private sector context, one cannot expect any stronger effects in the often non-
commercial and semi-public NTO context either. On the contrary, it would probably be
even harder to design top-management compensation systems that are effective in the
NTO context. This consideration, along with the arguments listed above, suggests that an
organizational performance-based reward system through budgeting is preferable to an
individual top-manager performance-compensation system.
2.5.6.2 Performance-based systems vs. promotion-based systems
An alternative to a performance-based reward system is a promotion-based reward
system, where good individual performance is rewarded with upward promotion in the
organization. This is often used in the public sector, and is probably common reward
system for many NTOs. However, there is one important problem with this kind of
system. It requires organizational growth to "feed" the reward system. Such a system is
likely to generate problems in a slowly growing or shrinking organization (Baker, Jensen
and Murphy, 1988). In slowly growing organizations with free cash flow, promotion-
based reward systems encourage managers to spend resources on unprofitable growth
rather than paying out cash to shareholders (Jensen, 1986a, 1986b). Normally NTOs do
not payout cash to stakeholders, but managers may spend excess resources to expand the
organization, which in turn provides promotion opportunities for NTO employees and
management. Obviously, stakeholders would not want NTOs to engage in non-productive
organizational growth, so that the organizations end up as low-efficiency colossuses. A
promotion-based system could even fuel the tendency of public bureaus such as NTOs to
budget-maximize (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3 earlier in this chapter).
For example, properly structured compensation policies at allievels of the organization
can punish top executives for unprofitable and unproductive growth without degrading
the incentives for lower level managers. Finally, it is often argued that promotion contests
are desirable since they need only to be based on rank order and thus can reduce risk or
random noise common to all contestants - but bonus systems based on rank or relative
performance can easily achieve these same objectives (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988).
2.5.6.3 Relative performance-based systems vs. absolute
performance-based systems
Contracting theory predicts that pay should not be based on factors beyond the control of
the executive - management compensation should therefore be based on performance
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relative to the performance of all firms or firms in the same industry, rather than on
absolute measures of firm performance (Holmstrom, 1979). This is to remove the effect
of external factors. The theory is compelling, but imprecise; managers should not be
insulated from outside factors ifthey can take actions that reduce the firm's exposure to
losses from such sources. This caveat aside, it seems desirable and feasible to base the
pay on relative performance instead of absolute performance (Baker, Jensen and Murphy,
1988). However, boards of directors do seldom use relative performance measures.
Neither absolute nor relative performance-compensation is common in the NTO context.
Jensen and Murphy (1988) show that absolute firm-value changes measured relative to
the industry are better predictors of changes in salary and bonuses than value changes
measured relative to the industry and the market (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988).
Reverting to the NTO context, we have discussed earlier that NTO managers face many
more or less uncontrollable events that may affect NTOs' market performance. However,
these factors should also have a similar impact on other comparable NTOs' (i.e., from the
same region or targeting the same markets) operation and performance. A relative
performance-based system should remove or reduce the effect of some of these factors.
Baker, Jensen and Murphy also raise an important point that it is not the purpose to have
managers (i.e., the NTO) insulated from outside factors. Given the proper incentive e.g.,
through relative performance-based budgets, managers could be motivated to act
proactively to mitigate the effect ofthose factors. An NTO manager could do this by e.g.,
changing key markets, switching to a different market segment, encouraging
development of new product/packages, increasing promotion activity, etc. We therefore
suggest that relative-based performance budgeting is preferable to absolute-based
performance budgeting principles. The empirical results reported in Chapter 5 show that
our respondents to a large extent agree with this conclusion.
2.5.7 Conclusions from application of corporate governance theory
The conclusions from this body oftheory are summarized in Table 2.11 below.
Peabody's (1995) critical study of the WHO brings up some concerns about similar non-
commercial organizations that could be comparable to the NTO context. Like the WHO,
NTOs may face the same kind of scenario where e.g., goals are vague, there are many
different demands from many diverse stakeholders, and organizational output is difficult
to measure. In such a scenario, there is a danger that NTOs, as in the case of the WHO,
can develop into rule-based procedural organizations. Managements and employees may
develop a too strong focus on adherence to rules and procedures rather than on productive
output, which is not beneficial for the organizations' work climate and productivity.
Thus, there may be a need for structural reform through alignment of goals and incentives
for the NTOs' employees, the organizations themselves, and their stakeholders. This can
probably be achieved best through the use of performance-based rewards systems, which
will turn the focus to accountability and output. It can reduce managements' need to
closely supervise staff in terms of rules-adherence, and then free more time and energy
that can be made available for strategic marketing work. Introduction of performance-
measurement, accountability, and pay-for-performance systems may also help attract
more private sector funding.
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Table 2.11
goals, many
stakeholders, rule-based may hide lack of
system, output difficult performance behind
to measure adherence to rules.
Performance-based
funding can help
alignment of goals and
Operational freedom not NO YES Outcome-based Performance-based
funding may help NTO
gain more operational
freedom, and
stakeholders to relax
behavior-based control.
Can increase NTO
initiative and..,...o
<1) Short-term A N/A Long-term Long-term budgeting-s
<1) management focus budgeting practices could makeue practices NTO management less'"E likely to only focus on<1).. short-term goals ando
O maximize short-term
~...o Individual vs. No available A N/A Outcome-based Group/team bonuses ande-
o group/team bonuses and information organ izational compensation in the formU
compensation on this issue bonuses of performance-based
budgets may be more
effective than individual
Absolute vs. relative Neither IS A N/A
performance-based presentlya budgets based budgeting can remove
budgets common on relative some the effect of
budgeting performance uncontrollable external
system factors. Can be more fair
and forNTO.
Promotion-based Promotion- NO YES Outcome-based Promotion-based system
reward systems vs. based is (Promotion- (Performanc can cause undesirable
performance-based probably based) e-based) organizational growth.
reward systems common Relative-performance
based systems can help
avoid this
Research on the impact of length-of-contact for managers suggests that offering long-
term contracts can increase the manager's loyalty to shareholders' interests. A long-term
performance-based budgeting system may have the same effect on the incentives for
long-term planning for NTO managers. Furthermore, the managers' task assignments
should not be changed too frequently, which can be achieved by providing NTOs with
more Operational Freedom. Implementation of a performance-based budgeting principle
could relax stakeholders' need to intervene in NTO managers' decision process. It should
rid the managers with the problem offrequently changing assignments, since the
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managers would have more freedom to decide what actions to undertake. On the
contrary, a behavior based-principle, where the stakeholders are constantly involved in
deciding on NTOs' plans and activities, could shorten the managers' planning horizon
and incentives for a Long-Term Perspective.
Conclusions from some of the personnel and finance research literature we have reviewed
appear to suggest that team-based bonuses and profit sharing appear to be more effective
in terms of organizational performance than top-executive cash bonuses.
We argue that rewards through performance-based budgeting systems will have much of
the same traits as a team bonus or profit sharing reward scheme in the private sector.
Thus, we believe this kind of reward system will have a stronger effect on organizational
performance than using an individual bonus system aimed at NTOs' top executives.
Unfortunately, the kind ofpromotion-based reward-systems often used in the public
sector have an important flaw: It requires organizational growth for the system to have
any motivational effect on lower-level managers. Therefore, it can provide dysfunctional
incentives for the employees to let the organization grow beyond what is optimal from an
efficiency standpoint. Rank-order or relative performance reward systems, which can be
tied in with the organizations own performance-based budgeting system, could provide
better incentives for efficiency rather than for undesirable organizational growth.
The NTOs and their managers are faced with some external factors that are more or less
uncontrollable for the NTOs. These factors can obscure the relationship between NTOs'
behaviors and the outcomes in terms of market performance. Contracting theory suggests
that managers under performance-based reward system should be insulated from effects
of factors they cannot control for the system to be perceived a fair and have a true
motivating effect. Management compensation should thus be based on performance
relative to the performance of comparable organizations in the same industry or field,
rather than on absolute measures of the organization's performance. We therefore suggest
that relative-based performance budgeting system, where the NTO is judged on
performance relative to its counterparts in comparable countries, is preferable to absolute-
based performance budgeting principles for NTOs.
2.6 Summary of the theoretical framework
The theoretical framework provides no 100% definite theoretical conclusions as to what
type of governance system, i.e., behavior-based versus outcome-based type of principles,
or public versus private ownership and funding arrangements, which is best suited for the
NTO context. However, most of the theory reviewed and applied in the NTO context
suggests that performance-based budgeting is necessary and beneficial for effective NTO
governance. In the following sub-sections we will sum up each body oftheory as they
relate to the context ofNTOs.
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2.6.1 Theoretical arguments for performance (outcome) - based
budgeting principles
Market orientation theory describes what market orientation entails (e.g., market
intelligence competitor intelligence, and information dissemination, etc.) The theory
asserts that organizations should strive to be market oriented, and that market-oriented
organizations perform better - rather than how to make them behave in a market-oriented
way. However, non-profit organizations, like most NTOs are, probably need incentives to
become market-oriented. Based on market orientation theory we argue that Market Focus
best can be achieved through an outcome- or performance-based budgeting system.
Agency theory, in its simple form and seen from the principals' angle, tends to prescribe
an outcome-based system as well. This is because of the problems with information
asymmetry and goal conflict, which can result in moral hazard (less than optimal effort
on the part of the NTO) and adverse selection (sub-optimal selection of the NTO as the
marketing agent). Transaction cost theory prescribes outcome-based principles due to
lower monitoring and maladaption cost incurred under such a regime. The application of
Public choice theory also leads toward an outcome-based system. The main reason for
this is the public nature of most NTOs. NTOs are usually not commercial organizations,
and do not face the disciplinary mechanisms from owners' residual claims. Both NTOs
and some stakeholders can benefit from slack in NTOs' resources. NTO employees could
engage in shirking or divert resources to benefit themselves or certain stakeholders.
Socially undesirable budget-maximization behavior and cost inefficiency can be a
consequence of that, if left unchecked. Our application of public economy theory also
suggest outcome-based budgeting, because it is necessary to motivate NTOs for efficient
production and at the same time extract the pure rent to some degree. Outcome-based
budgeting can serve as means to entice the NTOs to tailor their production to their true
cost, and to produce no more or no less than optimal effort (This is also in line with
Gunning's discussion ofbudget- maximizing behavior, see Section 2.3.2). Finally, the
review and application of corporate governance theory concludes that using a
performance-based principle, where both management and staff are evaluated, rewarded,
and made accountable based on measurable output, would help align employees', NTOs',
and stakeholders' goals, as long as all parties are made dependent on the same outcome.
That would allow staff to work for their own self-interests, as well as for NTOs' and
stakeholders' interests at the same time. Furthermore, a performance-based budgeting
principle can maybe help NTOs get increased funding, particularly from the private
sector, which can be beneficial. Performance-based budgeting could also reduce the
stakeholders' need and incentives for monitoring NTOs, which can allow the
stakeholders to provide NTOs with more Operational Freedom. Operational Freedom can
increase NTOs' initiative, participation, and productivity.
Theory also suggests that to offer long-term contracts, i.e., budgets based on longer
periods oftime, can increase the managers' loyalty to shareholders' interests both short-
term and long-term. Corporate governance theory suggests that team- or organizational
performance-based incentives are more effective than individual management
performance based compensation. Performance-based incentive systems are also
preferable to promotion-based reward systems. Finally, the theory suggests that relative
performance-based systems are more desirable and feasible than absolute performance-
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based systems. We believe relative reward systems are especially important in the NTO
context, since NTO managers are exposed to many uncontrollable external factors.
2.6.2 Theoretical arguments for behavior (activity) - based budgeting
principles
The a) commercial/profit-maximizing and b) one-principal only point-of-reference
assumed in traditional agency theory is somewhat useful for our purposes. However, it is
not very descriptive of the situation in NTO context. In this context stakeholders are
many in number and diverse in character, and they may have conflicting interests. Many
clients do not pay for the services directly, and some principal-agent relationships are
unclear. This can make goals for NTOs ambiguous, and thereby make NTOs'
managements unsure of which goals to prioritize. When there is such conflict of interest
and unclear goals, it may be unfair to hold NTOs accountable (through outcome-based
budgeting principles) for their governing stakeholders' supposed inability to provide clear
directives. Furthermore, the cause and-effect-relationships between NTOs' behavior and
market performance are not necessary direct. Many other factors beyond NTOs' control
can influence the outcome. In terms ofNTO as public agencies, one can expect resistance
to performance-measurement from both the agent-NTOs and some NTA stakeholders,
which will make well functioning performance-based principles hard to implement in
practice.
In addition, there are the considerations regarding the cost of transfer ofrisk to the agent,
outcome measurability, length of relationship, etc. as commented on earlier under the
agency theory discussion. All these aspects increase the attractiveness ofbehavior-based
systems to both the controlling stakeholders as principals and the NTOs as agents. An
obvious practical problem with more sophisticated kinds of regulation systems, such as
outcome-based budgeting, is their complexity. Some resources will have to be consumed
by both the governing stakeholders and the NTOs to set up and follow up and adapt to the
system. The parties involved may not want to spend those resources and put forward the
needed effort, unless the parties perceive that the benefits outweigh the costs of changing
the current regime. Given the particularities of the NTO context as discussed above, one
can thus expect a dominance ofbehavior-based systems in practice. We shall see later
that is also the case (ref. Table 5.1 in Chapter 5)
2.6.3 Theoretical arguments for public vs. private funding and
ownership
A combination ofboth public and private sector funding and ownership/control may be
the best solution. This is because private sector influence may be beneficial for the
organizations' Market Focus, their cost-efficiency, their accountability, and reduce
tendencies ofbudget-maximization behavior. It could increase NTOs' competence on
tourism and marketing through more industry participation; and increase the industry's
commitment and interest in NTO matters.
Public ownership and funding also has some merit. Government influence may be needed
to secure that important societal concerns beyond cost-efficiency and profit-maximization
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are taken into consideration. Government funding may represent a more stable source of
income e.g., due to a more stable budget situation than private businesses' collectively, as
well as the governments' ability to commit to long-term contracts. There is also the
problem with the common good nature ofNTOs' output, along with the private sector
funding problem related to that. Stable government funding could aid NTOs' ability to
adopt a Long-Term perspective. As Olsen pointed out, some ofNiskanen's assumptions
from public choice theory, e.g., over-confidence in private sector ownership as
disciplinary mechanisms, etc. discrediting government operation can also be questioned.
The issue of government vs. private ownership is much debated in the theory we have
investigated here, and different authors have conflicting views on this issue.
2.6.4 Overall conclusions from the theory review and application
There are parts of the theory reviewed and applied that favor an outcome-based system,
while other parts leads to behavior-based systems. Some considerations call for
government control and funding, while other aspects call for strong private sector
presence. Consequently, the theory discussed does not provide us with absolutely distinct,
clear-cut recommendations with regards to which type ofNTO governance system that
would be the most beneficial taking all stakeholders into consideration. However, most of
the theory reviewed and applied in the NTO context leads toward recommending the
performance/outcome-based principles.
Decisive recommendations in terms of ownership and funding source are not easy to
make based on the theory we have reviewed and applied in this chapter. Thus a combined
industry/government funding- and ownership scheme might be the best solution.
However, implementation of performance-based budgeting principles may also reduce
the role ofpublic versus private ownership.
Appendix 3 shows various conceivable control-principles applicable for NTOs and how
these principles relate to the theory discussed in this chapter, including some potential
benefits and negative consequences. These principles also constitute the core of the
independent variables presented later in this thesis. How these independent variables are
operationalized in detail is shown in Table 5.1, and the corresponding dependent
variables are shown in Appendix 4.
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Table 2.12
*Identifies the *Perf orm ance
needs additional agency-problem. control problem in contracts in public performance
incentives to be "Discusses pros bureaus, where sector have been measurement and
market-oriented, and cons of market unsuccessful due rewards can align
since M.O. behavior- vs. competition lacks to problems with goals of stake-
activities consume outcome-based as disciplinary odd incentives holders and NTO
extra resources contracts. mechanism and governrnents' *Discusses the
commitment to advantages of
the contracts various
performance -
based incentives
Funding * No link between a) *Performance- * Performance
source NTOs' income influence on the differences in based budgeting measurement and
/budgets and NTOcan be demands from will transfer some rewards can
market bought through a taxpayers vs. outcome-risk from increase willing-
performance may sponsorship role private sector as sponsors to NTO ness for private
lead to sponsor NTO financiers and possibly sector funding
orientation rather *b) budget- increase private
than M.O. maximizing sector's
behavior in willingness for
bureaus NTO
Ownership * Organizational *Public owners *Many
!control control can be might not be as is cost-inefficient stakeholders with
exercised through concerned with *Concentrated many demands
formal ownership efficiency as private owner- make it difficult
N/A or board private owners. ship might not be to agree on
membership, *Discusses beneficial specific
reporting government *Public owner- performance-
procedures etc. alternatives for ship might serve measures. NTOs
NTO regulation important societal might become a
under a market concerns beyond procedural
failure situation
Market "Defines M.O. *Dependence on
Focus *Establishes that outcome (market
M.O. is important performance) will N/A N/A N/A
for organizational entice NTO to
performance seek market-
Long-Term "Long-Term Long-term
Perspective Perspective is relationships Long-Term contracts are
important for between actors Perspective of the beneficial for
performance, and reveal agent NTO, government L.T.F.
is tied in with behavior and thus N/A funding/and or *Intervening and
M.O. reduce need for control could be frequent
performance beneficial for the changing of
contracts organization's assignments (low
long-term O.F.) could make
operational focus. NTO focus on
short-term results
* Incentives to *Performance-/ *Deals with *O.F. is
Freedom lobby sponsors or outcome-based organizational important for
owners for contracts reduce control problems N/A initiative and
recourses and the need to ofbureaus in participation of
support rather monitor agent terms of the agent NTO
than to focus on effectiveness and
the market
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3.0 A framework for understanding the market performance of
NTOs
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 leaves us with no 100% absolute
directions as to which principles would be most beneficial for NTO governance. Some of
the theory implications are relatively clear, while other areas oftheory provide more
incoherent implications. In this chapter we will consider the multi-sided implications
derived from general theory and apply them in the particular NTO context in order to
develop the theory framework further. This can be done by the inclusion of some
contextual, practical, and political considerations in the theoretical framework. The
purpose is to arrive at solutions that are both theoretically sound, practically
implementable, and politically viable to the various stakeholders.
Three issues will be discussed in this section:
1. What conditions may promote market goals and facilitate market performance of
NTOs?
2. What parties constitute the stakeholders of the NTO?
3. What goals exist for organizations like NTOs?
4. In a practical manner, how can organizations like NTOs be controlled, so that NTOs
fulfill the stakeholders' objectives?
3.1 What determines market performance?
The market performance of the NTO is dependent on a number of factors, some external/
exogenous and some internal/endogenous. Some ofthese factors can be controlled or
influenced by the NTOs stakeholders, some by the NTO itself and some are more or less
beyond the control of either party.
Exogenous factors
It is rarely possible to isolate market performance as a pure organizational achievement.
The market performance of an NTO has to be estimated rather than measured as stated
above. The reason for this is that market performance, e.g., in terms of increase in
number oftourists or value oftourism, never will be the accomplishment of the NTO
alone, but most likely will depend on a number of exogenous factors. Such factors
include political, economic and climatic conditions in addition to a host of other variables
as illustrated in Figure 1.1 presented in the introductory chapter in Section 1.3. These
factors are of course important, but are not within the main scope ofthis study. The
factors we are interested in are the ones shaded/highlighted in Figure 1.1, because they
are the ones the stakeholders can control from a governance perspective.
Characteristics of the NTOs' decision-making
We assume that three characteristics ofNTOs' decision making will affect their ability to
influence the market positively:
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• Market Focus - i.e., the degree to which the market gives the premises for NTOs'
decisions and activities, e.g., the design of promotional material and campaigns,
choice of market segments and positioning of products and travel destinations.
• Long-Term Perspective - i.e., the NTOs' ability to make decisions that are optimal in
the long run, (of course without ignoring short-term activities) and
• Operational Freedom - i.e., the degree to which the NTO has the freedom to make
decisions without interference from other organizations
Neither ofthese characteristics are, in isolation, sufficient conditions for good market
performance, but we believe that a sustainable strategy will require a combination of the
three, i.e., market success requires not only a market focus, but long-term perspective and
operational freedom as well.
We believe a sustainable strategy will be in the intersection between Market Focus,
Long-Term Perspective and Operational Freedom as illustrated in Figure 3.1:
Figure 3.1
A focus for a sustainable strategy
Organizational make-up and resources
The three aspects above will reflect the internal organizational make-up with respect to a
number of factors as illustrated in the figure:
• human capital
• professional attitudes
• financial resources
• organizational culture
Based on our research we strongly believe that the NTOs vary considerably in terms of
the characteristics listed. Human capital varies obviously both quantitatively and
qualitatively and economic resources vary from less than a million US$ per year to more
than 100 million. In some NTOs the government receives considerable attention, while
others appear much more oriented toward their markets.
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To the extent such organizational traits determine the market performance of the NTO
through their impact on the way the NTO makes its decisions; an important issue is how
the stakeholders can influence these traits. This influence can obviously be achieved
directly by taking part in e.g., hiring decisions. However, influence can also be attained
through other sources of control.
Sources of control
There are reasons to believe that the nature of organizations and the way they act are
partly determined by the following factors:
• on what basis are the financial sources provided, i.e., what budgeting principles
are in use?
• who provides the financial sources?
• who owns the organization or in some way exerts controlon it
Budgeting principle
The amount of resources devoted to the NTO can be based on the acceptance of activity
plans or activities carried out; or tied to organizational performance (i.e., the performance
of the tourism industry in term ofinflux oftourist or economic value oftourism).
Alternatively, they can be allocated as a more or less fixed sum from year to year.
In the empirical part ofthis thesis we have included eight budgeting principles, some of
which can be termed mainly performance-based, and some that are mainly activity-based.
Some ofthese principles are currently in use in NTO administrations, while some are
interesting potential principles not in use today.
Funding source
It is reasonable that contribution of resources is an important source of power.
Organizational control will to a certain extent be exchanged for monetary recourses. The
character of organizations like NTOs will thus partly reflect who provides its economic
resources. To the extent the financing stakeholders differ with respect to how they
perceive goals should be prioritized, and perception of reality and cause-effect chains, the
funding source should be an important issue.
We have included three alternatives in the empirical part: public funding, funding by the
travel and tourism industry, and a combination of the two.
Organizational "ownership"
Who "owns" or controls the organization (i.e.,what entity the organization is responsible
towards or what entity/coalition is above the organization in line of command) will most
likely influence the organization as well. Control of the organization can also be attained
through power over appointment of key staff or by board representation, which in turn
will influence the decisions made by the organization and the priorities of the NTO.
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Organizational control is often interconnected with the funding source, but it is
conceivable that no direct relationship exist between the two. For instance, some NTOs
are completely government funded, but at the same time have strong industry board
representation.
A simplified research model
The model depicted in Figure I.l in Chapter l is quite unwieldy and does not lend itself
easily to empirical investigation. The simplified version shown in Figure 3.2 contains the
shaded parts of the more complete model and provides the conceptual framework for the
empirical part ofthis thesis.
Figure 3.2
A simplified research model
l
Long-Term
Perspective
Operational
Freedom
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3.2 Stakeholders, goals, and activities of the NTO
We will continue our contextual analysis by identifying NTOs' stakeholders and discuss
the organizations' activities and goals.
3.2.1 NTOs' stakeholders
, I
Through efficient and effective use ofNTO's resources the domestic tourism industry as
a whole can benefit through increased business from incoming tourism. Hence, the
performance of an NTO is important for the tourism sector. Most businesses in the
tourism industry depend on access to both domestic and international customers for the
businesses to survive and prosper. NTOs often have a vital function in the process of
generating international demand for the industry's products and services. Besides its
promoting role, an NTO may also play an important role as a provider of strategic advice,
input to product development, strategic market information, tourism industry education
and public statistics. This kind of NTO-activity can be of outermost importance to the
competitiveness of the domestic tourism industry in international markets.
In addition, the local and national governments have an interest in that NTOs' resources
are spent in an optimal way. Incoming tourism can help generate tax revenue and influx
of foreign currency, as well as supporting the balance-of-payments for a country or
region. Thus, the local and national governments will obviously benefit from the
prosperity of the tourism industry as well. Clearly society, e.g., local and national
community and tax-payers, also has a stake in the actions and achievements of the
organization. This is because a well-performing NTO-organization can contribute to
make the tourism industry profitable, and society in general can harvest the spin-off from
that. Tourism can help maintain population employment, contribute to development of
infrastructure and public services, and attract foreign and domestic investments. In some
countries revenues from tourism comprises a major portion of the GOP, and some
countries' economies are heavily dependent on incoming tourism. It is often crucial to
such a country that its NTO is well-functioning and well-performing in terms of creating
incoming tourism demand.
Furthermore, the international tourism market, as current and potential visitors to the
country, has an interest in receiving the travel assisting services provided by the
organization as well. Last, the internal stakeholders, which are the employees and
management of the NTO, benefit from a well-functioning organization that can provide
secure employment and career opportunities.
Clearly, a typical NTO has a number ofstakeholders within the organization itself, as
well as within and beyond the tourism industry. The diverse make-up of different
stakeholders with different interests makes the task of finding an optimal set-up and
government of such organizations quite a complex problem to solve. Particularly is this a
challenging task if one really wants to safeguards the interests of all the NTOs'
stakeholders in a pareto-optimal way.
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It should then be apparent that in any given country with an NTO in operation there are at
least four kinds of external NTO-stakeholders - whose constituents and interests only to
some extent overlap:
l. The travel and tourism industry"
2. Local and national government
3. Society (non- tourism industries, taxpayers, the environment etc.)
4. The international tourism market (i.e., users of the NTO's tourism services, such as
travel advice and information, product information/promotion, product
bundling/packaging etc.)
These stakeholder groups may have coinciding interests, as well as conflicting ones. The
set-up and governance problem ofNTOs revolves around safeguarding the interests of all
stakeholders, which may seem impossible. A "mutual interest" alternative appears to be
the most appropriate, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3:
A balanced focus for NTOs
Desirable focus
and resource
usage of NTOs
Thus, an important purpose ofthis study is to determine how NTOs best can be set up
and governed in order to serve the interests of all of its stakeholders, and not only
selected groups with special interests. Through a market focus of the organization - so
that the organization spends most of its time, effort and resources working with the
market - government, industry and societal interests will also be served, as depicted by
the shaded area in Figure 3.3.
22 "Tourism industry" is termed here as defined by the World Tourism Organization (WTO) 1999; ref.
"Tourism Satellite Account (TSA) - The conceptual framework", pp. 6-7.
99
3.2.2 Goals and activities of the NTO
As outlined in Chapter 2 (e.g., sections 2.2.2.1,2.2.5.3, and 2.3.2) an organization will
have some external and internal goals. To achieve these external and internal goals the
organization will engage in activities assumed to lead to the fulfillment of the objectives
related to these goals. A rational organization will retrospectively evaluate ifthese
activities and strategies in fact had the desired effects (see Figure 3.4a). Based on the
appraisal the organization will engage in new activities and continue activities assessed to
be successful, as we explained in Section 1.4.1. The simple model depicted in Figure 3.4a
assumes that goals are clear, that relevant decision alternatives are known with close to
certainty, and decision-outcomes are unambiguous. It also assumes that organizations
have the freedom to make decisions quite independently of other organizations and that
they have jurisdiction and authority over their resources and actions. Prescriptive theory
prompts managers to identify goals and craft strategies to attain these goals, and to
accumulate resources and acquire the necessary support to do so.
Figure 3.4
A sim Ie and a com lex decision context
/[;]
Many stakeholders
~--------~ .-------~
regions
1 2 3 ...
T&Tgovern-
ment industries
EffectsActivities
Figure 3.4a: Simple model, no stakeholders, no
unclear cause-effect relationships
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Partly conflicting goals =
Ambiguous goals for the NTO
Equivocal
effect measures .
Ambiguous
decision
alternatives
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about 'facts"
Figure 3.4b: Many stakeholders, disagreement
and ambiguity
For some organizations, and particularly for NTOs, the simple model does not provide a
good description. Due to ownership and funding arrangements there are constraints in
many organizations autonomy and ability to exercise discretion. Powerful stakeholders
may matter more than the potential success of a given action.
For many reasons the way in which goals are related to activities and effects can be quite
problematic for NTOs. First of all,
• the NTO has several stakeholders
• that may have partly conflicting goals and aspirations for the organization (see Figure
3Ab)
Different political institutions at the nationallevel, e.g., ministries offinance, industries,
and ministry of labor (see first column in Table 3.1), may perceive different goals for the
organization such as the ones listed in the second column in Table 3.1. Different regions
and local destinations may have different ideas as to how the advertising budget and
alternative destinations should be prioritized to attract tourists. Furthermore, since the
tourism sector comprises several industries (transportation, lodging, restaurants, etc)
many potential and partly conflicting goals may exist among the stakeholders and result
in goals for the NTO that are difficult to re-conciliate.
The ambiguity with respect to goals and decision alternatives is not only a result of
antagonistic goals and values among the shareholders, but may also be a consequence of
• disagreement about "facts" and
• unclear cause-effect relationships.
In a tourism setting, different regions or various types of accommodation-providers may
have conflicting views on ''facts'', such as e.g., the quality, attractiveness and the value
for money oftheir offering. Furthermore, conceptual models of cause-effect chains may
differ or may be unclear. It will always be difficult to assess whether changes in the
influx oftourists are due to
• economic trends
• changes in the nature or quality ofthe tourism product that is provided
• changes in the relative prices
• climatic conditions
• changes in the domestic NTO's activities, or
• actions brought about by foreign NTOs (i.e., competitors).
In addition to the ambiguity imposed on the organization by its external stakeholders, the
internal stakeholders, the employees and various departments of the NTO, may perceive
cause-effect relationships differently and may have objectives for the organization that
may not entirely coincide with those perceived as important by the principals.
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Table 3.1
Examples of areas of ambiguity and conflict among stakeholders
Stakeholders that may Areas of disagreement/ambiguity
disagree Goals and objectives "Facts" Cause-effect chains
• Government • contribution to • attractiveness of • the impact on number
• Ministry of labor • balance of • destination A of tourists of
• Ministry offinance payment • destination B • price level• employment • various types of• Ministry of regional • type of
development • tax revenue accommodation campaigns and
• "green tourism " promotional tools• Regions • market potential for
Destinations • economic value of given products • economic trends•
Tourist industries tourism and regional attractiveness of • climatic conditions• •development given markets and • taxation• Trade unions • region A segments • travel distance and• Etc. accessibility• region B
city A • product quality•
• city B
• industry A
• industry B
Conflict among stakeholders and ambiguities with respect to goals, "facts" and cause-
effect relationships raise many organizational challenges. It is difficult to imagine
"correct" solutions, as the "rules of the game" may change as a function of changes in the
NTO's constituencies. Consequently, political processes may often to some extent
determine the organization's goals and actions. (For an organizational comparison, refer
also to the World Health Organization case discussed in Section 2.5.)
3.3 Principles for governing NTOs
How can stakeholders assure that the organization acts according to their interests? As
explained earlier, two fundamentally different types ofbudgeting principles can be
applied that may have different consequences for the organization:
• One can either decide on, or try to influence, the activities of the organization;
• or govern the organization by monitoring the effects of its activities.
3.3.1 Criteria for evaluating governing alternatives
In Figure 3.5 we have listed goals or performance measures at two levels. At level one we
have listed activities that are directly tied to tourism, e.g., the number of incoming
tourists and/or their expenditures during the visit. Level two encompasses secondary or
indirect effects: Contribution to GOP, employment, profitability, etc. Level-two effects
also encompass the direct impact on variables of vital concern to the NTO as an
organizational entity. In the ideal and unlikely situation where goals are non-conflicting
and cause-effect relationships are known and clear, it does not matter at all what kind of
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Figure 3.5
Activities and goals of the NTO
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employees
governing principle is chosen. Uncertainty of outcomes often tends to make organizations
and their people reluctant to take on high risk, particularly when stakes are high, e.g.,
when there is a chance for substantial negative outcomes. In theory, this will make the
stakeholders want to govern the organization on the basis of achieved effects (results) and
thereby push the" risk of failure" upon the organization ("It' s your fault, you didn't get
the job done"). The organization on its side would maybe want to be governed on the
basis of activities, and thereby push the "risk of failure" upon the external stakeholders
("It's not our fault, we just followed directions").
A number of activities ofNTOs can be decided on or influenced by external stakeholders
(see upper part of Figure 3.5). For instance, it could be to decide the nature of and/or
amount of money or other resources spent on activities ranging from market intelligence
and information dissemination to market development and various types of services
(behavior/activity-based budgeting). (See Section 2.2.3 for theory details). A criterion for
evaluating the adequacy of an activity-based governing principle should focus on both
effectiveness and efficiency.
• To what extent does carrying out activities lead to desirable outcomes?
Control of the NTO through activity-based budgeting can be effective ifthe execution of
the various activities will with reasonable certainty lead to the desired level-one and
level-two goals. The stakeholders can then pay the NTO ex ante to carry out these
activities or reward the NTO ex post for the successful completion ofthese activities.
However, such a procedure requires the governing stakeholders to be well-informed of
the cause-and-effect relationships between the activities to be carried out and the goals to
be achieved. The stakeholders must also agree amongst themselves and with the NTO
about which activities that should be undertaken and to what extent they should be
carried out. Furthermore, the stakeholders need to know something about how much
money these activities would cost to carry out in order to arrive at reasonable budgets for
the NTO. In addition, the stakeholders will have to monitor the NTO's execution of
activities and collect information ex post in order to assess whether the NTO has done the
agreed-upon activities satisfactory. We have already pointed out in Section 2.2 the
information problems that can occur due to information asymmetry, such as moral
hazard and adverse selection as well as the transaction costs incurred in the from of
monitoring- and maladaptation costs. Another profound problem is that there will be
stronger incentives for the NTO to focus on the activities (upper part of Figure 3.5) and
not the desired results (central and lower part of Figure 3.5). In turn this can give the
NTO incentives to maximize the amount and magnitude of activities and not the goal-
related outcome of the activities. Assuming that sane activities are determined by the
stakeholders and the NTO, and these are carried out accordingly, activity based budgeting
can in some instances be effective. However, such a procedure does not provide
incentives for efficiency, as we have pointed out in Section 2.4.3-5.
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Another alternative is to govern the organization by measuring and reward its
performance against the specified goals and objectives and by allowing the NTO the
freedom to decide how to accomplish these goals (performance-based budgeting). (See
Section 2.2.4 for theory details). Assuming that e.g., increased employment or economic
growth is the ultimate purpose for establishing an NTO, does not imply that such goals
also should be the goals by which the NTO's performance is judged. A number of criteria
for evaluating the adequacy of a given performance measure can be listed:
• To what extent is the performance measure reflecting the outcome of the NTOs'
actions?
Ideally it should be possible to identify the direct impact of the NTO's actions. Effects
can, however, at best be estimated - and rarely measured directly. The reason for this is
that only a limited amount of the variation in the various performance variables listed in
Figure 3.5 are attributable to the actions of the NTO. Changes in employment, for
instance, do not only reflect the success of the NTO in attracting more tourists, but can be
attributed to employment procedures and wage levels as well as to various demand and
economic factors beyond the control of the organization. However, this situation is not
unique, neither for the tourism sector nor the NTO itself. The success of most companies
in the tourism sector as well as in other industries is not solely attributable to the
company itself, but is the outcome of a number of circumstances and exogenous factors.
A minimum requirement is, however, that the performance measure (at least partially)
reflects the "true" performance of the NTO. We believe this particularly will be the case
for the level-one performance measures listed in Figure 3.5. By choosing the most
beneficial market segments, making professional decisions with respect to marketing and
promotional activities and disseminate market relevant information to decision makers in
the tourism sector, the NTO should at least partly influence performance variables like
tourist arrivals and measures of the economic value oftourism. Performance variables at
level two will be more indirectly related to the NTO's decisions than the ones at level l.
• To what extent are the performance measures related to ultimate goals?
Ifwe assume that the various economic goals listed at level two are legitimate goals and
reasons for marketing the country as a tourist destination the question is how closely
these goals are related to the level one measures. It seems plausible to assume that
although other factors (such as relative prices, exchange rates and managerial practices in
the tourism sector) will obscure the relationship between level-one and level-two
variables, the relationship will be reasonably strong.
More problematic are the relationships between e.g., tourism arrivals and variables that
are relevant from an ecological or sustainable tourism perspective. A performance
measure tied to tourism expenditures/receipts rather than tourist arrivals could motivate
the NTO to focus on quality tourism rather than quantity tourism. It could entice the NTO
to try to market its destination(s) to a more upscale market that is usually better educated,
more ecologically and culturally concerned, and fewer (i.e., fewer visitors needed to
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generate the desired level oftourism receipts). One could also introduce a take-care-of
responsibility (as we discussed in Section 2.4.5) as part of the performance-measure(s).
• To what extent can performance measures be directly tied to "success criteria"
and internal goals of the NTO?
It is desirable that performance measures are strongly related to internal goals and
success criteria for the NTO. This can be obtained through some incentive mechanism
that ties e.g., influx oftourists or tourism derived income to the budget of the NTO so
that the resources available for the NTO will be correlated with the performance variable
the organization is assumed to influence. Through this incentive mechanism the NTO
will to some extent be "self-monitoring" and thereby make it less required for external
stakeholders to monitor and control the organization. Market related performance
measures should in a sense promote markets and customers to become the NTO's most
important stakeholder.
A third way of controlling the NTO is through funding and a fourth way through
ownership. Any governing stakeholder can in theory exert decision power or influence
through funding (financial authority) and/or ownership (formal authority) of the NTO.
We believe that this kind of control will be more important under an activity-based
budgeting regime than under a performance-based one. This is because the stakeholder
will want to influence the determination of goals and activities and monitor the NTO
under an activity-based system, while this is not necessary to the same extent under a
performance-based system.
• To what extent will the funding source influence the NTO's priorities, activities and
goals?
It is reasonable to believe that an existing or potential financial sponsor would have
certain motives connected to their contribution offunds to the NTO's budgets. One can
probably expect that private sector or industry sponsors would be even more concerned
with efficiency and effectiveness "getting their monies worth" with their sponsorship of
the NTO than the government would be. This is because the industry will have to spend
their own corporate funds while the government spends taxpayers' money. The industry
faces market competition and thereby an inherit pressure for market performance
(effectiveness) and conserve scarce resources (efficiency). The businesses in the industry
are for the most part comprised of profit-maximizing organizations, and could be
expected to focus on goals related to market performance that can be enhanced e.g.,
through Market Focus. The benefits of the NTO's activities will be allocated directly to
the businesses in the industry. That would give the businesses strong incentives to push
on the NTO to come up with good market results. On the other hand, public funds are not
first and foremost dedicated to maximizing profits, but probably more geared towards
attaining political and societal goals. Because one is dealing with public funds with
political and societal concerns attached, there may be more restrictions and procedures
related to how the NTO can spend such money, limiting the organization's operational
freedom. Furthermore, the benefits ofNTO's activities will not be allocated to the
individuals or entities providing the public funds (in theory - and then disregarding
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shirking) but the industry, government, and society stakeholders as whole. There is then a
lesser incentive to push for performance than for private sector sponsors. However, given
that the government is fairly stable in their priorities and policies, government may be
able and willing to adapt a more long-term perspective in funding matters that the
industry, which is facing a bottom line requirement each year.
The ownership of the organization or board of directors' control would be reflected upon
the people (and their priorities and ways ofworking) who can exert formal control of the
NTO. It is then safe to assume that this will influence how they will try to make the NTO
operate. It is then relevant to consider
• to what extent will the ownership/control influence the NTO's priorities, activities
and goals?
It is reasonable to believe that industry stakeholders would have more professional
competence on e.g., the industry and marketing than government bureaucrats. Industry
representatives could also be expected to have a more business-oriented attitude than
government representatives. The background, whether it is industry or government, of the
various board members can affect their ability and willingness to try to influence the
NTO to become more business and market-oriented.
It is also conceivable that an NTO controlled by the government would be more
bureaucratic, procedural and less flexible than an industry led organization. On the other
hand the industry representatives could maybe be expected to push more for their own
interests and less for the whole industry and society, whereas government representatives
would focus more on collective benefits. How the board is put together probably have an
impact on the NTO's operational freedom in terms ofpressures to focus on special
interests.
3.3.2 Theory and context-based recommendations for choice of
funding principle
It seems reasonable that performance-based control is in most concerns preferable to
activity-based control of the NTO - however difficult it might be to find adequate
performance measures that also will be satisfactory to the various stakeholders.
Performance-based control mechanisms have several advantages, albeit a few
disadvantages, compared to activity-based mechanisms:
l. Performance-based control will make the NTO accountable for its decisions and the
outcome of its actions.
Since the NTO should possess the most adequate expertise in international tourism
marketing, it seems natural that the NTO should be the most competent organizational
entity in translating goals into actions. Performance-based control should motivate the
NTO to seek success and avoid failure because
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2. Performance-based control will make it simpler for the stakeholders to monitor the
performance of the NTO, and at the same time reduce the need for the NTO to engage
in justification-for-existence-efforts.
Activity-based control mechanisms require considerable effort - particularly ifthe
various stakeholders are well involved in the planning processes. For instance, the
stakeholders and the NTO will have to agree on clear and unambiguous goals and specify
activities to be performed.
Both stakeholders and the NTO will incur higher transaction costs, such as monitoring
and mal-adaptaion cost, under an activity-based regime.
In the NTO context the agency problem related to information asymmetry and adverse
selection is particularly pronounced. Performance-based control could align the goals of
both stakeholders and the NTO because they all depend on the same outcome.
3. Performance-based control can reduce the agency problem in the NTO context.
Due to its private information advantage the NTO may use this information to negotiate
budgets higher than socially desirable and shirk on slack resources. This is a lot easier to
achieve under an activity-based system in a non-commercial context, where NTO can be
able to exaggerate its cost-of-operation estimate in budget negotiations.
4. Performance-based control will make it harder for the NTO to resort to budget-
maximizing behavior.
Thus, performance-based control should make the NTO focus on cost-efficiency and
market performance rather than budget-maximizing lobbying effort.
Performance-based control will reduce the need for stakeholders to supervise the NTO,
and allow the stakeholders to relax their intervention in NTOs operational maters.
5. Performance-based control allows considerable autonomy to the NTO.
This may be particularly important when conditions change that call for quick
adjustments. Autonomy will reduce the need for the organization to justify its actions and
to seek acceptance and approval of its decisions. It could also increase the NTOs
participation and motivate for innovative behavior because NTO would not have to be
worried about being constantly overruled by its stakeholders.
In order to be successful under a performance-based system that is dependent on
performance, the NTO wiIl need to acquire competent staffthat can improve market
results. It will, for instance, give the NTO stronger incentives to hire skilled marketers
rather than skilled lobbyists.
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6. Performance-based control will motivate and require the NTO to acquire necessary
expertise.
In an activity- based system, the NTA23 or other dominant stakeholder-entity will have to
build sufficient competence to define sensible activities and goals. This is in fact
paradoxical to the establishment of an NTO in the first place, since the main reason for
establishing an NTO is that the organization has unique competence to market the nation
as a tourist destination. In a performance based control regime it is the NTO's
responsibility and motivation to acquire the human resources needed for goal fulfillment.
One of the probable reasons why many NTOs under activity-based systems have not
garnered more regular private sector budget funding is that a lack of accountability has
widened the gap among payments, promises and performance. Performance-based
budgeting principles can help close this gap.
..
7. Performance-based control could generate more private sector funding.
Due to the common goods-problem in the NTO context it is hard to generate sufficient
private sector funding. Performance-based control cannot let alone rid us with the
common goods problem entirely. However, it could increase the private sector's
willingness to contribute funds, since it introduces accountability on the part of the NTO,
and the NTO "gets what it deserves" in the eyes of the private sector. It also reduces the
private sectors payment risk (ref. Section 2.4.4).
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that performance-based principles (i.e., Principles PI, P2, P7 and PS)
should be beneficial for both the NTO's Market Focus and Operational Freedom.
However, there are also some reasons to include a non-performance-based component in
the budgetary mechanism. One could argue that organizations like NTOs are particularly
vulnerable to fluctuations in budgets, or other things that are hampering NTOs' ability
and motivation to adapt a Long-Term Perspective. The nature of the performance-based
budgets is so that the NTO could experience fluctuations in the budgets, sometimes
partially due to factors beyond their control (e.g., war and terrorism, recession, currency
rates etc.). Besides the motivational value ofperformance based budgets it could be
beneficial for the NTO to have at least some part of the budget relatively fixed. In that
way it would be easier to commit to long-term engagements.
1. A fixed amount as part of the budget would help planning and implementation of
long-term engagements.
We will make a case later in Chapter 5 and Appendix 7 that long-term operation could in
some instances be attained also under performance-based principles, but we believe that a
23 NTA= National Tourist Authority, the government body responsible for tourism matters. Can often, for
instance, be an integral part of the Ministry of Transport, Trade, Culture etc, in a given country.
109
fixed component type of budgeting principle can function as a safety-net needed to
motivate the NTO for investments in long-term activities.
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that non-performance-based component (particularly Principle P5) should
be beneficial for the NTO's Long-Term Perspective.
3.3.3 Theory and context-based recommendations for choice of
funding source
We will see later from the survey on current practices included in Chapter 5 that
government funding and ownership/control is the dominating governance form today.
However, we believe that increased industry participation in funding of the NTO will be
beneficial for the performance of the NTO.
1. Industry participation could put additional and beneficial efficiency and
effectiveness pressures on the NTO.
Monies stemming from private sector funding would probably have stronger demands in
terms of market results and reasonable return on investments attached to them than
taxpayer's funds would. That would put more pressure on the NTO to perform well. It
could in turn entice the NTO to become more market-focused, since that would increase
the chances of being able to perform better in the marketplace.
2. Pure government funding could make the NTO resort to budget-maximizing
behavior.
We have already discussed the tendency ofbureaus to resort to budget-maximizing
behavior (ref. Section 2.3.2). A government-funded type ofNTO could maybe be
anticipated to spend some amount of effort and resources on such counter-productive
behavior, diverting the NTO from a market focus. Industry participation in funding
matters to could possibly reduce this propensity.
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that industry participation in funding (i.e., Principles PlO, and possibly
PlI) should be beneficial for the NTO's Market Focus.
However, there are also some important reasons why we believe the government should
continue its involvement in funding of the NTO's budget.
1. Government funding can secure a more stable and long-term source of funds.
Given that the government is committed to work seriously with tourism, and does not
simply cuts budgets dedicated for NTO purposes arbitrarily from one year to another, the
government can contribute to help NTO retain a Long-Term Perspective. The
government is not as vulnerable to fluctuations in revenue/income as the private sector in
one single industry. Normally, the government should have the "financial muscle" to be
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able to commit to long-term engagements in NTO matters. Pure private sector financing
may not be as stable as a source of funds.
2. The government "can afford" to have a more Long-Term Perspective in NTO
matters.
Related is the notion that the government is not that dependent on immediate payback in
investments in NTO operation as businesses in the private sector. Commercial actors may
be more dependent and focused on short-term engagements and more quickreturn on
investments and market results. One indication of this situation is that private funding
often comes in the form of financing of specific projects with limited time span, rather
than long term commitments to the general core budget of the NTO (ref. Section 5.2).
3. Government contribution offunding is "fair" from a societal perspective.
We have also pointed out in Section 3.1 that there are many stakeholder beneficiaries
beyond the travel and tourism industry itself. Many different stakeholders, including the
public sector, are beneficiaries of incoming tourism. Since tourism often generates
substantial benefits of societal value, it is only fair that government contributes to NTO
operation. At least some portion ofpublic funding may be necessary to avoid a situation
where the businesses in the tourism industry refuses to contribute because they would
feel it unfair that they would have to pick up the entire bill for NTO's operation, as long
as tourism benefits other stakeholders beyond the tourism industry. A focus on societal
concerns also requires a long term-perspective in funding policies.
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that government contribution to funding (i.e., Principle P9, and probably
PH) should be beneficial, particularly for the NTO's Long-Term Perspective.
We have discussed the special nature of generic international tourism marketing in
relation to the common goods-problem. Thus one can make a case that
l. Government funding could be necessary to secure sufficient financing ofNTO's
budget.
As pointed out there are (short-term) incentives for industry actors to free-ride on the
benefits ofNTO's operation. This makes it difficult to obtain stable financing from the
private sector. An NTO that is under-financed will also face serious constraints on its
operational freedom, and may not be able to carry through activities and efforts needed to
satisfy a professionally sound market strategy.
2. Government funding could be necessary to avoid an over-focus on private
interests.
Moreover, an NTO solely dependent on the industry to provide it with necessary funding
could be forced to accept projects or engagements that favors special interest in the
industry and that is not in line with its overall strategy. The NTO could also be subject to
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undesirable pressure from special groups with private interest, or large commercial actors
that want to support their agenda on the expense of smaller stakeholders. It may force the
NTO to spend too many resources on securing funds from the private sector, and lead the
NTO towards an industry or product focus rather than a market focus. That would
probably reduce NTO's Operational Freedom.
3. Government participation in can help secure funding for efforts directed at
societal concerns beyond the profit-maximizing interest of the industry.
Although this is disputed by some scholars (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), government
participation can help secure that important societal concerns beyond private profit-
maximization are considered, and that the interests of all stakeholders are safeguarded.
Along with the common goods-problem, this is probably one of the most important
reasons why government is still so much involved in NTO matters worldwide.
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that government contribution to funding (l.e., Principle P9 and possibly
PlI) should be beneficial, particularly for the NTO's Operational Freedom
3.3.4 Theory and context-based recommendations for choice of
ownership principle
Many scholars justifiably argue that private operation is more resource-efficient than
public operation. The industry is operating in a competitive environment, and business
managers are used to face efficiency and effectiveness constraints on a day-to day basis.
More industry participation in ownership/control would bring more business executives
into the NTOs' boards, and these managers could be expected to bring their business-
oriented attitude with them. Under pure government operation these beneficial demands
and influences on the NTO are probably not so pronounced, since the board would be
dominated by bureaucrats or ex-bureaucrats not that used to think in terms of efficiency,
effectiveness and market performance.
1. Industry ownership participation could increase the degree of professionalism in
theNTO.
More industry representation in NTO's boards could help the NTO to become more
professional as a marketing organization. Industry representatives could be expected to
possess more expertise in e.g., marketing, corporate strategy, finance etc. than
bureaucrats.
2. Industry ownership participation could increase the degree of commitment and
interest in NTO-matters.
The legitimacy problem stemming from the odd (but still common) situation where the
NTO is for the most part controlled by the government, and at the same time set to do
marketing tasks on behalf of an industry that is only to a limited degree involved in its
operation, could be somewhat reduced by assuring more industry ownership
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participation. With sole government ownership/control of the NTO, the businesses in the
industry may feel detached and somewhat uninterested in what the NTO is doing. More
industry participation can probably increase the likelihood that the industry will be more
interested to co-work with the NTO, and thus support and adhere to national strategies for
tourism marketing developed and implemented by the NTO. That could give the NTO
room to focus on its market-oriented tasks rather than to spend resources on legitimacy-
related activities directed at the industry.
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that industry ownership/control (i.e., Principles P12 and possibly P14)
should be beneficial for the NTO's Market Focus.
In terms of Operational Freedom, government ownership/control can make the NTO less
susceptive to pressure to do what the private sector wants.
l. Government ownership/control could shield the NTO from undesirable pressure
from powerful industry stakeholders.
We have discussed in Section 2.4.1 the danger of concentrated private ownership. Large
private firms with large investors might pressure the NTO to under-provide quality and
otherwise shortchange the NTO's other smaller stakeholders because oftheir potential
single-minded focus on special interests or short-term profits. Such private motives could
prompt industry owners to intervene in NTO's operation and put undue restrictions on
NTO's Operational Freedom. Government ownership could help secure that all
stakeholders are treated equallyand that societal interest is taken into concern. There is,
however, some controversy about this in the privatization debate, as mentioned earlier.
Thus, the theory reviewed and special considerations in the NTO context lead us to
conclude that government ownership/control (i.e., Principle P13) should be
beneficial for the NTO's and Operational Freedom.
Considering Long-Term Perspective it is more difficult to come to any clear conclusions
in terms of preferable ownership/control. On one hand one could argue that the industry
would constitute a more short-term oriented owner, since the tourism industry is often
more focused on short-term profits than the government as an owner would be. On the
other hand, government coalitions (in democratic countries such as the OECD members
in this study) do change from time to time and from one election term to another.
Government policies and priorities also change accordingly, which could make the NTO
have to deal with frequently changing assignments and owner priorities. Neither ofthese
situations could be considered beneficial for the NTO's Long-Term Perspective. We
therefore have no decisive conclusions on this issue based on the theory reviewed and
special considerations in the NTO context.
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4.0 Methodology
The following section explains the choice of research method ofthis thesis and how the
empirical part was carried out.
4.1 Research method and data collection
The empirical research method we have used is an "experimental laboratory approach"
with controlled focus groups, using a scenario technique derived from conjoint analysis
design. The technique uses descriptions of the NTOs in terms of the 3 categories of
principles (budgeting principle, funding source, and organizational ownership/control as
independent variables) systematically combined into scenarios. The "experiment"
involves having all the proposed scenarios evaluated in terms of the expected
consequences by practitioner respondents from different cultural and professional
backgrounds within the OECD community. The data is then compared with current
practices and theory recommendations. The said consequences were operationalized in a
questionnaire in terms of estimating the effect on the organization's Market Focus, Long-
Term Perspective and Operational Freedom, comprising the dependent variables. Thus
the research design entails a measurement and analysis of the relationship between the
principles (independent variables) and the expected effects (dependent variables). The
principles' applicability for NTO governance were evaluated by international key-
informants with backgrounds from both NTOs and involved stakeholder groups, i.e.,
government and industry entities along with some independent informants representing
the society-stakeholders. Because many of the respondents had prior experience with
several of the principles, and generally possessed a thorough understanding of the
workings of"real world" NTO contexts, we found these respondents capable ofmaking
qualified judgments of the expected consequences of the scenarios. This was done for
both the already implemented principles and the alternative suggested principles not yet
in use. As mentioned earlier, pre-existing theory from research literature is not, in
isolation, sufficient to provide us with such qualified judgments. This was the rationale
for the chosen research design shown in Figure 2.1, and the approach to the empirical
part ofthis study as described next.
The main goal of the present study was to assess the perceived consequences of different
potential arrangements for financing and controlling NTO's. Consequently, we were not
searching for one optimal arrangement, but were more interested in the perceived
consequences of different arrangements from the perspectives of the NTA, NTO and the
travel industry, (and in a few cases, the society). A heterogeneous make-up of the
respondent groups, representing various stakeholder interests, was necessary to safeguard
that the interest of overall stakeholders were reflected in the evaluation of the principles
(ref. Figure 3.1). Furthermore, the theory review and contextual framework suggest
several interesting potential principles that are not in use in NTO administrations today.
Thus, we were not only concerned with arrangements currently in use, but also with
several potential arrangements that are not in use today. These arrangements were
included to provide a more complete assessment of potential alternative financing and
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control arrangements, instead of confining the evaluation to existing arrangements with
the danger of leaving out promising candidates.
4.2 Data sample
The effect of different arrangements with regard to budgeting principles, financial source
and organizational control was assessed through 2 sets of group interviews conducted a)
among 14 groups ofpractitioners in different OECD-countries and, b) among a group of
theory experts with experience from different relevant areas oftheory. In this section we
will present the data samples and the data collection procedures.
4.2.1 Practitioners' sample
The practitioners' data collection was based on a convenience sample including OECD-
countries that agreed to participate. Agreement and assistance from the involved tourism
administrations were necessary to recruit the desired group make-up representing
stakeholders and NTOs. However, despite the use of a convenience sample, we have
reason to believe that the respondents are representative of individuals in the real world
setting of interest. We have purposely sampled individuals who vary on important
dimensions (i.e., stakeholder type and cultural background) that characterize the members
of the target population, as suggested by Calder, Phillips and Tybout (1981). The group
interviews and data collection procedures were conducted in the following countries in
the order as shown:
1. Norway
2. Sweden
3. Denmark
4. UK (British Tourist Authority)
5. The Czech Republic
6. Slovakia
7. Austria
8. Luxembourg
9. Spain
10. Portugal
11. South Korea
12.Japan
13. Canada
14. Finland
Three to eight persons representing the government (NTA), the NTO, and in most
instances, the travel industry took part in the interviews". The interviews were conducted
between June and September of 1999. With the exception of the UK and South Korea,
where only one person was responsible for the interviews, a team oftwo researchers were
conducting the interviews.
24 In a few countries people from research institutes and consultants participated as well, presumably
representing neutral stakeholders.
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The research design was pre-tested on 1) a group Ph.D. students at The Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, and 2) a group of executives from
two local Norwegian tourism organizations.
4.2.2 Theory experts' sample
The theory presented in Chapter 2 is necessarily of a more qualitative character than the
data from the practitioners' scenario evaluations in our international sample. Thus, it is
difficult to compare the two sources of information directly. It was necessary to "reduce
and focus" the rather comprehensive qualitative data from the theory discussion into a
more compact, quantitative form more comparable with the data derived from the
practitioners' evaluations. A way to handle this problem is to have a group oftheory
experts "quantify" the relevant theory through use of the same series of scenario
evaluations as the practitioners evaluated. In this way we could investigate any
discrepancies between theorists' and practitioners' views on how NTOs best could be
organized and governed in terms of the principles we are interested in. In other words, we
were concerned about determining ifthe way the practitioners think and reason about the
issues at hand is congruent with theoretical knowledge as represented by the judgment of
theory experts. This procedure is meant to make the two types of data (research-based
theory versus practitioners' espoused theories and theories-in-use) far more comparable,
since the data would then be in the same format.
Furthermore, there is some degree of inconclusiveness in certain areas within the
theoretical framework in terms of recommendations about what principles should be
applied for NTO governance. Thus, the quantitative data from the theory experts'
evaluations was meant to be a supplement to the qualitative information from the theory
review in Chapter 2. We wanted to check the concordance between the literature theory
recommendations and the results from the theory experts' scenario evaluations. A relative
match between the two would contribute to validate the theory side of the study. In areas
where the theory recommendations are somewhat inconclusive, the results from the
theory experts' scenario evaluations can be used to arrive at more decisive
recommendations from the theory side of the study.
Therefore, we asked a panel consisting oftheory expertsf to do the same procedure as
the practitioners did in the international sample as explained in the next section. The
results of scenario evaluations made by the practitioners and the theorists are presented,
analyzed and compared in Chapter 5.
25 The panel was made up ofacademic personnel (professors, assistant professors and researchers) from the
Norwegian School o/ Economics and Business Administration and the Foundation/or Research in
Economics and Business Administration. The group had six members with expertise form different areas of
theory relevant for the issues at hand, and thus representing the theory areas discussed in the theory chapter
ofthis thesis (e.g., marketing, organizational sciences, agency theory, public choice, public economy theory
etc.).
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4.3 Data collection
In the following section we describe the data collection procedure, the scenario design,
and some advantages of using this approach.
4.3.1 Procedure
The following procedure was used for the focus groups and scenario evaluations:
l. A brief introduction to the project was presented to the participants.
2. The second stage included a presentation of the various principles for budgeting,
funding sources, and ownership/control arrangements. The participants in the
practitioners' groups were then asked to compare these principles with the current
practice for their own country. The group members collectively participated in this
process in each country.
3. Then the groups were introduced to 3-4 scenarios containing combinations of
budgeting principles, funding source and ownership arrangements to familiarize the
group with the procedure.
4. Finally, group members individually evaluated the likely consequences of 3-7
scenarios each so that every national group in total evaluated a set of 22 scenarios'".
The purpose of stages 1 through 3 was to familiarize the group members with the
research design and data collection procedure. Furthermore, stage 2 provided useful
information for comparison of the different arrangements found in the participating
countries (practitioners' sample only). Stages l through 3 in the practitioners' sample was
videotaped for further analysis of any verbal statements, and contextual information that
surfaced during the presentation and the group discussion. Stage 4 was important to
obtain a systematic comparison of different potential arrangements, including principles
not currently in use in any participating countries.
Each of the 22 scenarios consisted of:
a) one budgeting principle (out of 8 principles in total)
b) one source offunding (out of3 possible sources)
c) and one form of organizational control (out of 3 possible forms)
(See Table 5.1 for a list of the independent variables (principles»
The scenarios were developed according to a factorial design similar to that used in
Conjoint-analysis. Conjoint-analysis is a method used to estimate how preferences (or
utility) for alternative unique combinations of attributes (here "scenarios") are determined
by the partial preference for the different attributes (here "principles"). By presenting the
respondents various alternatives that systematically vary on the attributes thought to have
an impact on the preferences, it is possible to get an estimate ofhow each attribute
contributes to the overall preference (or utility) of the alternative. In our case, the
respondents are asked to evaluate alternatives in the form of so-called "scenarios" that
26 An explanation of the rationale for the choice ofthis number of scenarios (22) is given on the following
page.
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systematically varied with respect to budgeting principle, funding source, and
ownership/control of the NTO. Conjoint computer software was used to arrive at the
optimal number of scenarios given the combination of 8 x 3 x 3 independent variables.
The computer software reduced the number of (potential) scenarios down to 24, which
was the optimal number computed using the conjoint logarithm. Two scenarios had to be
deleted from the set, since they constituted unrealistic scenarios in practice (e.g.,
Budgeting principle = taxation ofvisitors, NTO funded by the industry, and NTO
owned/controlled by the government). Each ofthe remaining 22 scenarios presented to
the groups were then scored on the basis of 18 different evaluation items representing the
dependent variables. Anyone ofthese scenarios was evaluated for its perceived impact
on NTO's Market Focus, Long-Term Perspective, and Operational Freedom. (See also
Appendix 3 for the item list, factor analysis and interview guide/questionnaire; and a
sample of the scenarios in Appendix 4). Four of the items were later deleted from the
final analysis based on the factor analysis, which resulted in 14 items used for the
analysis in the end.
In a traditional conjoint-analysis design each individual would have had to evaluate all 22
scenarios. In our research design, this would have meant that each respondent would have
had to score the same 18 items 22 times during one session, resulting in 396 judgments
(22 scenarios x 18 items each) altogether. This would be way beyond reasonable time and
work load capacity limits of the respondents. Instead, the 22 different scenarios were
distributed evenly among the respondents in the national groups. Anyone national group
consisting of 3-7 respondents each would then equal "one individual" in a traditional
conjoint-analysis design. Thus, each set of scenarios consisting of 22 scenarios was
evaluated two times by the theory expert panel and 14 times altogether by the country
groups combined. This resulted in 44 cases (2 x 22) for the theory expert group and 308
cases (22 x 14) for the national groups combined. Among the practitioners' evaluations
only 304 cases were kept for analysis'". This meant that each of the 8 budgeting
principles were then evaluated 6-4 times by theory respondents combined and 42 - 27
times by the practitioners combined, depending on the make-up of the scenario set. The
three funding source and three ownership principles were evaluated 18 - 12 times each
by the theory experts combined and 125 - 83 times by the practitioners combined.
Following the scenario evaluation session, a "debriefing" was conducted where the group
members were asked to express their views on the research design and procedure. The
purpose was to elicit any qualitative additional information that may not have been
captured by the quantitative scenario design, and to discover any possible
misunderstandings or problems that could help explain any odd responses in the scenario
evaluations.
27 4 scenarios evaluated by one single respondent were deleted form further analysis because this individual
was deemed "careless respondent" (constant mid-scale (score 4) responses on all 18 items on all 4 scenarios
he had been allocated).
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4.4.2 Avoidance of strategic evaluations
Apart from the technical advantages the scenario design offers - it was also chosen for
tactical reasons. The results from this study, as they were also reported to the OECD
Tourism Committee, could potentially prompt NTO administrations to change current
practice. Particularly in the case ofpractitioners' evaluations ofprinciples, one could
foresee that some of the respondents would have incentives to evaluate principles
strategically according to self-interest, rather than to evaluate a principle as to its
potential merits for NTOs' operation. For instance, a stakeholder respondent interested in
preserving the status quo, and thereby maintaining power, influence or resources, could
have incentives to evaluate a typical status quo scenario or principle more positively than
that principle "deserves" from an objective general stakeholder's point ofview. That is,
to systematically over-score a given "favorable" (for the respondent) principle or under-
score principles that would change status quo if implemented.
In the scenario design we have used, the respondent is not asked to state whether he or
she likes a given scenario or not, or to rate scenarios according to own preference. The
respondent is "forced" to evaluate the likely consequences of a given scenario on specific
items thought to be important for NTO's performance. If a respondent were to evaluate
strategically purely according to self-interest, he or she would have to intentionally and
systematically misrepresent any given scenario on a number of different items. We firmly
believe that this is more difficult to do in our set-up that ifthe respondent were to simply
rank scenarios according to own preference, or asked directly what kind of system they
prefer.
In terms of a potential propensity to evaluate scenarios strategically, our theoretical
experts are not really stakeholders in NTO matters, and should have few incentives to
make any intentional misrepresentations in the scenario evaluations. As we will see later
in the data analysis chapter, the evaluations made by the theorists were cross-checked
with the corresponding practitioners' evaluations to look for indications of strategic
evaluations. The evaluations of the two groups appeared to concur to a high degree,
which should indicate that it is not likely that the practitioners in fact evaluated the
scenarios strategically.
Furthermore, ifthe scenario evaluations made by the practitioner respondents were to be
in concurrence with current practice, that could be an indication that the respondents may
have evaluated the scenarios strategically to preserve the status quo. However, as we will
report in the next chapter, neither ofthese two conditions seems to be the case. The
theorists and practitioners evaluations appear to concur, and at the same time,
practitioner's evaluations appear to differ from what is current NTO practice, i.e., defying
status quo. We chose to interpret that as evidence that the respondents have not evaluated
the scenarios strategically according to pure self-interest.
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5.0 Empirical Results: Description of current practices, Scenario
evaluations, and Gap-analysis.
In this chapter we will present the analysis of the results of the sample practitioners'
group consisting of all 14 countries combined, as well as the results from the theory
experts' group.
5.1 Outline of results-section
1. First, the combined results originating from the group assessments of the current
governance practices will be presented and discussed. These results will be discussed
as to the degree of
• activity/behavior-based budgeting,
• performance/outcome-based budgeting,
• government vs. industry funding, and
• government vs. industry ownership/control or shareholder ownership/control.
2. Second, we will discuss how each of the three main groups ofprinciples:
• 1) budgeting principle,
• 2)funding source, and
• 3) ownership/organizational control,
are estimated by the theory expert and practitioner respondents to have on impact on:
• 1) Market Focus,
• 2) Long-Term Perspective, and
• 3) Operational Freedom.
3. Third, we present a comparison ofthe:
• practitioner representatives' vs. theory experts' evaluations, and
• current governance practices vs. practitioner representatives' evaluations
5.2 Existing practices described in terms of the principles
Table 5.1 below depicts how the proposed 14 principles are assessed to be descriptive for
the practices currently implemented across our sample of OECD countries. The scale
used ranges from 1 (does not describe the situation) to 7 (describes the situation), i.e., the
higher the average score of a given principle is, the more descriptive the principle is for
existing governance practices of a "average" country in the sample. Based on Table 5.1,
the principles can be split into three categories:
1) Principles that describe the current practices well (High mean scores)
2) Principles that in some instances are descriptive for the current practice
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3) Principles that have little resemblance with the current practice (Low mean scores).
Table 5.1
The degree to which the principles are descriptive of current practices
(l=Does NOT describe the situation, 7=Describes the situation)
Country sample (N=14NTOs) Mean score Most
Type of (standard frequent
Principle Principle description deviation) score (# of
countries)
l. NTO's budget one year is based on last available
estimates of the amount ofmoney spent by incoming 1.18 (0.52) 1(12)
visitors and/or estimated number ofincoming visitors
the previous year
2. NTO's budget one year is tied to the
increase/decrease in the amount of money spent by 1.07 (0.26) 1(13)
incoming visitors (or the number ofvisitors in NTO's
country) relative to " comparable" countries the
previous year
Budget J. NTO's budget is based on sale and participation in 2.77(1.10) 2(4)
principle specific projects
(8 principles) 4. NTO's budget is negotiable and funded based on
overall evaluation of the NTO's marketing plans each 2.19(1.34) 1(6)
year
5. NTO's budget is based on a fixed sum decided each 5.45 (1.60) 6 and 7 (4)year
6. NTO's budget is tied to the achievement of a number 1.68 (0.93) 1(8)
of goals that are agreed upon each year
7. NTO's budget is based on the revenue generated from 1.07 (0.26) 1(13)taxation on visitors and the traveling public
8. NTO's budget is based on the revenue generatedfrom 1.00 (0.00) 1(14)
fees and taxes oaid bv the travel and tourism industry
9. NTO is funded by the government 5.17 (1.50) 4,6 and 7(3)
Funding
ID. NTO is funded by the travel and tourism industrysource 2.34 (0.96) 2(5)
(3 principles) Il. NTO isfunded jointly by the travel and tourism
industry and the government 3.53 (2.77) 1 (7)
12. NTO is a non-profit organization owned by and
responsible toward the travel and tourism industry 1.70 (0.96) 1(8)
Ownership/ 13. NTO is a non-profit org. owned by and responsible
control toward the government 6.23 (1.27) 7(9)
(3 principles)
14. NTO is a limited corporation owned by shareholders 1.43 (1.57) 1(13)
within and outside the travel and tourism industry
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5.2.1 Principles that describe current practices well
The four principles that most often describe current or existing governing practices are
listed below. In most countries in the sample the budgets are based on a fixed amount that
is decided each year, but the amount is usually in line with the amount allocated last year.
Four countries gave this principle a score of7, another four gave it a score of6, and three
countries gave it a score of 5. Only one country reported that this was not a principle
descriptive oftheir practices. In Denmark and Great Britain the government portion of
the budget is allocated for a period ofthree years at a time. (In the listings below mean
scores are typed in boldface, and the corresponding standard deviations in normal type).
• PS: NTO's budget is based on a fixed sum decided each year (5.45; 1.60)28
• P9: Central (national) government is the source of the funding (5.17; 1.50)
• PlI: NTO is funded jointly by the government and the tourism industry (3.53;
2.77)
• P13: NTO is "owned", controlled, or responsible towards the government (6.23;
1.27J
In most instances the central (national) government is the main source offunding for
NTOs. Three countries gave this principle a score of 7, and four gave it a score of 6. One
country gave this principle a score of2, and one gave it a score of 3. It should be noted
that one cannot always equate the amount obtained from the industry with private sector
funding, since some of the non-central government funding may originate from other
public funds. Often there are two parts ofthe budget: one central government (core)-part,
and one part provided by the private sector. In most countries the government-part of the
budget is decided on each year, but it does not vary considerably from one year to
another. Six countries reported thatjoint funding was common (five gave this principle a
score of a 7, and one gave it a score of 5), while seven countries did not rely on joint
funding with the private sector (score 1).
In addition, the NTO is in most cases perceived to be "owned", controlled, or responsible
towards the government (given a score of 7 by nine countries, and a score of 6 by another
two). In some countries industry representation in NTO boards contribute to increase the
score on principle # 12 in Table 5.1 ("owned" or responsible towards the industry). Two
countries gave this principle a score of 3, and another three gave it a score of2. Eight
countries reported no industry involvement in NTO ownership/control (score I).
28 The item representing fixed sum-budgeting was changed after interviews were conducted in Norway,
Sweden and Denmark so that "NTO's budget is based on a fixed sum decided for a three-year period"
was changed to "NTO's budget is based on a fixed sum decided each year".
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5.2.2 Principles that in some instances are descriptive of current
practices
The principles listed below are in some instances (or partially) descriptive of current
practices in the sample countries. The tourism industry contributes with funding of
specific projects quite frequently. These co-operative projects are in some instances
initiated by the NTO itself, while in other instances, the projects are initiated by the
industry. One country depends quite often on this form offinancing (score 5), while three
other countries use it partially (score 4). Most countries use project budgeting to a limited
degree: Four countries gave the principle a score of3 and another four gave it score of2.
• P3: The budget is based on sale and participation in specific projects (2.77; 1.1O)
• P4: The budget is negotiable and based on an evaluation ofNTO's marketing
plans each year (2.19; 1.34)
• PlO: NTO is funded by the industry (2.34; 0.96)
Some smaller amount of private sector funding is common in the majority of our
respondent countries. Eight countries gave this principle (PIO in Table 5.1) either a score
of 3 or 2. In some cases, the funding contributed by the industry originates from public
funds - first chandelIed to the industry and later (partially) redistributed to the NTO.
Some groups reported that prior to money being allocated to the NTO from government
funds there were some form of"negotiations" with the government on the size of the
budget based on NTO's plans for next year's activities. Six countries indicated that P4
had some resemblance to the budgeting process in their country (three gave it a score of
2, and another three gave it a score of 3), while two countries uses this kind of budgeting
more often (score 4 and 6, respectively). However, in most such cases the final size of the
budget is rarely a direct result ofthese "negotiations". More frequently, the size of the
budget is a consequence of the government's overall budget situation, resulting quite
often in a situation where prior years' precedence determined the final NTO budget the
following year. However, that could in some cases result in the budget being cut or
increased arbitrarily fairly unrelated to NTO's activities or performance, depending on
the government's budget and priorities.
In theory, both project-based financing and funding based on activities and plans are
behavior- or activity-based budgeting principles. In practice, the degree of activity-based
budgeting practice depends on the NTO's freedom and ability to set goals and to decide
on the project activities. It also depends on the NTO's freedom and financial ability to
decline certain projects (or goals) that are not found to be compatible with a
professionally based overall market strategy.
Why industry funding has a "score" higher than 1.00 (score 2.34), can be explained by
the fact that the industry quite often contributes to the NTO's budget through (partial)
financing ofvarious projects. The industry contributes usually in one oftwo ways: In
some cases the industry contributes financially to specific projects without this practice
being a formal requirement from the NTA (government) - as opposed to cases where
there is a formal matching-requirement. In other cases, there is such a matching
requirement, designed so that the government will match the amount contributed by the
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industry. Consequently, the NTO budget in such countries contains both a government
and industry portion.
As noted earlier, industry funding has a relatively high "score", which may contribute
positively to the organization's professionalism and market orientation, particularly ifthe
tourism industry in the country is highly market-oriented as well. Substantial levels of
industry contributions may increase the industry's commitment to the organization and
interest in its activities, goals and performance as discussed in the end ofChapter 3.
Furthermore, in some countries industry contributions appear to increase the NTO
budgets to levels that are more competitive in the international tourism market, and reach
levels that would have been hard to reach with government funding only. Industry
funding can also give legitimacy to the NTO and be considered as evidence that the
organization is professional and also deserves financial support by the government.
However, as the practitioners' scenario evaluations show, industry funding may put some
constraints on the organization's freedom to act and long-term planning perspective. It is
possible that marketing efforts directed at gaining the support of the industry ("industry
lobbying") could absorb resources better spent elsewhere.
5.2.3 Principles that are not descriptive of current practices
The principles listed below are rarely or never descriptive of the current practice:
• P6: NTO' s budget is tied to the achievement of a number of goals that are agreed
upon each year (1.68; 0.93)
• Pl: NTO's budget one year is based on last available estimates of the amount of
money spent by incoming visitors and/or estimated number of incoming visitors
the previous year (1.18; 0.52)
• P2: NTO's budget one year is tied to the increase/decrease in the amount of
money spent by incoming visitors (or the number ofvisitors in NTO's country)
relative to "comparable" countries the previous year (1.07; 0.26)
• P7: NTO's budget is based on the revenue generated from taxation on visitors and
the traveling public (1.07; 0.26)
• P8: NTO's budget is based on the revenue generated from fees and taxes paid by
the travel and tourism industry (1.00; 0.00)
• P12:NTO is a non-profit organization owned by and responsible toward the travel
and tourism industry (1.68; 0.96)
• P14: NTO is a limited corporation owned by shareholders within and outside the
travel and tourism industry (1.43; 1.57)
As shown in Table 5.1, performance- or outcome-based financing is not practiced in
general. Principles # 1,2, 7, and 8 in Table 5.1 are not common in international practice.
For instance, tax on the industry is not used by any countries, while only one country
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(Austria) has a visitor tax connected to NTO budgets. In several countries, lawor
established practice does not allow tax revenue to be earmarked for any particular
purpose. Thus, tax revenue collected from tourists or the industry (which in principle
reflects the amount of revenue generated from tourism business and could in theory be
considered as an indirect performance measure) will not be earmarked for funding of the
NTO as oftoday. Principle 7 and 8 are performance-based to the extent that the budgets
of the NTO do not reflect changes in tax rates, but only reflect changes in the bases on
which the taxes are levied. However, on the local or regional level in some countries,
such tax links are in effect: Local tax revenues (e.g., "kurtax") are sometimes used for
financing local/regional tourism marketing organizations (e.g., Austria and Spain).
However, it is probably incorrect to claim that NTOs are entirely free of performance-
based budgeting practice. The reason why most of the principles linked to performance
(Principles 1, 2, 7, and 8) do not have a score of 1.00 (lowest = non existent), is because it
in a few instances was expressed that good market performance one year could provide a
basis for determining the size of the next year's budget - without this being established in
a formal way. Two countries indicated practices with a slight resemblance to PI (score 2
and 3) and one country gave P2 a score of2. Itwas pointed out that a lack ofmeasurable
results or no results ofNTO projects most likely could cause private sector and
government to curb their spending on the NTO - at least in the long run.
Why the limited corporation ownership principle does not have a score of 1.00 (lowest)
either, is because that in some countries (e.g., Portugal) the NTO itself has control of or
owns commercial companies. In instances where the industry has significant board
representation, the NTO is sometimes perceived as being partially owned or controlled by
the industry. One country gave this principle (P 12) a score of 4, three countries gave it a
score on, and two more gave it a score of2 - indicating at least some degree ofindustry
control of the NTO in about half of our sample countries.
Generally, the "typical/average" NTO holds the following characteristics:
• Fixed sum (core) budgets are decided upon each year
• Project financing is quite common
• Budgets based on evaluations of marketing plans is also common
• Budgets are not performance-based in the sense of being tied to quantifiable
effects in the tourism market
• The NTO is predominately funded by the government, and in some instances
jointly by the government and the industry
• The NTO is owned/controlled by the government, i.e., under the authority of a
ministry or other government body.
From the descriptions of current practices shown in Table 5.1 it becomes apparent that
there is very little variation in how NTOs are organized and governed worldwide. Many
of the principles we are studying have low mean scores, indicating that they are non-to-
rare in existence. The standard deviations are relatively small for most of the 14
principles, indicating only small variations in the degree ofthose principles' use in
practice. This fact is important to note, because it puts substantial restrictions on the
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number of feasible research designs. As discussed in Chapter 4 this precludes the ability
to choose a purely experimental design, or to do natural experiments and case studies.
Generally there is too little variation in the independent variables (principles) to make
any such comparisons meaningful. The only principle that has some degree of variance
worth to mention is Pli (st. dev. = 2.77), which isjoint funding. The variance stems for
the most part from what degree (proportion) of the budget is funded by the government,
and how much funded by the industry in a combined funding scheme. (We will
investigate the empirical relationship between the funding source and NTO's market
focus in more detail later in Appendix 7.) At the same time it is then difficult to find any
"best" or "worst" cases in existing practices that can be studied and explained by our
governance principles, since most NTOs are organized and governed in about the same
way. This problem also precludes the ability to do case studies to investigate the variables
we are interested in this study.
Very little variance in the way NTOs are organized and governed has another important
implication. When stakeholders responsible for NTO matters are to organize a new NTO
or reorganize an existing one, there are few other cases to look for that can provide a
better solution than the traditional way. Had there been more variation in practice, there
would probably have been more examples for stakeholders for to follow trait (in positive
cases) or avoid (in negative cases). Without this kind ofvariation in existing practices,
this could act as a conservative force, perpetuating the current "regime". As mentioned in
the introductory section, an important purpose ofthis thesis is to question current practice
and suggest alternative ways to organize and govern NTOs. Therefore, we find it
necessary to extend the analysis beyond current practices.
5.3 Scenario evaluations: The principles' importance for NTOs'
incentives, abilities and working conditions
In this section we will address how the participants evaluated the 14 principles, which
were embedded in the scenarios respondents were presented to, in terms of the principles'
impact on:
• Market Focus
• Long-Term Perspective
• Operational Freedom
From the scenario evaluation data it was possible to extract each individual principle 's
perceived impact on the said dependent variables. By comparing the mean score of the 14
principles on the items representing any of the three dependent variables one can
determine which budgeting principle,junding source or owner alternative that is
perceived to be best (or worse) forNTOs' Market Focus, Long-Term Perspective, and
Operational Freedom. A significantly higher (than another principle's) score of a given
principle on items representing any of the three dependent variables would indicate that
the principle is evaluated more positive on that aspect. For instance, a given budgeting
principle that scores significantly higher on e.g., NTOs' Market Focus than any other
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budgeting principle could be interpreted as (on average) better for NTOs' Market Focus
than those other budgeting principles. This is also valid for that principle in combination
with any of the funding and ownership principles (and vice versa.)
Most of the quantitative analyses presented in this thesis are carried out using ANOVA.
ANOVA (Analysis ofvariance) is used to test whether the scenario evaluations vary
systematically with any type of principle. For our purposes this method of analysis is
used to determine if differences in mean scores between principles are due to systematic
variation in the evaluations of the principles, or simply due to random error. The level of
confidence is 95% (p< 0.05) unless otherwise noted.
The presentation is organized as shown in Table 5.2. An overview ofresults and
operationalizations of the various constructs are shown in Tables 5.6-5.9. We only
discuss principles that receive scores that are substantially higher or lower than the scores
obtained for other principles. For ease of distinction the independent variables are typed
in italics, and the Dependent Variables are typed with capitalization in this chapter.
Table 5.2
Structure of presentation of scenario evaluations (numbers in cells refer to text-paragraphs)
Independent variable (Principles)
Dependent variable Budgeting Funding Ownership/
method source control
5.3.2 Market Focus 5.3.2.1 5.3.2.2 5.3.2.3
5.3.3 Long -Term Perspective 5.3.3.1 5.3.3.2 5.3.3.3
5.3.4 Operational Freedom 5.3.4.1 5.3.4.2 5.3.4.3
5.3.5 Conclusion
When interpreting the results, a caveat is in order: A "low" score does not imply a
negative score on the scale used. It only implies that the principle in question on the
average gets a score that is considerably lower than the other principles with which it is
compared, and is thus evaluated less positive rather than negative for the aspect in
question.
5.3.1The relative impact of the principles
Table 5.3 below shows the relative impact of the three main groupings of principles,
which are: the budget principle (P l-P8),Junding source (P9-P 11), and ownership/control
of the organization (PI2-PI4) on the dimensions we are interested in. Table 5.3 shows the
data from the practitioners' sample only.
From the information in Table 5.3 below, it becomes apparent that:
I) The budgeting principles have less importance for NTOs' market focus than for the
ability to plan and operate on a long-term basis its operationalfreedom.
2) The budgeting principles are clearly more important than both thefunding source and
the ownership/control ofNTOs with respect to all the three evaluative aspects.
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The groups were instructed to cognitively "free themselves" from their country-specific
context as much as possible when they were to evaluate the scenarios. Despite this
instruction, our experience based on the interview sessions is that the importance group
members attribute to the various principles will be somewhat influenced by the
economic, cultural, and political context prevailing in the respondents' countries.
Table 5.329
Practitioners' international sample: The relative impact of the three factors on
M k F L T O ti d O f I F d f th NTOar et ocus, ong- erm 'pera lon, an rpera IOna ree om o e
Market Focus Long-Term Operational
Factor Perspective Freedom
Budgeting principle 47% 60% 52%
Funding source 33% 18% 27%
Ownership/control 20% 22% 21%
For instance, respondents from countries that have experienced a decrease in government
spending on tourism aspects may evaluate government involvement in financing and
political control of the NTO differently from those who have witnessed an increase in
government spending.
One condition reduces the across-countries comparability somewhat: The wording of one
of the principles (P5) was changed slightly after the interviews in Norway, Sweden and
Denmark were completed. In these three countries the principle was formulated such that
the respondents were asked to evaluate the effect of afixed sum negotiatedfor a period of
3-5 years, while the respondents in the other countries were asked to evaluate the effect
of afixed sum decided each year. This was done when we discovered that the first
alternative (long-term budgeting period) seldom was descriptive of current practice,
whereas the last alternative (short-term budgeting period) was far more applicable.
Table 5.4 below shows the F value and level of significance of each independent
variable's evaluated effect on the dependent variables in our model for the practitioners'
sample. Using this general linear model procedure, we can test the null hypotheses about
the effects of factor variables on the means ofvarious groupings of a joint distribution of
dependent variables. The test scores from this (multivariate) test can be understood as
follows: The test is used to test the Ohypothesis that there are no differences in means. A
high F-value (df= 1) and a low significance level (p<O.05) indicate that the Ohypothesis
should be rejected. In other words, the independent variable produces in fact significant
systematic variations in the dependent variables. In our case, it means that inclusion of a
29 The information in Table 5.3 was derived from running the data from the practitioners' scenario
evaluations in conjoint analysis software. The percentage scores in the table represent the proportion of
"utility" attributed to each category of principles in terms oftheir impact on the dependent variables. A
relatively higher percentage score ofa given category means that this category ofprinciples has more
impact on a given dependent variable than the categories. Note: The theory experts' sample size was too
small to make a corresponding analysis ofthat group's evaluations meaningful.
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given principle with a low significance-level score in a given scenario should have a
significant impact on how that scenario is evaluated in terms of the effects we are
interested in.
P , .
Table 5.4
ti I I L l of si ·tiractttioners mterna IOna sample: eve !_gm icances
IRrinciples ~xpected effects F Sig.
Budgeting principle Market Focus 5.909 0.016
lLong- Term Perspective 5.633 0.018
pperational Freedom 12.462 0.000
funding source lMarket Focus 36.087 0.000
lLon~- Term Perspective 1.316 0.252
IOperational Freedom 7.287 0.007
Ownership/control lMarket Focus 0.000 0.984
lLong- Term Persl!_ective 0.049 0.826
!Operational Freedom 3.608 0.058
From the table we can see that the budgeting principles appear are evaluated to have a
strong and significant impact on all three dimensions we are interested in. Thefunding
source is also considered important for NTOs' Market Focus and Operational Freedom,
while it has only a limited expected effect on NTOs' Long-Term Perspective. The least
important of the three independent variables appear to be ownership/control when
analyzed as composite group. The respondents only expect it to have a significant impact
on NTO's Operational Freedom, while it has little bearing on NTO's Market Focus and
Long-Term Perspective. Ifwe, however, split the analysis of the practitioners' group into
three sub-groups representing respondents from the NTO, the NTA and the industry, the
ownership variable seems to have a stronger effect than for all respondents combined.
When analyzed in sub-groups the F values and significance levels improve, and the
impact of the ownership variable is then significant for both Market Focus and
Operational Freedom for all three sub-groups: NTA: Market Focus, sig.= 0.000;
Operational Freedom, sig.= 0.020; NTO: Market Focus, sig.= 0.060; Operational
Freedom, sig.= 0.07; and industry: Market Focus, sig.= 0.016; Operational Freedom,
sig.= 0.036. This should indicate that some of the unexplained variance in how ownership
is evaluated to affect Market Focus and Operational Freedom could to a large extent be
explained from variance between the evaluations of the three sub-groups. The impact of
ownership, however, is not significant for either sub-group for impact on Long-Term
Perspective.
Table 5.5 below shows the same set of data for the theory experts' sample. The only
significant effects we can identify are the budgeting principles' evaluated impact on
NTOs' Market Focus, and a somewhat less pronounced effect on Operational Freedom. A
small effect could also be traced to thefunding source 's effect on Operational Freedom.
Lack of significant scores for the other variables may be partially attributed to the small
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sample size. (Some of the budgeting principles had only 4 observations). A larger
sample, like the practitioners' sample, may have yielded more significant results'".
eory exper s samJ! e: eve o S!KDI icances
Ifrinciples ~xpected effects F Sig.
Ifjudgeting principle !Market Focus 6.597 0.014
!Lon2-Term Perspective 0.070 0.793
pperational Freedom 1.882 0.178
lFunding source ~arket Focus 0.281 0.599
lLong-Term Perspective 0.415 0.523
pperational Freedom 1.659 0.205
"{Jwnership/control Market Focus 0.579 0.451
lLong-Term Perspective 0.555 0.460
I<>perational Freedom 0.715 0.403
Th
Table 5.5
t ' I L If' ·ti
In the following sections we will investigate the results from the scenario analysis in
more detail, and break the level ofanalysis down to deal with each of the 14 individual
principles. The main results from the scenario analysis is depicted in Figures 5.6 and 5.7
on the preceding two pages, and summarized in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 at the end ofthis
section. From this point on, we will present the results from the theory experts' sample
first and then the practitioners' sample where applicable.
5.3.2 Effects on market focus
The first dependent factor we will analyze is the Market Focus of the NTO, and look at
how the various principles are evaluated to affect this dimension.
Market Focus reflects the organization's ability or tendency to collect, analyze, distribute
and act upon market information about the visitors' current and future needs and
preferences and about competitors products and actions. A scale of Market Focus was
measured." as the mean (on a scale from 1-7) of the following items:
• Collect information on customer needs and preferences
• Communicate information about the market to the tourism industry
• Influence the tourism industry to improve their products
• Collect and analyze information about competitors
• Use ofmarket information when designing communication with the market
• Be selective in terms ofwhich products and markets NTO will market
30 The analysis of the scenario evaluations shows a fairly good match between the theorists and
practitioner's evaluations (as reported later in this chapter), therefore it is reason to believe that the experts'
sample would go in the same direction (including higher significance levels) as the practitioners sample,
had the sample size been increased. The sample size was kept small due to time- and resource restrictions.
31 The items were factor analyzed and were found to correlate highly with one factor (see Appendix 3).
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cenario eva uations: eory experts sample
Effects High scoreJ!!'incipJes* Low score principles"
Market Focus Budgeting principle Budgeting principle
Scores (1-7 scale) based on • P I: Budget based on estimates of the amount of • P5: Budget based on a fixed sum decided each year
the following measures: money spent by visitors the previous year (5.64; (3.32; 1.15)
Will motivate NTO to ...: 1.70)
• collect information • P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the
based on customer amount of money spent by incoming visitors relative
needs and preferences to "comparable" countries (5.36; 1.27)
• communicate • P7: Budget based on the revenue generatedfrom
information about the taxation on visitors and the travelling public (4.64;
market to the tourism 1.67)
industry
Funding source• influence the tourism Funding source
industry to improve • p Il: NTO isfunded jointly by the travel and tourism• p 10: NTO isfunded by the travel and tourismtheir products industry (5.15; 1.04) industry and the government (4.28; 1.19)• collect and analyse • P9: NTO isfunded by the government (4.37; 1.35)
information about Ownership/Controlcompetitors Ownership/Control
• use market information • (P12: NTO is a non-profit organization owned by (P13 Government ownershiplcontrol (4.44; 1.16),•
in communication with and responsible towards the travel and tourism and P14: Limited Corporation owned by
the market industry (4.86; 1.43) scores highest, but not shareholders score (4.45; 1.26 ) lowest, but not
• be selective ofproducts significantly higher) significantly lower)
and markets
Long-Term Budgeting principle Budgeting principle
Perspective • P7: Budget based on the revenue generatedfrom • P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's
Scores (1-7 scale) based on taxation on visitors and the travelling public (4.63; marketing plans each year (3.62; 0.72)
the following measures: 1.11) • P6: Budget based on achievement of goals and
Will give NTO ...: • P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the objectives decided each year (J.88; 0.82)
• long-term perspective amount ofmoney spent by incoming visitors relative
in plans and activities to "comparable" countries (4.29; 0.58)
• difficulties to pursue • P5: Budget based on a fixed sum decided each year
long-term goals (4.26; 1.06) Funding source
• (not) enough funds for • (P10: Funding by the industry (3.92; 0.96) and P Il
NTO's budget Funding source joint funding (3.94; 0.46) score lowest, but not
• improved long-term • (P9: Governmentfunding scores highest (4.15; significantly lower)
market performance 0.81), but not significantly higher)
Ownership/Control
Ownership/Control • {P12: Industry ownership (3.88; 0.89) and P 13
• (P14: Limited Corporation ownership scores highest government ownership (4.02; 0.71) score lowest, but
(4.14; 0.73), but not significantly higher) not significantly lower)
Operational Budgeting principle Budgeting principle
Freedom • P7: Budget based on the revenue generatedfrom • P3: Budget based on sale and participation in
Scores (1- 7 scale) based on taxation on visitors and the travelling public (5.40; specific projects (3.03; 0.52)
the following measures: 0.93)
Will give the NTO ... : • P5: Budget based on a fixed sum decided each year
• problems with ope- (4.75; 0.75)
rations due to too much • P8: Budget based on the revenue generatedfrom
fluctuations in budget taxation of travel and tourism industry (4.47; 1.12)
• (not) make the NTO
over-prioritize special Funding source Funding source
interest • P9: NTO isfunded by the government (4.61; 0.97) • P10: NTO is funded by the travel and tourism• make the NTO spend industry (3.35; 1.03)
too much resources on Ownership/Control
sale to the industry • P13: Government ownership/control (4.32; 1.13) Ownership/Control• freedom to act P 14: Limited Corporation ownership (4.17; 1.13)• P12: Industry ownership/control (3.36; 1.08)•
s
Table 5.6
Th
* Mean scores are typed 10 boldface, while standard deviation statistics are In normal type.
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Table 5.7
Scenario evaluations: Practitioners' samnl e
Effects High score principles" Low score principles *
Market Focus Budgeting principle Budgeting principle
Scores (1-7 scale) based on • P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the • P7: Budget based on the revenue generated/rom
the following measures: amount ofmoney spent by incoming visitors relative taxation on visitors and the travelling public (3.74;
Will motivate NTO to ... : to "comparable" countries (5.07; 1.0 l) 1.29)
• collect information • P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's • P5: Budget based on afixed sum decided each year
based on customer marketing plans each year (4.88; 1.22) (4.01; 1.14)
needs and preferences • p I: Budget based on estimates of the amount of
• communicate money spent by visitors the previous year (4.77;
information about the 1.21)
market to the tourism Funding source Funding source
industry • p IO:NTO isfunded by the travel and tourism • P9: NTO is funded by the government (3.96: 1.21)• influence the tourism industry (5.20; 1.09)
industry to improve • p Il: NTO isfunded jointly by the travel and tourismtheir products industry and the government (4.94; 1.08)
• collect and analyze
information about Ownership/Control Ownership/Controlcompetitors
use market information • P12: NTO is a non-profit organization owned by and • P13:NTO is a non-profit organization owned by•
in communication with responsible towards the travel and tourism industry and responsible towards the government (4.15;
the market {5.09; 1.13} 1.28 )
be selective of products • P14: NTO is a Limited Corporation owned by•
and markets shareholders (4.79; 1.15)
Long-Term Budgeting principle Budgeting principle
Perspective • P5: Budget based on afixed sum decided each year • P3: Budget based on sale and participation in
Scores (1-7 scale) based on (4.24; 1.11) specific projects (3.41; 1.18)
the following measures: • P7: Budget based on the revenue generated from • P I: Budget based on the amount of money spent by
Will give NTO ...: taxation on visitors and the travelling public (4.07; incoming visitors the previous year (3.64; 1.12)
• long-term perspective 1.61) • P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the
in plans and activities • P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's amount of money spent by incoming visitors relative
• difficulties to pursue marketing plans each year (4.00; 1.47) to "comparable" countries (3.75; 1.09 )
long-term goals
Funding source• (not) enough funds for Funding source
NTO's budget • PlI: NTO isfunded jointly by the travel and • p IO: {Funding by the industry scores lowest (3.62;
• improved long-term tourism industry and the government (4.05; 1.23 ) 1.17), but not significantly lower than govt. funding)
market performance
Ownership/Control Ownership/Control
• {P 13: Government ownershipicontrol scores highest • (P 14: Limited Corporation scores lowest (3.78;
(3.91; 1.28), but not significantly higher than others) 1.25), but not significantly lower than both others}
Operational Budgeting principle Budgeting principle
Freedom • P5: Budget based on afixed sum decided each year • P3: Budget based on sale and participation in
Scores (1-7 scale) based on (4.79; 1.25) specific projects (2.88; I.lO)
the following measures: • P7 Budget based on the revenue generatedfrom • P I: Budget based on the amount of money spent by
Will give the NTO ... : taxation on visitors and the travelling public (4.41; incoming visitors the previous year (3.45; 1.13 )
• problems with ope- 0.96) • P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the
rations due to too much • P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's amount of money spent by incoming visitors relative
fluctuations in budget marketing plans each year (3.98; 1.54 ) to "comparable" countries (3.50; 1.19)
• (not) make the NTO
over-prioritize special Funding source Funding source
interest • P9: NTO is funded by tile government (4.13; 1.28) • PlO: NTO is funded by the travel andtourism
• make the NTO spend industry (3.16; 1.19)
too much resources on Ownership/Control Ownership/Control
sale to the industry • P13: Government ownership/control (4.13; 1.33 ) • (P 14 Limited Corporation scores lowest (3.36;• freedom to act 1.20), but not significantly lower than industry
ownership)
"Principles In boldface are significantly higher/lower scored than the majonty of others on the p<O.OSlevel
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These items overlap to some extent with the concept of"market orientation", which will
be discussed in more detail in Appendix 7. (We will use the terms "market orientation"
and "market focus" interchangeably here.) In the next paragraphs we will discuss how
budgeting,funding source, and ownership relate to NTOs' Market Focus.
5.3.2.1 Effects of budgeting principle on market focus
The respondent groups perceive the following NTO budgeting principles to have a
positive effect on the Market Focus ofthe organization (numbers shown in bold type are
the mean scores, while numbers in normal type are the corresponding standard
deviations):
High scores
Theory experts' sample:
• Pl: Budget based on the last available estimates of the amount of money spent by
incoming visitors (international tourism receipts) the previous year (5.64; 1.70)
• P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the amount ofmoney spent by
incoming tourists (international tourism receipts) relative to "comparable"
countries (5.36; 1.27)
• P7: Budget based on the revenue generated from taxation on visitors and the
traveling public (4.64; 1.67).
The three principles ranked highest by the theory experts are all performance-based
principles. We can label the two highest-ranked (PI and P2) as direct performance
principles, while the third-ranked (P7) can be termed an indirect performance principle
since NTOs' budgets are then reflected by e.g., a certain percentage ofrevenues from
visitor taxes. Our theory experts' evaluations are in line with what we have discussed
earlier in the theory chapter, indicating that an organization like an NTO probably needs
some kind of incentive tied to market performance to adopt a strong Market Focus.
Practitioners' sample:
• P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the amount ofmoney spent by
incoming visitors (international tourism receipts) relative to "comparable"
countries (5.07; 1.01)
• P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's marketing plans each year (4.88;
1.22)
• Pl: Budget based on the last available estimates of the amount of money spent by
incoming visitors (international tourism receipts) the previous year (4.77; 1.21)
It is notable that, while the principles ranked first and third (P2 and P I) by the
practitioners are both performance-based principles, this is not the case for the second-
ranked principle P4 (budgets based on evaluation of the NTO 's marketing plans each
year). The relatively high ranking ofthis principle is somewhat surprising according to
what we could derive from theory. A budgeting procedure based on evaluation ofplans
and activities could potentially lead the NTO to focus on lobbying- and negotiation
processes. This could be in order to maximize budgets and gain plan approval by the
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funding stakeholders. Such processes can be counter-productive in terms of a desirable
Market Focus. Our practitioner respondents apparently view this matter differently (refer
also to the comments made about this particular principle in Section S.2.2).
Low scores
Theory experts' sample:
The theoreticians score PS (budget based on afixed sum decided each year) (3.32; 1.IS)
the lowest in terms of its impact on Market Focus. This is also in line with the theory
reviewed; afixed sum allocation should provide weak or no incentives for Market Focus.
On the contrary, it could give incentives to focus on lobbying activity during the yearly
budget negotiation process, given that such real negotiations in fact do occur.
Practitioners' sample:
Among the practitioners the budgeting principle that received the lowest evaluation
(3.74; 1.28) in terms of its impact on market focus was P7 (budgets based on the revenue
generatedfrom taxation on visitors and the traveling public). It is interesting to note that
this principle in fact can be perceived as an indirect performance-based principle since
the revenue generated for the NTO would co-vary with the economic value of incoming
tourism. Also, a large portion oftax revenues for the government is obtained indirectly
(i.e., income taxes of industry employees or sales tax on tourism products and services).
To the extent this tax is levied in addition to other taxes (and not made a part of e.g., the
already existing sales tax) it may be considered an extra burden that would harm tourism.
In addition, some of the respondents were concerned that the tax revenue would go into
the national government general tax fund, and parts of the revenue generated from
tourism would be spent on funding of other causes than NTOs' budgets. Ifthe latter were
the case, the principle would obviously have little value as an incentive mechanism. So
the concern among some respondents that the funds generated through a tax would not be
channeled in full back to NTO funding, and at the same time it would increase the tax
burden on tourism, may have made the respondents evaluate the principle negatively with
regards to the impact on NTO's Market Focus. Despite its character as a performance-
based principle, we believe the general negative attitude toward extra taxation is the
primary reason for the low score.
It is also interesting that the most common budgeting principle in current practice PS
(budgets based on a fixed sum negotiated each year), receives the second lowest score
(4.02; 1.13) among the eight budgeting principles. Thus, our practitioner respondents
express through their scenario evaluations that today' s most commonly used budgeting
principle may not be the best for NTOs' Market Focus.
5.3.2.2 Effects of funding source on market focus
High scores
Theory experts' sample:
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The theory experts find PlO (funding by the industry) (5.15; 1.09) as the best source for
NTOs' budgets in terms offacilitating Market Focus. We have made the argument earlier
in the theory chapter that private/industry financiers may put pressure on the NTO to
show market results, since private funds may have stronger requirements for return on
investment than public funds. It would be very difficult for an NTO predominantly
dependent on industry funding to "ignore" the tourism market, because that would
probably give mediocre market results eventually. In such a case, the industry could then
be expected to reduce their funding for the NTO, and through that "punish" the NTO. An
NTO funded solely by the government may not be held accountable in the same way, and
could be able to maintain or increase funding - even with weak market results.
Practitioners' sample:
From the practitioners' evaluations it was not possible to identify a single funding source
principle that could be labeled significantly "best" in terms of its impact on Market
Focus. PlO (industry funding) (5.19; 1.09) and PlI (joint funding) (4.93; 1.08) are
evaluated about equally attractive, with P10 slightly better than PIL
Low scores
Theory experts' sample:
From the theoreticians' evaluations it was not possible to identify a single source
alternative that could be termed "worst". Both P1O (government funding) and P11 (joint
funding) score about equally, with the government alternative scoring slightly higher of
the two.
Practitioners' sample:
However, one principle appears to be considered worse than others by the practitioners:
P9 (Government funding) (3.96; 1.21) as the sole funding source, is the one that has the
weakest positive impact on Market Focus.
5.3.2.3 Effects of ownership on market focus
High scores
Theory experts' sample:
Among the theory experts P12 (NTO is a non-profit organization owned by and
responsible towards the travel and tourism industry) scored the highest (4.86, 1.25) as
positive for Market Focus. The corporate governance theory discussed earlier tend to
suggest private ownership as positive because it argues that government-owned
organizations involved in business (e.g., state owned enterprises, SOEs) are less efficient
than private firms. This is also supported by the discussion in the public choice theory
section, which discusses the inefficiency of bureaucracies, and the World Bank-study
discussed in Section 2.4.2 under social economics theory. However, there is still some
disagreement in the theory discussed about this matter; and our theory experts are
apparently not univocal about this matter in their evaluations of the ownership
alternatives.
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Practitioners' sample:
From the practitioners side P 12 (industry ownership) (5.09; 1.13), and P14 (NTO is a
limited corporation owned by shareholders) (4.79; 1.15) received positive scores in terms
oftheir impact on NTOs' Market Focus. Thus, respondents seem to believe that an
industry-led NTO or a commercial type ofNTO organization will be more motivated and
able to focus on the market than a government-controlled NTO. However, there is no
absolute distinction in the data between these two ownership alternatives, yet industry
ownership is evaluated significantly better than the others on the p< O.IO-level.
The analysis shows that industry ownership is considered the most positive for NTOs'
Market Focus, while government ownership is evaluated less positive. The respondents
may view industry owners as more market-focused than public sector owners, and they
probably reason it will influence the focus of the organization in the same direction as its
owners.
Low scores
Theory experts' sample:
Both P13 igovernment ownership) (4.44; 1.16), and PI4 (limited corporation} (4.44;
1.26) score equally among the theoreticians. These scores are, however, only slightly
lower than the highest scoring principle, which is P12.
Practitioners' sample:
The practitioner respondents are somewhat less positive (4.14; 1.28) with respect to how
P13 government ownership may influence the Market Focus ofNTOs.
This finding also is consistent with our analyses of the ranking of scenarios: Scenarios
that contain government funding and government ownership get rather consistently the
lowest score in terms of positive effect on NTOs' Market Focus. Scenarios where
government funding is combined with government ownership score definitely lowest on
average (3.74; 1.20) e.g., compared to industry funding combined with industry
ownership (5.12; 1.15).
What becomes apparent is that the most common combination of funding source and
ownership, namely NTOs funded and owned by the government, is not at all evaluated
positive in terms ofNTOs' Market Focus. Among a1l22 scenarios evaluated, the scenario
that scored lowest overall on Market Focus (3.35; 0.86) was a scenario containing ajixed
sum allocation as budgeting principle (P5), and with NTO funded by the government (P9)
and ownedlcontrolled by the government (PI3). This is in fact the most common scenario
in current practice according to the respondents' assessments. The highest scoring
scenario (5.46; 0.67) was one with industry funding (PI0) and NTO organized as a
limited company (PI4), combined withproject basedbudgeting (P3), i.e., one of the most
commercial of the alternative scenarios. Furthermore, 13 of the 14 countries rank industry
ownership better than government ownership as positive for the organizations' Market
Focus. Obviously, in this case there is a clear difference in how things are done in
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practice and what is considered ideal. We discuss this theory-practice gap later in Section
5.3.6.2.
On the Market Focus-dimension in general, we found a great amount of concordance in
the evaluations between the expert and practitioner groups. We will also revert to the
issue ofbetween-group concordance in more detail in Section 5.3.6.1.
Differences in evaluations between various practitioner respondent-types:
Using a t-test for differences in means, we found that variations in evaluations between
NTO, NTA and industry respondents were not significant with regards to most of the
eight budgeting principles' effect on NTOs' Market Focus. The exception is, however,
that industry representatives are more positive to the tax alternatives P7 and P8 than the
other practitioner respondents.
One could of course speculate that industry respondents would be more in favor of
performance-based principles, since this type of incentive mechanisms are more common
in the private sector, whereas activity-based budgeting is the norm in the public sector.
According to the practitioners' respondents, this notion only applies to the two tax-based
principles P7 (visitor tax) and P8 (industry tax). The industry representatives are more
positive to taxation for enhancing NTOs' Market Focus than the NTA representatives
(P7: NTA (mean score 3.80) vs. Industry (mean score 5.11); sig. = 0.041 & P8: NTA
(mean score 3.87) vs. Industry (mean score 5.18); sig. = 0.029). This is also the case for
the NTO vs. industry representatives (P7: NTO (mean score 3.45) vs. Industry (mean
score 5.11); sig. = 0.005 & P8: NTA (mean score 4.37) vs. Industry; sig. = 0.014). The
NTO representatives are also more skeptical to budgeting through projects than the
industry {P3: NTO (mean score 4.35) vs. Industry (mean score 5.35); sig. = 0.013).
Other than that, is not so surprising that we find few differences in evaluations between
the respondent categories on this issue. It should not really be any other strong reasons
why there would be differences in how people from different respondent categories
evaluate the various budgeting principles. Few differences can be found with respect to
funding source as well. However, there is reason to believe our categorization of
respondents representing NTO, NTA, and industry respectively has more relevance in
terms of the ownership-dimension, since the NTO and industry represent in reality
different ownership/control groups.
Further analysis shows that there are significant differences in the way industry, NTO,
and NTA representatives view ownership. Not surprisingly, industry representatives give
systematically higher Market Focus-ratings to the limited corporation alternative than the
two other groups of respondents do (NTA (mean score 4.78) vs. Industry (mean score
5.44); sig. = 0.056) and (NTO (meanscore 4.64) vs. Industry: sig. = 0.010) as shown in
Figure 5.1. This indicates that business people have greater faith in a commercial type of
NTO-organization to be market-focused than a non-profit one, even if it is industry-led.
NTA respondents (government), surprisingly, appear to be somewhat more convinced
that industry ownership would benefit Market Focus than the two other groups (e.g.,
NTA (mean score 5.33) vs. NTO (mean score 4.87): sig. = 0.079). This may indicate that
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NTAs consider that NTOs, as NTOs are usually government-controlled as oftoday, need
stronger industry representation/control in order to become more market-focused. It may
also indicate that NTAs in general are not entirely satisfied with NTOs' current focus.
Figure 5.1
Differences between NTA, NTO, and Industry in
evaluations of the effect of Ownership on Market
Focus
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5.3.3 Effects on long-term perspective
A scale of Long-Term Perspective was measured" as the mean (on a scale from 1-7) of
the following measures:
• Long-term perspective in plans and activities
• Problems with planning due to insufficient funds for the budgets
• Difficulties to pursue long-term goals
• Lead to improved long-term performance
The second and third measures were re-scaled (inverted). In the following paragraphs we
will discuss how budgeting, funding source and ownership/control relate to Long-Term
Perspective.
32 The items were factor analyzed and were found to correlate highly with one factor (see Appendix 3)
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5.3.3.1 Effects of budgeting principles on long-term perspective
Long-Term Perspective implies that plans and activities are carried out with long-term
objectives in mind. It also implies that there should not be too much short-term budget
squeezes that long-term objectives should not be too difficult to pursue. Long-Term
Perspective thus both reflect the attitude toward and the ability to plan ahead.
i
High scores
Theory experts' sample:
The two highest scoring budgeting principles in terms of Long-Term Perspective were
both performance-based principles. Assuming that NTOs are in fact able to influence
their market performance from one year to another, and with a market performance-based
budgeting principle in place, that would give NTOs some control oftheir future income
flows. Again, this would assume the ability to transfer funds from one budget year to
another. Like many commercial corporations NTOs could then generate reserves during
good years to set aside for use in more difficult future periods. Generated reserve funds
from periods ofhigh market performance could also allow NTOs to engage in projects
and activities of a more long-term character, which could extend NTOs' planning
horizons in time. The budgeting principles with the highest scores were:
• P7: Budget based on the revenue generated from taxation on visitors and the
traveling public (4.63; 1.JO)
• P2: Budget based on the increase/decrease in the amount ofmoney spent by
incoming tourists (international tourism receipts) relative to "comparable"
countries (4.29; 0.58)
• P5: Budgets based on afixed sum decided each year (4.26; 1.06)
The third ranked alternative is P5, and different in principle than P7 and P2. Budgets
based on a "fixed-sum-negotiated-each-year" -principle would provide a steady base of
income (given that the budget would not be fluctuating considerably from one year to
another). Reasonable certainty of the budget size in the future could also allow NTOs to
get into long-term engagements and plan activities for several years ahead.
From a theoretical standpoint, a combination of the two types ofprinciples would be
ideal. We will discuss this in more detail in the recommendations chapter (Chapter 6).
According to the theory experts' ranking ofbudgeting principles, the experts' data seem
to support this idea.
Practitioners' sample:
Except for P4, none of the budgeting principles positively related to Market Focus by the
practitioners were found to have the same impact on Long-Term Perspective. The three
budgeting principles found to have the most positive impact on Long-Term Perspective
were the following:
• P5: Budget based on afixed sum decided each year (4.42; 1.11)
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• P7: Budget based on the revenue generatedfrom taxation on visitors and the
traveling public (4.07; 1.Jl)
• P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's marketing plans each year (4.00;
1.47)
We can identify two principles that contribute to Long-Term Perspective and at the same
time "make sense" from a theoretical standpoint, as well as from the comments made in
the focus groups. One is P5 (fixed sum negotiated each year). The other principle with a
high positive impact is P7 (taxation of visitors), The fact that the "fixed-sum-negotiated-
each-year"-principle (P5) is evaluated to affect Long-Term Perspective positively
probably reflects what many of our respondents underscored: that the yearly negotiations
were of a formal nature, and that the amount fixed tended to be quite invariant from year
to year. Consequently, the budget size is fairly predictable from one year to another,
which could make long-term planning relatively easy. The fact that P7 also contributes
positively probably reflects the assumption that taxes, once they are introduced, rarely
disappear - and thus perceived to remain a fairly stable source of income.
Why P4 Budgets based on evaluation of the NTO's marketing plans each year ranked as
high as number three is a bit more difficult to explain. In fact, this principle is ranked the
lowest among our theory experts (see below). However, in cases where the NTO is
granted autonomy to financially commit to long-term plans, and can relatively easy get
approval for long-term plans in the budgeting committee, budgeting based on marketing
plans can in some instances be beneficial for NTOs' Long-Term Perspective.
Low scores
Theory experts' sample:
The two lowest scoring alternatives among our theory experts' evaluations are both
typically behavior-based type of principles:
• P4: Budget based on evaluation of the NTO 's marketing plans each year (3.62;
0.72)
• P6: Budget based on achievement of goals and objectives decided each year
(3.88; 0.81)
In theory, a budgeting process where NTO managements will have to gain approval of
plans from one year to another and face the risk of having plans disapproved by the
financing stakeholders, would not ease the long-term planning scheme. Marketing plans
and goals subject to approval and change every single year could preclude the ability and
incentives for NTOs to adopt a Long-Term Perspective. A negotiating process regarding
the financing ofNTOs' marketing plans and activities, involving (several) governing
stakeholders and NTOs', could require considerable lobbying effort on the part ofNTOs
in order to secure their interests. Furthermore, it would require competence and insight in
NTO matters on the part of the stakeholders in order to effectively evaluate NTOs'
marketing plans, and set sane long-term goals and short-term objectives for NTOs. For
such a budgeting principle to be beneficial for Long-Term Perspective one would have to
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assume that NTOs have the ability and motivation to develop long-term plans and gain
budget approval.
Practitioners' sample:
Budgets based on sale of specific projects are considered by our practitioner respondents
as an unstable source of funding, as they expressed it in the focus groups. This is also the
principle that gets the least positive evaluation with respect to Long-Term Perspective:
• P3: Budget based on sale and participation in specific projects (3.41; 1.18)
• Pl:Budget based on the amount of money spent by incoming visitors the previous
year (3.64; 1.13)
• P2: Budgets based on the increase/decrease in the amount ofmoney spent by
incoming tourists relative to "comparable" countries (3.75; 1.09)
Budgeting principles that are subject to changes from year to year as a consequence of
changes in number of visitors and their travel expenditures are believed to be an obstacle
to long-term planning and operation. On this aspect there seem to be some disagreement
between the theoreticians and the practitioners. The theory experts score performance-
based principles (PI and P2) high, while the practitioners do the opposite and score the
same principles among the lowest. The practitioners' skepticism to performance-based
budgeting can also reflect the inability for most NTOs to transfer budget funds from one
year to another under current practice.
5.3.3.2 Effects of funding source on long-term perspective
High and low scores
Theory experts' sample:
Among our theory experts' evaluations it was not possible to distinguish between the
funding source-principles with respect on their impact on Long-Term Perspective.
Government funding (4.15; 0.81) scored only slightly better than Joint funding (3.94;
0.46), and industry funding (3.92; 0.96). In theory, one can argue that the industry's
ability and willingness to fund NTOs could change as a result of the general profitability
of the industry. One could then argue that government sources would provide a more
stable source of income, since the government is more able to handle fluctuations in
revenues rather than a coalition of businesses dependent on one single industry' s
performance. However, governments sometimes make seemingly arbitrarily cuts in
NTOs' budgets. These cuts can come as a result of changes in political power or priorities
of political character, rather than strategically from an economical or business
perspective. So one could argue both ways, both the industry and the government could
in theory be unstable as a source of income. The results of evaluations may reflect this
dilemma, sincethey show that both the theorists and practitioners have difficulties to
identify a "best" or "worst" source of income related to Long-Term Perspective.
Jointfunding seems to be the better alternative from a theoretical point ofview, leaving
the NTO with two sources to depend on rather than one only. However, this alternative
still fails to score significantly better than the two others, at least with our theory experts.
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Practitioners' sample:
In our practitioners' samplejointfunding (4.05; 1.23) scored slightly better than
governmentfunding (3.86; 1.28) with respect to its relationship to Long-Term
Perspective.
Industry funding (3.62; 1.17) scored significantly lower than the combined funding
alternative. It should be noted that our practitioner respondents expressed through some
of the itemized data and comments in the focus groups that they are concerned that
industry funding alone would not provide the NTO with enough funds, and that will
make it more difficult for the NTO to initiate long-term planning and engagements.
Combined funding, with contributions from at least two different sources, could reduce
such a problem.
Overall based on the evaluation ofboth respondent groups, we cannot conclude that
funding source could be expected to have a strong impact on Long-Term Perspective. In
other words, it does not matter that much where the money comes from in regards to
NTOs' propensity to engage in long-term planning and activities. However, in both
groups there is a (weak) tendency to disregard the industry as a source for funding the
NTO seen in relation to a long-term perspective. Industry funding is ranked lowest of the
three alternatives by both groups.
5.3.3.3 Effects of ownership on long-term perspective
High and low scores
Theory experts' sample:
There are only small and non-significant differences in how the different ownership
alternatives are evaluated by the theory experts. NTO organized as a commercial limited
corporation scores the highest (4.14; 0.73), but government ownership (4.02; 0.71), and
industry ownership (3.88; 0.89) score just a little lower. As in the case with funding
source related to its impact on Long-Term Perspective, one could argue both ways
theoretically with respect to ownership/organizational control of NTOs. On one hand,
industry ownership may pressure the NTO to focus on short-term market results on the
expense of a more long-term based strategy, since the industry is probably more
dependent on short-term income from tourism sales. In other words, the industry would
need market results fast, and may not want to wait for market performance in e.g., five
years ahead in time. One could probably expect the government to be able to commit to
more long-term engagements than the industry. For instance, a commercial type NTO
could be under pressure from shareowners to produce short-term results. On the other
hand, potentially constantly changing political power coalitions and their priorities within
the government bureaucracy can change how a government-controlled NTO is governed,
and that could hamper the NTO's ability to plan and operate on a long-term basis. From a
theoretical perspective it can thus be somewhat difficult to judge whether industry,
government, or commercial ownership is preferable in terms of the NTO's Long-Term
Perspective. The evaluations seem to reflect that, since no single one of the ownership
alternatives seem to be evaluated as significantly better than the other two.
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Practitioners' sample:
Also the practitioner respondents seen as an overall sample seem to believe that
ownership/organizational control has little bearing on the NTO's willingness or ability to
plan ahead and operate on a long-term basis. Government ownership scores the highest
(3.91; 1.28), while industry ownership (3.85; 1.15) and limited corporation (3.79; 1.25)
score marginally lower.
Differences in evaluations between various practitioner respondeat-types:
Some differences can be found in between the sub-groups' evaluations of the effect ofP8
(taxation on the industry) on Long-Term Perspective (NTO (mean score 3.44) vs.
Industry (mean score 4.67); sig. = 0.050). This is somewhat surprising, since P8 would
constitute an extra tax-burden on the industry. The different practitioner respondent-types
also differ on one aspect in their view on the effect of ownership on Long-Term
Perspective, as shown in Figure 5.2:
Figure 5.2
Differencences between NTA, NTO and Industry in
evaluation of the effect of Ownership on Long-Term
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Participants from the industry view industry ownership as more positive for Long-Term
Perspective than NTO representatives (NTO (mean score 3.53) vs. Industry (mean score
4.28); sig. = 0.050).
For instance, one could speculate that NTOs have had experiences with industry
engagements that have been of a more short-term character than desirable. This idea is in
line with the findings of a 1999 European Tourism Committee (European joint
organization ofNTOs) survey we will discuss later in this section (5.3.5).
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5.3.4 Effects on operational freedom
Operational Freedom refers to the degree to which the NTO can make independent
decisions without consideration ofpolitical issues and pressures from special interests. A
scale ofOperational Freedom was constructedf as the mean (on a scale from 1-7) of the
following items:
• Will (not) make the NTO over-prioritize special interest
• Will (not) make the NTO spend too much resources on sale of services to the industry
• Will not make the budget fluctuate so much that it restricts NTO's ability to operate
• Will give the freedom to make its own decisions
The scale is thus intended to reflect the degree to which the respondents believe that a
certain principle will reduce undue interference from groups and considerations external
to the organization. It also considers NTO's incentives for prioritizing special interests,
and creating a budget situation limiting the NTOs freedom to act.
5.3.4.1 Budgeting principles' effects on operational freedom
High scores
Theory experts' sample:
Our theory experts are in general positive to the two types of taxation as means for
funding the NTO. P7 and P8 are both indirectly tied to performance, since the NTOs'
income would depend on the level of tourism generated taxes. These taxes are again
dependent on the level of tourism traffic.
• P7: Budget based on the revenue generated/rom taxation on visitors and the
traveling public (5.40; 0.94)
• P5: Budget based on afixed sum decided eachyear (4.75; 0.75)
• P8: Budget based on the revenue generated/rom taxation on the travel and
tourism industry (4.47; 1.12)
In theory, budgets based on taxes should provide the NTO a fairly high degree of
desirable independence from its governing stakeholders. In terms of financing there is
little incentive for NTOs to lobby stakeholders to secure funding under a tax-based
budgeting principle. It would also give NTOs desirable autonomy, since stakeholders
cannot pressure the NTO to focus on special interests through the budgeting process. We
had also expected that performance-based budgeting principles would be evaluated to be
positive for Operational Freedom, because it would give stakeholders less need to
monitor NTOs' activities and intervene in NTOs' operation as discussed in Section 2.5.4.
So the evaluation given by the theorists is therefore not surprising; given that type of
theoretical of reasoning.
33 The items were factor analyzed and were found to load highlyon one factor (see Appendix 3).
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PS (afixed sum decided each year) should also give some budgetary room for autonomy
as well, given that the budgeting process does not involve extensive negotiations as a part
of the yearly budget determination.
Practitioners' sample:
According to our analyses of the practitioners' sample, there are two budgeting principles
clearly identifiable with a strong positive impact on Operational Freedom. The most
positive principles are: budgets based on afixed sum, and taxation of visitors. Thus, on
this aspect the theorists' and practitioners' evaluations concur to some extent,
performance-based- andfixed sum budgeting seems attractive to both groups.
• P5: Budgets based on afixed sum decided each year (4.79; 1.26)
• P7: Budgets based on the revenue generatedfrom taxation on visitors and the
traveling public (4.41; 0.96)
Low scores
Theory experts' sample & Practitioners' sample:
The less positive impact of P3 (sale of specific projects) is more pronounced. According
to both groups of respondents, the budgeting principle which distinguishes itself as the
least positive for NTOs' Operational Freedom is P3 (budgets based on sales ofprojects)
(theory experts: 3.03; 0.52) (practitioners: 2.88; 1.10). From a theoretical viewpoint, this
is not surprising either. An NTO solely dependent on sale of projects to secure funding
may be forced to sell or accept to do projects that are not according to their overall
marketing strategy. Sale ofprojects can force the NTO to over-focus on sponsors' special
interest.
5.3.4.2 Funding source's effects on operational freedom
High and low scores
Theory experts' sample:
The evaluations done by the theory experts show thatfunding by the government (4.61;
0.97) seems to provide the best conditions for NTOs' Operational Freedom. Jointfunding
(4.02; 1.10) scores second best, while industry funding (3.35; 1.02) is evaluated to be the
least positive.
In theory, one could argue that government funding would give NTOs more desirable
independence than ifthe funding coalition was made up by industry actors. The reason is
that the government could be a more "passive and neutral" financier than the industry,
providing the NTOs with more autonomy. Strong and dominating members of an
industry funding coalition (e.g., a major airline company, or a casino chain) could
pressure NTOs to focus on their special interests on the expense of the industry and
stakeholders in general in return for money contributed to NTOs' budgets (e.g., refer to
the WHO-case discussed in Section 2.5.1)
Practitioners' sample:
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Also on this issue the practitioners are in agreement with the theory experts. The
practitioners express that government funding (4.12; 1.28) is the most positive alternative
with regards to NTOs' Operational Freedom. This alternative is considered better than
the two other ones. Jointfunding (3.73; 1.26) scores second best. Industry funding (3.35;
1.02) is viewed as the least positive on this aspect, and significantly worse than the two
other alternative sources.
5.3.4.3 Ownership's effects on operational freedom
High and low scores
Theory experts' sample:
With regards to ownership the picture is similar. The theorists view government
ownership (4.32; 1.13) as slightly better NTOs' Operational Freedom than ownership
through a limited corporation (4.17; 1.12). The least positively evaluated alternative is
ownership by the industry (3.36; 1.08). Why government ownership is evaluated more
positively than industry ownership could be explained by the notion that dominating
industry representatives in NTO boards may put pressure on NTOs to act as the industry
wants or to focus on special interests, which may not be in accordance to NTOs'
marketing strategy (refer also to the ETC-study later in this section).
Practitioners' sample:
Government ownership (4.12; 1.33) is evaluated by the practitioners to have the most
positive impact on Operational Freedom as well, and is considered better than the two
other alternative ownership arrangements. Both the NTO under industry ownership (3.59;
1.24) or organized as a limited corporation (3.36; 1.20) are perceived to be less positive
for NTOs' Operational Freedom. From studying the itemized data it appears that the
limited corporation-alternative scores low particularly because the respondents believe a
profit-maximizing version of an NTO wiIl be too much engaged in selling its services and
over-prioritizing of special interest groups among the share owners. Some respondents
were concerned that a commercial NTO organized as a limited corporation would be
forced by its (presumably) profit-maximizing owners to act to maximize (short-term)
profits on the expense of the interests of the whole national tourism industry.
Opposite of the case with Market Focus, the analysis of the practitioners' scenario scores
reveals that scenarios containing industry funding combined with industry ownership
(3.39; 1.13) are considered inferior to scenarios with government funding combined with
government ownership (4.33; 1.31) in terms of perceived positive effect for Operational
Freedom. So aspect the current regime is considered better than the other alternatives by
our practitioners. The theory experts agree with the practitioners in this matter, and they
favor government to the two others when considering the combinations of funding source
and ownership.
Differences in evaluations between various practitioner respondent-types:
Considering differences between the three respondent types among the practitioners. we
find that the industry representatives are more positive to taxation on the industry in
terms ofNTOs' Operational Freedom (NTO (mean score 3.22) vs. Industry (mean score
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4.27); sig. = 0.032). Interestingly, the NTO representatives are more skeptical to
government funding than the NTA representatives (NTO (mean score 2.86, NB! a very
low score) vs. NTA (mean score 3.39); sig. = 0.032). Itmay be so that the NTO
representatives have experienced financing difficulties in dealing with the government
perceived to have curbed NTOs' Operational Freedom. We can also see from the chart in
Figure 5.3 that the industry representatives are far more positive to an industry-led
organization than the NTO (NTO (mean score 3.16) vs. Industry (mean score 4.26); sig. =
0.027), and partially the NTA representatives (NTA (mean score 3.63) vs. Industry: sig. =
0.19).
Figure 5.3
Differences in evaluations between NTA, NTO and
Industry about the effect of Ownership on Operational
Freedom
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The industry respondents themselves give systematically higher scores to the industry
ownership alternative with respect to Operational Freedom, while the NTO- and NTA-
representatives (predominantly government employees) have more faith in
government/public ownership ofNTOs. This is not really surprising either.
Another finding from the itemized data 34 is that the practitioner respondents believe that
industry funding (5.05; 1.72), or combined funding (4.60; 1.61) is significantly better than
pure government funding (2.94; 1.67) in terms of increasing the commitment and interest
34 In this case we refer to one of the items (# 14) deleted from further analysis after the factor analysis, i. e.,
that the item was not included in any of the three dependent variables (sse also Appndeix 3 for details of the
factor analysis).
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of the travel and tourism industry in the work of the NTO. We see the same pattern in
terms of ownership: Industry ownershiplcontrol scores significantly higher (5.03; 1.67)
than government ownership/control (3.26; 1.77). Limited corporation ownership/control
(4.20; 1.84) is regarded as second best in that respect, and also better than government
ownership. So one can conclude that industry participation in funding and ownership is
needed to make the travel and tourism industry seriously committed and interested in
NTOs' operation and activities. This is also a question ofNTOs' legitimacy in the eyes of
the industry. The industry would probably have far less interest in NTOs when they are
operating as a government entity, than ifthe industry can participate in the funding of
NTOs and influence their activities through e.g., monetary contributions and board
representation.
The itemized data also show an identical pattern on another item". This item probed if
the scenario in question would cause a negative reaction from the travel and tourism
industry. Government funding and ownership scored far less favorable than industry
funding and ownership on this item. It indicates that the pure government ownership and
funding would be perceived as the least positive alternative by the travel and tourism
industry in general. This is also in line with what we found when analyzing differences in
evaluations between different practitioners' respondent sub-groups (NTO, NTA and
Industry) as shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
5.3.5 Conclusions from scenario evaluations
Overall, the theory experts' evaluations concur well with what could be expected from a
theoretical standpoint as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. In other words, there is in general a
high level of agreement between the conclusions from the theory review and the
corresponding conclusions derived from the theorists' scenario evaluations. We believe
this is positive for the sake of our study, since the results from the experts' evaluations
can then contribute to validate the findings from the theory chapter and vice versa.
Furthermore, it indicates that we have been reasonably successful in the process of
"quantifying theory"; and then converted it into a format such that the theoretical
manifestations can be compared directly with the empirical data from our practitioners'
evaluations. These evaluations are the extensions of the practitioners' espoused theories,
as explained in Chapter l.
With regards to the practitioners' evaluations, the results for the individual national
groups are more clear-cut than the ones obtained for all groups in the whole sample
combined. This finding reflects the fact that although we instructed our respondents to
free themselves as much as possible from the context oftheir own NTO, the setting and
experience with the national NTOs provide a contextual frame for responding to the
various scenarios. This leads to considerable heterogeneity in the way respondents from
different countries perceive a given principle (se also Section 5.3.6.1 for statistical
details). The perceptual differences between members of different national samples
probably imply that the pursuit of one system that is optimal for all countries may be
futile. In the same manner, there are some differences in how representatives from the
35 This item (# Il) was also removed after the factor analysis.
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NTO, NTA and the industry view the effects of the various ownership alternatives. This
fact also contributes to the heterogeneity in how the various principles are evaluated. For
instance, most of the differences stem from variations in how the ownershiplcontrol
variable is evaluated by the three respondent sub-groups. It may partially explain why
this variable has low F-values and low significance levels, as shown in Table 5.4 in
Section 5.1.
The between-subject heterogeneity in the practitioner's sample, both with respect to
national origin and organizational background, will contribute to a central tendency in the
data. That is making it somewhat harder to significantly differentiate between how the
various principles are evaluated in the practitioners' sample. We will go into more detail
about these challenges in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2).
However, some ofthe findings appear to be generalizable, and we will discuss the
conclusions that seem to be generally valid in the following paragraphs.
The value of performance-based budgeting principles
Based on the practitioners' evaluations, two of the performance-based principles get
positive evaluations both in terms oftheir impact on Market Focus as well as their effect
on Operational Freedom. The two most positively evaluated performance-based
principles imply that NTOs' budgets should be linked to the direct economic value of
incoming tourism. The two principles differ with respect to whether they emphasize
relative performance (P2) or absolute performance (Pl). Foremost, these two
performance-based principles provide an incentive for a stronger Market Focus since the
budgets ofNTOs will depend on what NTOs achieve in the marketplace, and not only on
the goodwill and discretion of the financing stakeholders. Conversely, the behavior-based
principles will not provide such incentives, and are thus evaluated less positive in that
respect. This finding is supported by the results from the theory experts' corresponding
scenario evaluations, as well as recommendations from the theory review.
In terms oftaxes as a financing alternative, generally, taxes go into a general revenue
fund neither channeled back to the industry, nor is it directly identified with the industry
at the time of collection. Some practitioner respondents may be concerned, as mentioned
in some focus groups, that the revenue from a tourism-tax that is supposed to be
dedicated to finance NTOs will not be fully used for that purpose, and for the most part
used to finance other government expenses. 1fthis would be the situation, taxes would
not provide a strong incentive for NTOs' Market Focus, since the tax revenue would have
little impact on NTOs' budgets. This may be one of the reasons why the practitioner
respondents are less convinced of the virtue ofperformance-based principles linked to tax
revenues than the theory experts, who are less concerned with political obstacles in their
evaluations in principle. We interpret these findings as evidence that an increased tax
burden is considered an evil by the practitioners, regardless of the potential incentive
effect on NTOs. Our theory experts, however, are not sharing this idea, and evaluate tax
positively in concordance with a theoretical argument that taxes should have incentive
value as an indirect performance-based principle.
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It is also interesting that the positive impact ascribed to performance-based principles as
far as their impact on Market Focus and Operational Freedom is concerned, does not
apply to Long -Term Perspective. In fact, both PI and P2 receive low scores in the
practitioners' sample in terms oftheir impact on Long-Term Perspective.
We believe there are several reasons for this skepticism: One concern may be that the
budgetary mechanism is believed to result in fluctuating budgets. It is understandable that
ifNTOs' managements perceive that the future budget situation is very unpredictable due
to potentially heavily fluctuating future budgets, it will be hard to commit the NTO to
long-term engagements. This may very well be the outcome of applying a principle that
links revenues to market performance. However, to the extent that such fluctuations are
considered undesirable, a performance-based mechanism should motivate the
organization to counteract these fluctuations. This motivating effect is the very reason
why this type of principle is suggested as an alternative to existing practice. The theory
experts support this idea through their scenario evaluations; they mean that performance-
based principles in fact can be beneficial NTOs' for Long-Term Perspective.
IfNTOs were allowed to transfer some of the economic resources attained in prosperous
years to reserve-funds accounts for use when market conditions are more difficult, it
would probably promote long-term thinking on the part ofNTOs. A potential practical
problem is that, should NTOs be funded by government sponsors, it is not sure this would
be agreed to in practice, as it may be contrary to general public funding policy.
Another objection expressed by some of the practitioner respondents against
performance-based principles was that it would be difficult to accurately estimate the
value oftourism as a performance measure. We no not believe this constitutes a real
problem. The Tourism Satellite Account-system adopted by the OECD, WTO, and UN,
and already in use in many of our respondent countries, should allow reliable estimates to
be used for this purpose.
A third concern expressed by some of our practitioner respondents was that revenues tied
to market fluctuations would be "unfair" since the NTO only can be made responsible for
a limited part of the changes, and the NTO is not usually directly involved in the
commercial "sale". We agree that increases in NTO revenues that follow from market
changes may not necessarily be "fair" in the sense that they will accurately reflect the
level of effort or dexterity (or lack thereof) of the NTO. However, "fairness" is not what
characterizes the marketplace for most commercial organizations either. Service
operations as well as manufacturing companies will in general be rewarded or punished
in the marketplace byevents for which they may not be entirely responsible. For instance,
an oil company has only limited- to no contra l over the fluctuating spot-market price of
crude oil, fluctuations which may impact the company's profits significantly. The best a
company can do is to exploit favorable events and to counter harmfulones and to
maximize the value of benign conditions, while at the same time limiting negative
consequences.
One argument in favor of using some type of performance-based principle is that the
entire budget may not necessarily be made contingent on performance. The application of
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a performance-based budgeting principle does not preclude that some part of the budget
amount is held fixed. For example, fixed cost of the NTO's operation would be covered
by the fixed portion of the budget, while variable cost would be tied to performance
measures (see Section 2.4.5.3 for details).
The consequences of revenues based on sale of projects
The sale of projects is the second-most common budgetary mechanism in current
practice. Many NTOs base at least same part oftheir budgets on project sales. We
encountered very different reactions to the idea that part ofNTOs' revenues can be based
on the sale ofprojects to the private industry. Some of the respondents were opposed to
the idea that e.g., government funding should be made provisional on income generated
from sale of projects. A matching principle that makes it mandatory for NTOs to generate
sales revenues can easily lead to sub-optimal solutions ifthe projects are initiated for
pecuniary reasons and not as an implementation of a general market strategy. Budget
principles based on the sale ofprojects would also make the budget situation
unpredictable, which could inhibit long-term planning. Furthermore, project financers
could demand decision power on NTOs' activities in return for project funds, which is
not positive for NTOs' Operational Freedom. It requires a strong professional
organization and a proactive role to ascertain that projects sold to partners in the industry
in fact satisfy the requirements posed by NTOs' long-term strategies.
Arbitrarily determined budgets and behavior-based principles
In many countries it appears that NTOs' budgets are neither performance-based nor
formally tied to the execution of formal marketing plans or set objectives that have been
approved by the funding stakeholders and/or owner entity in advance. In most countries
the budgets are formally determined each year, but are not subject to considerable
variations from one year to another. In one country, Denmark, the budget period is three
years. A system in which budgets do not vary considerably, and are not based on
activity/behavior control mechanisms, allows Long-Term Perspective and Operational
Freedom, but inherently provides no incentives to promote Market Focus. This may be
why many practitioner respondents evaluate fixed budgets as positive on those two first
dimensions. However, if budgets are cut arbitrarily from one year to another, for instance
as a result of changing political coalitions or priorities, this will neither be good for
NTOs' Long-Term Perspective and Operational Freedom. The NTOs will have little
control oftheir future budgets, and cannot easily plan ahead. Lobbying activity and
justification efforts will probably be necessary to secure sufficient long-term funding.
Do source of revenue and ownership matter?
With respect to the effect on Market Focus, industry funding scores better thanfunding
from government sources. In fact this finding is in concordance with the results of the
separate data collection reported in Appendix 7. The higher proportion of industry
funding, the more market-focused the NTO is evaluated to be; and the higher proportion
of government funding, the less market-focused the NTO is evaluated to be.
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This type of industry-based funding may have both advantages and disadvantages: In a
ETC (European Travel Commission) survey the respondents expressed that funding from
the private industry may affect NTOs' Operational Freedom". As many as 50% of
member NTOs surveyed agreed (41% disagreed) that they were under pressure from the
private sector to do as the private sector wishes as a result of private sector contribution
to NTOs' funding. Another 59% agree (27% disagree) that a reduction in public funding
will weaken the strategic freedom to act.
At the same time, 55% of member countries surveyed in the ETC study agreed that closer
cooperation with the private sector has resulted in a substantial increase in their NTO
budgets. A majority of 45% agree that the cost of efforts to obtain greater funding from
the private sector is in a sensible relationship to income produced (32% disagree).
It is also possible that our NTO respondents may have experienced the same as most of
the ETC respondents: In the ETC survey 90% (l) ofrespondents agree (5% disagree) that
greater cooperation with the private sector has resulted in greater independence in the
relationship with the government. Thus, combinedfunding seems to be the best
alternative judging from the ETC survey. Our respondents agree with that, but more with
respect to the positive impact of combinedfunding on Market Focus than on Operational
Freedom.
In general, the respondents appear to be skeptical to the government both as single source
of income and as the only "owner". Both pure government funding and government
ownership are clearly perceived to be less positive for NTOs' Market Focus, while pure
industry funding and ownership is considered more positive. It is interesting that the first
listed set-up is quite similar to the current regime in most countries. With respect to the
current system, our respondents consider it to be less than optimal for achieving an NTO
that is market-focused. On the other hand, the results from the scenario evaluations are
not that clear with respect to funding and ownership-effects on NTOs' Long-Term
Operation. In terms of the impact oifunding source and ownership on NTOs'
Operational Freedom, government funding and ownership is evaluated positively, while
industry funding and ownership is considered to be less positive. The commercial type of
NTO in the form of a limited corporation is evaluated to be positive for Market Focus,
but at the same time less positive for Long-Term Operation and Operational Freedom.
Overall, the limited corporation-option comes out quite weak as our respondents evaluate
it.
Our industry respondents are more positive to the limited corporation, industry funding,
and industry ownership alternatives than their counterparts in the NTOs and NT As,
reflecting influence form the industry representatives' private/commercial background.
36 ETC Member Survey, spring 1999 (22 of 29 European member NTOs participated).
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Table 5.8
eory experts sample: ummary of scenario evaluation results
Estimated Principles Most positive Least positive Differencesbetween
Effects theory experts' (Table
5.8)& practitioners'
evaluations(rbl:.5~~)
Market Budgeting Estimates of Fixedsum Theory experts give higher
Focus Principle amount ofmoney (Significantly lower scores to industry taxation
spent by visitors than 2 out of 7 other (P7) and lower scores to
(Significantly higher principles)
budgeting based on
than lout of 7 other
evaluation of marketing
principles)
plans (P4) than
practitioners reps.
Funding (Industry) (Joint funding) Government funding is
Source (Only significantly (Only significantly considered somewhat less
higher thanjoint lower than industry positive by the
funding on p<O.lO funding on p<O.1O practitioners than by the
level) level) theory experts.
Ownership (Industry) (Government) No significant differences.
/control (Scores higher, but not (Scores lowest but not
significantly better than significantly lower than
the two other principles both others)
Long -Term Budgeting Taxation of Evaluation of Theory experts are far
Perspective Principle visitors marketing plans more favorable to
(Only significantly (Only significantly performance-based
better than l out of 7 worse than lout of 7 principles, and less
other principles on other principles on favorable to evaluation of
p<O.15 level) p<O.15 level) marketing plans (P4) than
the practitioners.
Funding (Government) (Industry) No significant differences.
Source (Scores highest, but not (Scores lowest, but not
significantly better than significantly lower than
two other principles) two other principles)
Ownership (Limited corp.) (Industry) Theory experts slightly
/control (Scores highest, but not (Scores lowest, but not more favorable to limited
significantly better than significantly lower than corporation, and less
the two other the two other favorable to govt.funding
. principl~s) principle~) than the practitioners .
,···c ·c·,_" ...._w,
Operational Budgeting Taxation of Specific projects Practitioners are more
Freedom Principle visitors (Significantly lower skeptical to performance-
(Significantly higher than 3 out of 7 other based principles than the
than 3 out of 7 other principles) theory experts.
principles)
Funding Government Industry No significant differences.
Source (Significantly higher (Significantly lower
than industry funding) than government
funding)
Ownership Government Industry Theory experts are more
Icontrol (Significantly higher (Significantly lower favorable to limited
than industry funding) than government corporation than the
funding) practitioners.
Th s
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Table 5.9
I S f ti Itractitioners internationa sample: ummary o scenario eva ua Ion resu s
Estimated Principles Most positive Least positive Differences in
Effects evaluations of
NTA,NTOand
~~ Illc:lll~.tr,yr~ps.
Market Budgeting Amount of money Taxation on Industry
Focus Principle spent by visitors visitors representatives give
relative to comp- (Significantly lower systematically higherscores to both industry
arable countries than 6 out of7 other taxation (P7) and
(Significantly higher principles) visitor taxation (PS)
than 3 out of 7 other than NTA and NTO
principles) (Fixedsum) representatives.
Funding (no clear "best" Government No significant
Source altern.) (Both industry funding differences.
andjointfunding score (Significantly lower
about equally) than both others)
Ownership (Industry) Government Industry
Icontrol (Industry scores (Significantly lower representatives give
significantly higher than both others) systematically higher
than Limited Co. on scores to limited
1'<:0.10level) corporation control.
Long -Term Budgeting FixedSum Specific projects No significant
Perspective Principle (Significantly higher (Significantly lower differences.
than 6 out of 7 other than 5 out of 7 other
principles) principles)
Funding Joint funding (Industry) No significant
Source (Significantly better (Industry funding differences.
than industry funding) scores somewhat
weaker than gov. fund. )
Ownership (no clear "best" (no clear "worst" NTO representatives
Icontrol alternative) (All alternati ve) are more skeptical of
owner alternatives (All owner alternatives the industry as owner
score about equallx) .. score aboutequallx) than the others.
Operational Budgeting FixedSum Specific Projects No significant
Freedom Principle (Significantly better (Significantly worse differences.
than 6 out of 7 other than 7 out of 7 other
principles) principles.)
Funding Government Industry No significant
Source (Significantly higher (Significantly lower differences.
than both others) than both others)
Ownership Government (no clear "worst" Industry
Icontrol (Significantly higher alternative) representatives give
than both others) (Industry ownership systematically higher
and limited corporation scores to industry
score about equally) ownership than NTO
representatives.
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In conclusion, a well-balanced combination of industry and government both as "owners"
and sources of income appears to be more acceptable. This is also in line with our theory
discussion in Section 2.4.1. However, NTOs' operation and performance is also
dependent on an industry that is able to be market-focused, have a long-term perspective,
quality-minded and otherwise professional. As one of the Canadian group members
expressed it: "As long as the client [user/buyer/beneficent ofNTO's services] is
professional it does not matter whether it [NTO] is a private firm or a state agency."
5.3.6 Gap-analysis
As outlined in the research design section and illustrated in Figure 1.2 in Chapter l, we
have stated an interest in investigating any potential mismatches between theory and
practice in the NTO context. We have already concluded that the findings from the theory
review match the corresponding findings from the theory experts' evaluations quite well.
We can then assume that the theoreticians' evaluations represent theoretical side of the
study to a large extent, as illustrated in the upper left section of Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1.
5.3.6.1 Gap-analysis # 1: Do the evaluations done by theorists match
the evaluations done by practitioners?
It is then interesting to analyze whether there is high level of agreement between the
espoused theories of the theory experts with no stake in the subject matter, and
practitioners with experience with practical NTO administration and governance with a
stake in NTO matters. If there is a great amount of disagreement between the two groups,
that could imply either: a) that the theoreticians are not well informed about the NTO
context; or b) that current theory is under-developed to deal with that context; or c) that
the practitioners are not well acquainted with the theoretical implications ofNTO
governance, or d) that our measures and/or theory work may not be as accurate as we
want it to be. In other words referring to a), b), and c): Either the theoreticians or the
practitioners could be "wrong" to some extent in their ideas about NTO-related matters.
Then there would be a need for either a) to readjust existing theory and/or develop new
theory for dealing with research problems similar to the NTO context; or b) to inform or
educate NTO practitioners more about the theoretical implications ofNTO governance.
Conversely, if there is to be a great amount of agreement between the two respondent
groups - that would indicate that there is theoretical-theoretical and practical-theoretical
agreement as well, and that would indicate that our measures are adequate. If so, that
would strengthen the theoretical side of the "equation": i.e., that both a) judgments by
theory experts, b) practitioners' espoused theories, and c) theory reviewed about how
NTOs should be governed - all come to more or less the same conclusions.
We will now compare the results consisting of the sample of scenario evaluations done
by theory experts with the corresponding ones done by the practitioners in more detail.
To check for differences or similarities, we will apply three different statistical tests:
T-test for differences in means
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First we wiIl start with presenting the results of a t-test for differences in mean scores. In
our case, however, the sample size represents a problem for this test, since we have a
relatively small sample of evaluations by our theory experts. Only two sets ofthe 22
different scenarios were evaluated by the theory-expert group. For instance, this left us
with only two "individuals" (see Section 4.3.1 for details) and 4-6 cases for each of the 8
budgeting principles. Therefore, we decided to group the budgeting principles into sub-
groups of two or more in order to yield more cases in each sub-group than for the
individual principles'", We grouped the two types of direct performance budgeting
principles (P1 and P2), the four behavior-based principles (P3-P6), and the two indirect
performance budgeting principles (P7 and P8).
With respect to the principles' evaluated effect on Market Focus, we only found anything
close to significantdifferences (t = 1.929, sig. = 0.07 J) between the two respondent
groups with regards to P J J joint funding as the funding arrangement. The practitioners
(mean score 4.94) view this source combination as more positive that the experts (mean
score 4.29).
In terms of the evaluations of the various principles' effects on Long-Term Perspective,
we found no significant differences between the two groups judged by this test.
On the Operational Freedom-dimension, there were some differences between the two
groups. With respect to taxation (P7 and P 8) as budgeting principles, the theory
respondents (mean score 4.98) are more positive than the practitioners (mean score 4.09)
(t = -2. J 74, sig. = 0.040). The theory experts also are more positive (mean score 4.17) to
limited corporation as the ownership constellation than their practitioner counterparts
(mean score 3.36) (t = -3. J 88, sig. = 0.05) as well.
Those are the only differences we can identify between the two groups using at-test.
Non-parametric test for rank concordance
We wanted to employ an additional test to test for differences between the two
respondent groups. Kendall's non-parametric test for rank concordance, which tests the
ordinal concordance between the ranking of m objects (principles or scenarios) by n
37 This grouping procedure may not appear obvious without an explanation: PI and P2 (both direct
performance-based principles) are relatively similar in nature, e.g., with regards to the incentives they are
expected to provide, and could therefore be grouped together. So are the two tax-based principles P7 and
P8 (both direct performance-based principles). More problematic are the four behavior-based principles:
P3, P4, P6, (and PS). It should be noted that PS is not strictly speaking behavior-based, since it constitutes
transfer ofa fixed sum aech year, relatively regardless ofNTO's behavior. Furthermore, the three others are
quite different in nature. Except the behavior-based nature of P3, P4, and P6, the only real feature these
four principles have in common, are that they are not performance-based and should give few incentives for
e.g., Market Focus. However, the t-test applied showed that there were, in general, few differences between
the two groups evaluations' using the grouping procedure as mentioned. Had there been major differences,
it may have been necessary to look at the grouping procedure again and regrouped e.g. the behavior-based
principles in another fashion. Given the small and relatively insignificant differences between the groups'
evaluations', we are thus comfortable with the grouping of budgeting principles into three different groups.
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judges (here "individuals" = country groups and theory expert group). In our case the test
checks for concordance in how the principles/scenarios are ranked by the two respondent
groups, to find out whether the two groups rank the principles differently. This test
statistic, Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W), ranges from 1.00 (perfect
concordance) to 0.00 (no concordance). First we ran the test with both respondent groups
together in a joint sample where we had included the data for all the individual countries
and the expert group. In that manner the rank test was run on the rank-order of all
individual countries plus the expert group. We then ran the test excluding the expert
group, and examined the difference in test scores between the two trials. Ifthe test
statistic W increased drastically after excluding the experts, it would signal that the expert
evaluations differ considerably from the practitioners' sample. For example, employed
with respect to all the 8 budgeting principles' effect on Market Focus, the concordance
appears to be fair (W= 0.288, Chi sq. = 30.25), while significant (sig. = 0.000) in the first
trial including the expert group. The second trial excluding the expert group, the test
statistics had changed only slightly (W= 0.292, Chi sq. = 28.60), while still significant
(sig. = 0.000). That should indicate that the exclusion of the experts does not raise the
numeric value of W much, which it should have done ifthe expert group sample rank-
order score was very much different from the other individual countries. In other words,
that means that the principles are ranked more or less similarly across the two groups, and
that the evaluations are concurring. This test also supports the notion that there are only
minor differences between the two groups.
It is also worth to mention that some disagreement was observed with regards to the
various funding sources' impact on Market Focus. The W statistic increased from 0.618
(sig. = 0.000) to 0.679 (sig. = 0.00) when we excluded the expert group. This difference
probably stems from the experts being somewhat more positive to government funding
than the practitioners, and less positive to combined funding.
Some disagreement can also be observed with regards to the budget principles' impact on
Long-Term Focus. The W statistic increased from 0.108 (sig. = 0.124) to 0.117 (sig. =
0.118) when excluding the expert group. So there are some disagreements between the
two groups about the impact of the various budgeting principles on Long-Term
Perspective; however, they are only small differences. This minor disagreement is based
on the fact that the expert group scores some of the performance-based principles higher
than the practitioner group on this dimension.
We also ran the same test using the ranking of the 22 scenarios instead ofthe 14
principles. In addition to serve as a validation of the preceding test, we also avoid the
problem with few degrees of freedom (2) when running tests for funding source (3 source
principles = 2 dj) and ownership (3 owner principles = 2 df). Running the test for all 22
scenarios (21 dj) including the expert group with respect to Market Focus, revealed a fair
degree ofconcordance with a W score ofO.191 (Chi sq. = 60.075), while significant (sig.
= 0.000). Excluding the experts and running the same trial revealed just minor differences
with a W score ofO.193 (Chi sq. = 56.739), and still clearly significant (sig. = 0.000).
Again we can conclude that there are only minute differences between the scenario
evaluations of the practitioners and the theory experts.
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With respect to Long-Term Perspective, this test revealed a weak level of concordance
among the countries when running the trial including the experts. The W score was 0.070
(Chi sq. = 21.900) and far from significant (sig. = 00405). Again excluding the expert
group, the W score increased only slightly to 0.076 (Chi sq. = 220429), while still far
from significant (sig. = 0.375). Judging from these two trials we can conclude that there
is a significant degree of differences with respect to how the respondents in each country
rank (i.e., score) the scenarios. However, these differences do not stem from differences
in the ranking of scenarios between the practitioner and expert groups, rather from
differences in rankings within the practitioners' group (i.e., between countries).
In terms of Operational Freedom the W score was 0.274 (Chi sq. = 86.251), and again
significant (sig. = 0.000) in the first trial with the theory experts included. With the
second trial excluding the expert group, the W score decreased to 0.268 (Chi sq. =
78.776), and still significant (sig. = 0.000). Again we can conclude that there is a fair
degree of concordance, both between the two groups and in-between the countries in the
practitioners' group.
From the Kendal test ofrank-concordance we can then conclude that there is a significant
degree of concordance between the rank-order of the scenario evaluations of the two
groups.
Cluster analysis
We then proceed to a third and final test to probe the degree of agreement between the
theory experts and practitioners. This procedure attempts to identify relatively
homogeneous groups of cases based on selected characteristics, using an algorithm that
can handle large numbers of cases. By including the expert group as one "individual" or
case along with the cases representing the 14 countries in the practitioners' sample, we
wanted to check ifthe expert group deviated from the other cases. For instance, ifthe
expert group was classified in one of the "deviant" clusters with few members, one could
conclude that the expert group differs from the majority of the other cases. We ran the
test for 2, 3 and 4 clusters for all the 3 dependent variables. Cluster analysis data are
reported in Appendix 3.
In terms of Market Focus the expert group was clustered with the majority cluster of 10
cases, while the evaluations of Sweden and Luxembourg were clustered in the deviant
cluster of only two members in the 4-c1uster trial. This indicates that the expert group is
not different from the majority of other cases in the practitioners' sample.
Continuing with Long-Term Perspective, the expert group was again clustered with the
majority-cluster of7 cases. Slovakia and Canada were clustered in the deviant cluster of
two members in the 4-c1uster trial. Also on this dimension, the expert group is in
agreement with the majority group of evaluations done by the individual country groups
or cases.
With respect to Operational Freedom, the expert group was actually clustered in the
deviant group along with Norway in the 4-cluster trial. The majority cluster contained 8
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cases in the final trial. There was also another deviant cluster oftwo members, but this
cluster was clustered with the majority cluster in the 3- and 2-c1uster trials. So the cluster
containing the expert group could be considered "most deviant". This analysis shows that
the expert group in some disagreement with the majority of country groups' evaluations
on this particular dimension. Seen in connection with the t-test reported earlier in this
section, the differences here seem to stem from differences in perceptions about taxation
as budgeting principles (P7 and PS) and a limited corporation as an ownership
constellation, about which the theoreticians are more positive to both ofthose than the
practitioners.
Based on the cluster analysis altogether, we find a great amount of agreement between a)
the majority of the practitioners' individual country groups, and b) the theory expert
group, on two out of the three dimensions
Judging from these three tests we have run: the parametric t-test of differences in means,
the non-parametric tests rank concordance and cluster analysis; we can conclude that
there is a high degree of agreement between the evaluations of the practitioners and the
evaluations of the theory experts. There are some differences, as commented on, but these
are definitely fewer than the similarities in the evaluations made by the participants in
these two separate samples.
We have concluded earlier that the theory reviewed is on most aspects in fairly high
agreement with the results from the evaluations made by the theory experts. Now we
have taken the gap-analysis one step further; and we have found that the practitioners
agree with the theory experts, as it is expressed through the scenario evaluations. We can
then put down the following "research equation" to illustrate the conclusions so far:
Theory reviewed ~ Theory experts' scenario evaluations ~ Practitioners' scenario
evaluations
Referring to Figure 1.2 in Chapter l depicting the research design, we can then state the
following: There is no clear mismatch between the theory reviewed, the theory experts'
espoused theories, and the practitioners' espoused theories. In other words, the three
separate pieces of "theory manifestations" support each other, aid to validate another, and
thereby strengthen the theory-side ofthis study, as we consider it. We will now go on to
add the "last piece of the puzzle", and ask the following: Does current practice concur
with prescriptive theory; do the practitioners in our sample and their colleagues in the
respective countries actually do as our respondents say (i.e., express through the scenario
evaluations) NTO governance should be done?
Our final question can be added to our illustrative "research equation":
Theory reviewed ~ Theory experts' scenario evaluations ~ Practitioners' scenario
evaluations = current practices?
We will attempt to answer this question in the following section.
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5.3.6.2 Gap-analysis # 2: Do the practitioners' evaluations (espoused
theories) match current practice (theories-in-use)?
Does the map (theory and scenario evaluations) match the terrain (principle descriptions
of current practices)?
Following the discussion in the preceding section, it is then very interesting to compare
the theory-side of the study with how thing reallyare done in practice; to see ifpractice
runs contrary to theory literature and espoused theory.
To investigate this issue it would intuitively be tempting to try to run a correlation
analysis between the descriptive scores for current practice (Table 5.1) and the
practitioners' scenario evaluations (Table 5.7) since the data are readily available and
measurement scales used are the same. However, as we have pointed out already, there is
too little variation in how the principles are applied in current practice to make such a
direct statistical comparison meaningful. Furthermore the scores in Table 5.1 are
measures of the degree of any given principles' use in current practice, whereas the
scores in Table 5.7 are measures of the evaluated effect of the principles on the three
dependent variables. Thus, the scores are not statistically directly comparable. Instead we
have decided to do the gap-analysis graphically". Any match or mismatch between the
degree use of principles, and the recommendations expressed through the scenario
evaluations, will become visuallyapparent when we plot the two data sources in the same
chart, as depicted in Figures 5.4 - 5.6 below.
There is in fact a mismatch in some instances between which principles are actually
practiced in NTO governance, and what the practitioner respondents express should be
done ideally in terms of governance principles. This becomes apparent as there is a
difference in what the respondents describe as the current situation in terms of the
proposed principles, and how the same principles are evaluated through the scenario
evaluations. In the graphical gap-analysis below, we have investigated the nature ofthis
mismatch. We will not go through all the possible combinations ofvariables in detail, but
concentrate on the most important findings.
Figure 5.4 illustrates this mismatch. The diagonal line across the chart shows the ideal
position of a given principle. For instance, any given principle that receives a low score
in the scenario evaluation on an important aspect should ideally be used only to a lesser
degree in practice, and conversely, a principle that scores high should be used to a higher
degree.
38 For this gap analysis we have chosen to use a visual comparison between the two sets of data. In Gap
analysis #1 we had two sets of data (theorists and practitioners) that were directly comparable for which we
could run regular statistical analysis for to check for differences in the two sets. For the purpose of Gap
analysis #2, this was not possible, since the scores for the descriptions of current practices illustrates to
which degree any given principle is in use, whereas the scenario evaluations illustrate the expected effect of
the principles on the three independent variables. Thus the data sets are not on the same format and
therefore not statistically directly comparable. This is why we chose to use a visual comparison of the two
data sets in Gap analysis #2.
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Figure 5.4
Current budgeting practices vs. evaluations
of principles' effect on Market Focus
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The principle that is the most "off the line", as illustrated by the dotted arrow going right,
is P2 (relative performance), since it scores high on positive effect on Market Focus, but
is virtually nonexistent in current practice. Similarly, P5 (fixed sum) is evaluated below
average in positive effect on Market Focus, while it is very common in current practice.
In other words, P2 is not used as often as it should, while P5 is used too often - according
to our respondents as judged by their scenario evaluations.
Use ofprinciples in existing practice and the corresponding scenario evaluation scores
are a lot more in congruence with respect to Long-Term Perspective, and will thus not be
discussed in more detail here.
However, Figure 5.5 illustrates a similar mismatch as shown in Figure 5.4, but then in
terms of Operational Freedom. The performance-based principles (P I, P2, P7 and P8) on
the left side of the chart all score about average in terms of positive effect on Operational
Freedom, whereas the same principles are virtually never used in practice. For instance,
P3 (project based) is used more often than the performance-based principles, despite its
evaluation score ranking it as the weakest of all the eight budgeting principles. P5 (fixed
sum) scores quite high on Operational Freedom, but is still used more often than it
"deserves" relative to, for instance, P7 (the visitor tax principle).
161
In terms of the eight budgeting principles we can summarize the findings as follows: We
can see from the principle descriptions made by the focus groups that direct performance-
based budgeting is not widely used (Pl: score = 1.18, and P2: score = 1.07). However,
our respondents rate these budgeting principles highly both on Market Focus and
Operational Freedom. The principles are rated highly relative to the more traditional
behavior-based budgeting principles such as fixed sum-based or project-based, which are
both more commonly used (P5: score = 5.45, and P3: score = 2.77). This is an interesting
finding, and important for the conclusions ofthis study.
NTA representatives and NTO executives, who made up the bulk of the scenario groups,
do in/act not "practice what they preach". On two out of the three factors we have
included as important for successful NTO operation, our respondents favor performance-
based budgeting as opposed to behavior-based budgeting, as it appears in the results of
the scenario analysis. But performance based-systems are almost never used in practice.
So our respondents clearly mean that performance-based budgeting is better overall, but
those involved in NTO governance do not seem to put that idea into practice.
Figure 5.5
Current budgeting practices vs. evaluations of
principles' effect on Operational Freedom
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Given the benefits of performance-based budgeting principles, why aren 't they used?
So why is not performance-based budgeting more widely used? We can only
"guesstimate" why this is the case. Probably are the reasons more political or traditionally
influenced than straightforward economical. In the following we suggest some plausible
possible explanations:
1. A simple explanation is that NTOs' governing stakeholders are locked into a
traditional way of thinking, and the idea of performance-based budgeting may not
even have been on the agenda in most NTAs or any other stakeholder coalitions. One
may simply not been aware ofthat performance-based budgeting is a realistic NTO
set-up option. They may not be aware of the problems associated with the current
traditional behavior-based budgeting system, and the potential benefits of
performance-based budgeting. This is a straight-forward plausible explanation, but
we hope this study can help overcome any disability to see new solutions on the part
of the stakeholders.
2. As we have pointed out earlier in the theory chapter (Section 2.4.3), an obvious
practical problem with performance-based systems is their complexity. They depend
on governments' access to all relevant data needed for the set-up, implementation and
execution of a performance-based system. This means that some resources will have
to be consumed by the governments to design and follow up such systems and for the
NTOs to understand, familiarize themselves with, and adapt to the new system.
3. There is of course a "switching cost" associated with breaking up established routines
and to develop and follow up new practices. Performance-based budgeting may not
be in line with current public budgeting processes for many governments, and such
changes may involve labor-intensive and bargain-laden effort involving coordination
of several ministries or departments, e.g., department oftourism, treasury, labor,
interior, etc. A bureaucracy will of course need both strong internal and external
incentives to embark on such a (possibly controversial) change process.
4. The flexibility for NTAs under e.g., a "fixed sum budget decided each year"-system
can be used to cut NTOs' budgets arbitrarily when the general budgeting situation
calls for budget cuts in the general national budget, and that flexibility will then be
lost under a performance-based system. The NTAs, other departments or parts of the
bureaucracy may not want or cannot agree upon giving up budget flexibility.
5. This is also related to the issue ofbudget liability uncertainty on the part of the
government or other funding stakeholders. Budget liability uncertainty can be
challenging for some governments, because it makes the government liable to come
up with extra budget funds ifthe NTO achieves significant increases in tourism
traffic. The government will not know for sure how much it will have to payout next
year, which may be problematic in the public budgeting process (ref. section 2.4.2).
The government and other sponsors may not wish to cope with this kind of
unpredictabi Iity.
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6. Since many NTOs worldwide still are government bureaus or entities, NTO
governance regimes based on government control and funding ofNTOs may not give
as strong incentives for a change of system compared to the incentives for private
organizations. Private principal-organizations have stronger incentives to try to
reduce any agent inefficiency, e.g., through performance-based contracting, when
strong competition forces organizational inventions and change in order for the
organization to survive. Performance-based contracting is in fact more common in the
private sector than in the public sector (ref. the World Bank-study discussed in
Section 2.4.2).
7. The set up ofNTOs and other similar organizations may be subject to a kind of
international "mimicking". When any given country decides to organize an NTO, it
may look at how this is done in neighboring or familiar countries. Since performance-
budgeting systems still are relatively uncommon, one can probably not expect that
governors of new NTOs are innovative and implement these kinds of new systems
"out of the blue". Any (hypothetical) governors of new NTOs will probably resort to
a cross-nations kind of "group thinking" with respect to NTO set-up. Then the
prevailing traditional system perpetuates to the governance system of new NTOs. The
parties involved may not want to spend the resources and put forward the needed
effort to invent and implement a new system, unless the parties perceivethat the
benefits outweigh the costs of changing the current regime.
8. There has been little empirical research on the subject matter. We know of no other
study that involves the set-up of an NTO governance system. To this date, there is
still little solid empirical evidence that performance-based budgets actually improve
NTOs' or similar organizations' performance in reality. Of course there are some
costs involved with implementing such systems, and when there are costs there are
risks. Governments or other stakeholder coalitions may be resistant to be the first-
mover actors and go ahead to set up such a new system when the effects have not
been solidly proven. Thus, they may not want to take on the risk to be the first-
movers on testing out a not-yet-proven system.
9. Furthermore, there could be a strategic imperative to resist performance-measurement
(ref. Section 2.3.4). It may reveal inefficiency, which obviously can be embarrassing
for the NTOs themselves, but also for the public sponsors (i.e., NTA) which is
supposed to be (at least to some degree) responsible towards its constituents for the
NTO agencies' (mis-)behaviors. In fact, this potential embarrassment can cause
implementation and use of performance-measurement being resisted to both by NTOs
themselves and sponsors i.e., the government or any other sponsoring stakeholder.
10. There is also the issue of cost of transfer of risk (ref. Section 2.2.4.3). Performance-
budgeting is likely to increase NTO managements' perceptions of risk, since tourism
traffic fluctuations, and thereby the budget outcome somewhat depend on factors
beyond their control. Then the managements may demand a risk-premium, for
instance higher relative base budgets, for them to accept an implementation of
performance-based budgeting. IfNTO managements are threatening to refuse to
comply with performance-based budgeting unless there is an addition of a risk-
164
premium, this could make the implementation of the system appear to be more costly
than beneficial form NTAs' viewpoint.
11. Finally, and this may be one of the most important reasons, the NTOs' managements
may be able to convince NTAs and other stakeholders that it is unreasonable that the
NTOs should be held accountable for factors that influences fluctuations in tourism
traffic that could be somewhat beyond NTOs' control. NTOs' managements may then
be able to negotiate soft NTO targets instead of hard performance targets (ref. 2.4.2).
The eleven reasons listed above may explain why performance-based budgeting systems
are not commonly used despite their many advantages and positive evaluations.
In the same way as with the budgeting principles, there is a mismatch in terms of
evaluation scores versus the current level of use of some of the various funding and
ownership principles.
In Figure 5.6 we have plotted both the scores for the funding and ownership principles in
the same chart. From the chart display we can notice that government funding (P9) and
government ownership (PI3) are by far the most common principles in practice. But these
principles score significantly lower on the evaluated effect on Market Focusthan industry
funding and industry ownership.
Figure 5.6
Current funding and ownership practices vs. evaluations of
principles' effect on Market Focus
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It is also noteworthy that the respondents express through the scenario evaluations that
limited corporation ownership should be used more often than it is, considering its
perceived positive effect on Market Focus.
Again, we can see from the principle descriptions made in the focus groups that industry-
owned/controlled (P 12: score = 1.70 and P14: score 1.43) and industry-financed (P 10:
score = 2.34) NTOs are not common in current practice. However, our respondents rate
industry ownership andfunding significantly better than government ownership and
government funding on Market Focus. In other words, government ownership and
governmentfunding are not considered as beneficial for NTOs' Market Focus as the
alternative principles; still these are the most common arrangements. Reducing
government funding and ownership/control and increasing private ownership/control,
could be beneficial for NTOs propensity for Market Focus. This is yet another interesting
finding.
In Figure 5.7 below we can see a more "correct" pattern in terms of the Operational
Freedom-dimension, principles that score high on evaluations are also used most
frequently (P 9 and P13), with P 10 (industry funding) being the most "in line", i.e.,
moderately positively evaluated and moderately used.
Figure 507
Current funding and ownership practices vs. evaluation
of principles' effect on Operational Freedom
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Government funding and government ownershiplcontrol is widely used, while these are
also the principles that receive the most favorable evaluations. So in that case there is no
serious mismatch, except that industry ownership could have been used more frequently
than it is relative to government ownership.
With respect to Long-Term Perspective, there is little variation among the principles with
respect to how they are evaluated. According to the evaluations, it does not matter that
much whichfunding- or ownership principle is used in that regard.
Given the value ofprivate ownership andfunding principles on Market Focus, why aren 't
they used?
So why are not private/industry ownership and private/industry funding used more
widely? Again, there are probably several reasons why, as listed below:
I. Obvious reasons can be the same factors like tradition; mimicking; costs and
perceived risks associated with change of existing practices; political resistance to
change; potential shift in power, status and resource-allocation etc. as noted in
connection with the budgeting principles earlier.
2. The NTAs and (other stakeholder coalitions) do not appreciate the value of Market
Focus, or think that this should be an important goal for NTO-governance. The NTAs
and NTOs themselves may not be aware of(i.e., what we propose to be) the cause-
and-effect relationship between Market Focus and organizational performance. Some
of our respondents may not even be familiar with the concept of Market Focus/market
orientation, (especially those from countries with a transition economy e.g., the Czech
Republic and Slovakia), even though we attempted to explain this concept thoroughly
in the focus group sessions.
3. There seemed to be a consensus among the group members and across groups that
government operation is less efficient than private operation, which is in line with the
theory-discussion in Section 2.4.1. However, as we pointed out there, the
governments may have other motives than cost-efficiency (e.g., through Market
Focus) and profit-maximization related to NTOs' operation. Our respondents, and
others who form NTO governance in the individual countries worldwide, could have
been concerned that private sector funding and private sector ownershiplcontrol
would cause NTOs to undervalue important societal goals, and that private operation
therefore is not appropriate.
4. Another plausible explanation may be the notion that private funding (and operation)
simply would not work in practice due to the commonlcollective good problem
discussed in Section 2.4.4. The common good nature ofNTO operation makes it
difficult to find one particular private actor or group who would be willing to accept
the responsibility to fund and operate the NTO. One concern is that NTOs would be
under-funded, another is that private actors may not want or be able to spend the
resources to obtain the information needed to influence or participate in strategic
planning, negotiate budgets, monitor activities and performance, and enforce reward
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and punishment schemes. Several focus groups pointed to the case with the failed
attempt by the Swedish NTA to privatize the funding and operation of its NTO. This
was mainly explained by the difficulties to rise sufficient private sector funding.
However, the Swedish NTO case should not be taken as all-time solid evidence that
all privatization attempts are destined to fail. For instance, as noted in Section 2.4.4,
local-level and private-sector LTOs do exist and seem to function adequately. Some
ofthese also receive some public funding. So private funding and operation could be
possible, but government participation, i.e., public-private joint funding, might be
needed to make such a system work in practice.
5. Private actors may not have the needed confidence in an organization like the NTO,
which can help explain why so few private sector NTOs exist. The private sector
actors may not have confidence in that the national-level generic type of marketing
activities performed by NTOs are sufficiently efficient and effective in terms of
attracting visitors. These actors may want to prioritize local-level, trade-specific, or
individual business-type of marketing activity. Our respondents, particularly the
industry representatives, may have been considering this when they made their
scenario evaluations.
As in the case with performance-based principles, there are many obstacles to stronger
private presence in NTO funding and operation. However, there are several merits by
introducing private influence. A good example is the Canadian Tourism Commission,
which participated in our study. The CTC is funded approximately 50% by the private
sector, and 50% by the public sector, which is the highest proportion of private sector
funding in our international sample. The CTC also has stronger-than-usual private
representation in its board of directors. Not surprisingly to us, the CTC appeared to be the
most market-focused, long-term oriented and autonomous NTO among the 15NTOs we
came across in our study. The CTC is also one of the most successful NTOs in terms of
performance. The CTC has managed to improve its performance significantly after it was
reformed from being a public bureau (around 1990) to its current semi-private/public
form. We will investigate the case of the CTC in comparison to other NTOs in our
sample in more detail in Appendix 7.
5.3.6.2 Conclusions from the gap analysis
From Gap analysis #1 it becomes clear that there are only minor differences in how the
theory experts and practitioners evaluate the 14 proposed principles. Conversely, we have
seen that there appears to be a mismatch on several counts between a) what the
stakeholders think are the best principles, as well as what literature and theory experts
prescribe, and b) the actual principles in use under current practices. This is shown
graphically and commented on in Gap-analysis #2.
We can then answer our final question in our illustrative "research equation"
Theory reviewed e Theory experts' scenario evaluations= Practitioners' scenario
evaluations i- current practice!!!
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As we have pointed out earlier, the theories-in-use are not only a result of the
discretionary choice of the practitioners in our sample alone. The decisions made and
practices implemented are also influenced by people not included in our sample.
Furthermore, current practices are the outcome ofpolitical processes, bureaucratic
regulations and existing legislation, as well as tradition and culture, etc. So the current
practices implemented may not be based on efficiency, effectiveness, and business
concerns alone, but are the result ofpolitical decisions as well.
Apart from that, some of the reasons we have listed why there is a mismatch between
theory and practice, as it relates to NTO governance, are probably more legitimate than
others. For instance, some ofthese reasons point to: unwarranted bureaucratic or other
stakeholders' "laziness", propensity to "let things slide", traditional ways ofacting, and
bilateral resistance to change. Others could involve: loss or change of power, status, and
resources. Common for all these reasons are that they are counter-productive seen from
societal perspective, and should not be allowed to hamper progressive change in NTO
governance. However, some of the other reasons are somewhat more justifiable; they do
point to real practical problems, and are thus harder to overcome even ifthe willingness
to change is present. Anyway, all the reasons listed, and any other that may be plausible,
are real obstacles to implementation ofNTO output-enhancing performance-based
budgeting systems and increased industry/private sector presence. For a change in regime
to occur, one probably needs consensus among several stakeholder parties about this
course of action. A change also depends on the real initiative from motivated, dedicated,
powerful, and resourceful individuals or groups to bring such changes about. Not all
NTAs or other stakeholder coalitions have such individuals or groups in their staffs and
needed resources within their administrations, and the result may be that the old system
prevails indefinitely.
As mentioned in the discussion from the introductory chapter in Section 1.4, an important
purpose ofthis study is to elicit how the stakeholders think and reason when they make
decisions about NTO matters, and ifthis reasoning is actually congruent with what ends
up as implemented principles in current practices. In fact, this research process can be
described in terms of Argyris and Schon' s (1974) notion of discovery of espoused and
theory-in-use. In line with Argyris and Schon's arguments as presented in Section 1.4.2,
we want to contribute through this study so that both the espoused theories and the
theories-in-use ofNTOs' governing stakeholders and their underlying assumptions are
discovered, made explicit, and put under public scrutiny. We believe that in this way
NTO governance matters could be made subject to healthy public debate, and eventually,
so that any inefficient or obsolete practices are abandoned.
5.4 Summary of empirical findings
The most important empirical findings from this study are as follows.
I. Existing practices, i.e., how NTOs are set up and governed today, are quite similar
from one country to another. In other words, there is little variance in which ones
of the proposed 14 principles that constitutes the best descriptions ofthese
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practices across the countries in our sample. Existing or current practices can be
termed the extensions of the theories-in-use ofthose involved in NTO
government in our sample countries, as explained earlier. These practices are
summarized in Table 5.1. The principles describing existing practices the best (as
expressed by our respondents), are the following: 1) Budgets are based on afixed
sum decided each (fiscal) year. 2) Some countries base parts of the NTO's budget
on the sale of specific projects. 3) The NTOs are (for the most part)
funded/financed by the government. 4) In some instances the NTOs are
funded/financedjointly by the government and the industry. 5) The NTOs are
owned or controlled by the government and thus responsible towards the
government (usually a ministry). 6) In some cases, industry representatives are
allowed to join the NTOs' boards, and some NTOs are therefore perceived to be
partially "controlled" by the industry.
2. The scenario evaluations represent the theory experts' and the practitioners'
anticipations about how the various principles, as they are combined into different
scenarios, will affect NTOs' incentives and working conditions. This can be
considered the respondents' espoused theories. Their "theories" as to how the
principles will affect NTOs' behavior are expressed in how they assess the likely
consequences (in terms ofNTOs' Market Focus, Long-Term Perspective and
Operational Freedom) of each scenario.
a. From Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 we can see that the budgeting principle is the
one independent variable that has the strongest impact on anyone of the
three dependent variables. On the other hand, ownership/control is the
independent variable perceived to have the least impact on any of the
dependent variables.
b. The analysis of the various principles derived from the scenario
evaluations are summarized in Tables 5.6 - 5.9. Both theoreticians and
practitioners seem to agree that performance-based principles (i.e., PI and
P2) are preferable in order to increase and maintain NTOs' Market Focus.
Furthermore, both industry funding and industry ownership/control are
perceived significantly better than government funding and
ownershiplcontrol on this dimension.
c. However, a governing principle deemed beneficial for one dimension of
performance does not necessarily have the same positive impact on other
dimensions. For instance, behavior-based budgeting principles (e.g., PS)
are perceived better than performance-based principles on the Long Term-
Perspective and Operational Freedom- dimensions by our practitioner
respondents. Moreover, government funding and government
ownership/control are perceived more positive than the industry
equivalent on the Long Term-Perspective and Operational Freedom-
dimensions by both respondent groups.
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d. Considering the practitioners' sample only, there are some differences in
how the various types ofrespondents (i.e., NTO, NTA, and industry
representatives) evaluate the principles. Industry representatives are more
favorable to taxation as a budgeting principle than the other respondents
with regards to enhancing NTOs' Market Focus (e.g., P7: NTA (mean
score 3.80) vs. Industry (mean score 5.11); sig. = 0.041 & P8: NTA (mean
score 3.87) vs. Industry (mean score 5.18); sig. = 0.029). This applies to
P8 (industry tax) for the two other dependent variables as well. The
industry representatives also give higher Market Focus-ratings to the
limited corporation alternative than do the two other types of respondents
(NTA (mean score 4.78) vs. Industry (mean score 5.44); sig. = 0.056) and
(NTO (mean score 4.64) vs. Industry: sig. = 0.010). Moreover, participants
from the industry also regard industry ownership/control as more
beneficial than e.g., the NTO representatives for NTOs' Long-Term
Perspective (NTO (mean score 3.53) vs. Industry (mean score 4.28); sig. =
0.050). Lastly, industry representatives are far more positive to an
industry-led organization than the NTO (NTO (mean score 3.16) vs.
Industry (mean score 4.26); sig. = 0.027) and somewhat more than the
NTA representatives (NTA (mean score 3.63) vs. Industry: sig. = 0.19)
with respect to NTOs' Operational Freedom.
e. The scenario analysis reveals that there are some differences between the
theory experts and practitioner groups. For instance, the theoreticians
appear to be more favorably inclined to taxation (P7 and P 8) as budgeting
principles than the practitioners, as well as more positive to a limited
corporation as an owner with regards to Operational Freedom. The theory
experts are in general more favorable to performance-based budgeting
principles (P 1, P2, and P7), and less favorable to behavior based-
budgeting (e.g., P4) than the practitioners in terms ofboth Long-Term
Perspective and Operational Freedom. On the last two dimensions, the
theory experts are more favorable to NTO ownership/control by a limited
corporation than their practitioner counterparts. .
3. Despite these differences between the two groups' evaluations, the statistical tests
in Gap-analysis # 1 reveal that these differences are still small and relatively
insignificant:
a. The pair wise t-tests for differences in means only reveal significant
differences in terms of the evaluations of the various principles' effects on
the Operational Freedom-dimension. With respect to taxation (P7 and P 8)
as budgeting principles, the theory respondents (mean score 4.98) are
more positive than the practitioners (mean score 4.09) (t = -2.174, sig. =
0.040). The theory experts are more positive (mean score 4.17) to limited
corporation as owner than their practitioner counterparts (mean score
3.36) (t = -3.188, sig. = 0.050) as well.
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b. Kendall's test of rank order concordance revealed some disagreement with
regards to the variousfunding sources' impact on Market Focus. The W
statistic increased from 0.618 (sig. = 0.000) including the theory experts,
to 0.679 (sig = 0.00) when we excluded the theory expert group. This
difference probably stems from the experts being somewhat more positive
to government funding than the practitioners, and less positive to joint
funding. Some disagreement was also observed with regards to the budget
principles' impact on Long-Term Perspective. The W statistic is increased
from 0.108 (sig. = 0.124) to 0.117 (sig = 0.118), when excluding the
theory expert group. This is mainly due to differences in evaluations with
regards to the two tax principles (P7 and P8).
c. Our final test, cluster analysis, only revealed differences with respect to
the Operational Freedom-dimension. The theory expert group was
clustered in the "odd" group in the 4 cluster trial on this one dimension.
This analysis shows that the theory expert group is in some disagreement
with the majority of the individual country groups' evaluations on this
dimension. The disagreement seems to stem from differences in
perceptions about taxation as budgeting principles (P7 and P8) and a
limited corporation as an owner, where the theorists are more positive to
both ofthose than the practitioners.
d. Judged by the three test reported in Section 5.3 there is a fairly high
degree of statistical agreement between the two respondent groups.
However, even though the between-groups variance is fairly low, there is
some variance between the individual evaluations within the two groups.
In particular this concerns how the principles are expected to influence
NTOs' Long-Term Perspective. This becomes apparent from the relatively
high standard deviation of the mean scores as depicted in Table 5.7 and
the rank order test of Kendall's W. For the practitioners." the W score is
0.19 for Market Focus, and W = 0.08 (no significant concordance) for
Long-Term Perspective, while W = 0.26 for Operational Freedom in terms
of how the scenarios are ranked. This is interesting, since it indicates that
different respondents view things differently, particularly with regards to
Long-Term Perspective. (Scores close to 1.00 would indicate strong
agreement across countries.) Regarding the practitioners' group we have
already pointed out the possibility that differences are stemming from the
respondents professional background. Further variance may be due to
differences in cultural background and varying exposure to the various
governance regimes (e.g., as in transition economies in Eastern Europe vs.
industrialized countries in Western Europe).
e. Judged by the lower standard deviation scores (e.g., compare Tables 5.6
and 5.7) the theory experts appear in general more in agreement within the
39 The sample size with only two sets of scenarios is too small to calculate the theory experts rank
concordance separately, and scores for this group is thus not reported here.
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group than the practitioners are across countries. Notwithstanding, the
theoreticians also represent different areas oftheory, and as we have seen
in the theory review, the various areas oftheory may yield somewhat
conflicting recommendations. This can account for some of the observed
variance within the theory experts' group.
4. Gap-analysis # 2 represents a visual/graphical analysis of the differences
between the results from the scenario evaluations and the existing or current
practices. The theories-in-use, in terms of to what degree the various
principles are used in NTO governance today, do not appear to match the
espoused theories derived from the practitioners' scenario evaluations on
several aspects, as depicted in Figures 5.5, 5.6 (& 5.?). This is one of the most
important and interesting findings ofthis study. For instance, performance-
based budgets as well as industry funding and industry ownership/control are
considered positive for NTOs' Market Focus, while seldom used in existing
practice. Moreover, project based budgeting is the second-most used
budgeting principle, despite its very low scores on both the Long-Term
Perspective and Operational Freedom dimensions. This fact should call for
some changes, or at least revisions, of existing practices (se also Chapter 6 for
details).
5. There are also a few differences between the theory- and context-based
propositions/recommendations in Chapter 3, and the practitioners' espoused
theories. Specifically, this applies to the practitioners' skepticism towards
visitor tax-based budgeting (P?). In general, the practitioners' are more
skeptical to the performance-based budgeting principles in terms of both
Long-Term Perspective and Operational Freedom than the
propositions/recommendations suggest. Not surprisingly, these propositions
are more in line with theory experts' evaluations, since the professional
background of the theory experts build (among other aspects) on the very
same theory literature the recommendations are derived from.
6. Finally, it is noteworthy that these recommendations or prepositions appear to
concur very well with the espoused theories of the theory experts extracted
from the scenario evaluations, and quite well with the espoused theories of the
practitioners. What distinguishes itself from these three "manifestations of
theory", are the existing practices, i.e., the practitioners' and their colleagues'
theories-in-use in their respective countries. So there is at least a partial
mismatch between theory and practice in our case. This is particularly valid
with regards to theory and practice in terms offostering a desirable Market
Focus ofNTOs.
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6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
Our findings and conclusions can be summarized as follows:
6.1 Conclusions
,~
We believe that it is advantageous for NTOs to have:
• a Market Focus as the dominating organizational orientation,
• a Long-Term Perspective in planning and engagements, and
• Operational Freedom to determine and implement marketing strategies.
We furthermore believe that the degree to which NTOs have a Market Focus, a Long-
Term Perspective, and enjoy Operational Freedom with incentives to determine and
implement its marketing strategies, at least to some degree is influenced by:
• the procedures used for determining the budgets/revenues for the NTO,
• its source of revenue, and
• who "owns" or controls the organization.
Our respondents from the international sample appear in general to concur with the
conclusions above - although this conclusion should be modified somewhat:
The practitioner respondents revealed, both in focus group discussion and in the scenario
evaluations, that:
• performance-based principles promote Market Focus and Operational Freedom, but
• these principles may at the same time discourage a Long-Term Perspective.
They also expressed concern that a performance-based principle may produce revenues
that would be very volatile. However, the theory experts do not seem to agree with the
practitioners on this issue. Theory experts evaluate performance-based principles to score
high also on Long-Term Perspective, which can be argued for from a theoretical
perspective as well.
Furthermore, our practitioner respondents distinguished fairly strongly between
alternative performance measures and were quite skeptical to the idea oftying the
budgets to tax revenues. The theory experts - on the other hand - are also far less
skeptical to tax revenues as a budgeting principle. Our separate data analyses (ref.
Appendix 7) also suggest that it may be unimportant whether performance-based budgets
are linked to tax revenues, tourist receipts or some other measure of value creation, since
• the correlation between alternative performance measures is high.
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We believe that the skepticism to any tax-based budget procedure to some extent reflects
legal constraints on earmarking tax revenues for designated purposes. We will return to
this issue later.
Although some of our practitioner respondents questioned whether the source of income
(e.g., the government) had any impact whatsoever on Market Focus, the scenario
evaluations reveal some skepticism tofunding by the government. This is also the case
with the evaluations of the theory experts. Furthermore, we found a relatively strong
correlation between the amount ofNTOs' budget accounted for by the government on
one side and the organization's Market Focus and market orientation on the other. This
parallel analysis is included in Appendix 7. This finding suggests that
• in fact the importance of government funding may affect NTOs' relationships to their
stakeholders.
There were also differences in how the ownership/control variable was viewed by our
respondents. Industry ownership was perceived positive for NTOs' Market Focus and
Operational Freedom, while government ownership was perceived important for NTOs'
Long-Term Perspective. Along with the theoretical support, this leads us to conclude that
• joint funding andjoint ownership may be the best solution for NTOs' operations.
In terms of our gap analysis there seems to be a good match between theory
recommendations from literature, theory experts' scenario evaluations, and practitioners'
scenario evaluations (which also are the practitioners' espoused theories). However, there
is an apparent mismatch between these three theory-representations on one side, and
current practices (the practitioners' and their colleagues' theories-in-use) on the other
side on several aspects. We believe this fact calls for revisions of current practice to make
it more coherent with what theory prescribes. This will most likely enhance NTOs'
performance.
These are the most important findings of this study.
6.2 Recommendations
Our recommendations are the outcome of a synthesis of the theoretical framework, a
contextual analysis, and the conclusions based on our empirical findings. The
recommendations are listed in below, and we will in the following give a short
justification for each:
• The NTO's budget - or some part of it, should be performance-based
We believe this recommendation can be justified on several grounds:
1. Itwill make NTOs share the destiny of the industry they are commissioned to
promote in the sense that they will realize that what is good for the overall tourism
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industry, will also be in their own interest. We believe this will promote Market
Focus of the organization. Hence, we believe it will be in NTOs' own interests to
engage in marketing activities like:
• information generation,
• information dissemination to the industry,
• competitor awareness and response,
• selection and positioning oftourist products that are market-oriented, etc.
2. It will reduce the need for the stakeholders to constantly monitor and approve NTOs'
plans and activities. Thus NTOs may put less emphasis on lobbying and legitimizing
its existence and activities, and put more emphasis on the market effects of its actions.
At the same time, the NTO will probably be allowed to enjoy more Operational
Freedom to base their decisions on their own professional judgment, i.e., under the
restrictions ofmarked-performance put on the NTOs' through the performance-based
principle.
3. A performance-based principle will reward both the NTOs and the tourism industry
for their value creation. In many countries the tourism industry is the only export
industry that has to pay sales/value added tax. Whether a performance-based principle
somehow is linked to e.g., value added tax or tourism receipts, performance-based
revenues will allow the tourism industry to get a "fair share" of its contributions to
the country's tax revenue.
4. Performance-based procedures can be designed so that the disposable revenues for
NTOs will reflect fluctuations in the size of the market they serve and their customer
base. This may be desirable, since it is more costly to sustain a large customer base
than a small one due to the costs associated with retaining "old customers". This is
also somewhat analogous to extra credit/bonuses for new accounts created in a sales
compensation scheme for an individual salesperson or team within a company.
5. Our respondents appear in general to be favorably disposed to the idea of
performance-based budgets (see Tables 5.6 and 5.7).
• The NTO's budget should have a fixed component with a time horizon of more
than one year (e.g., three years)
l. A fixed portion will reduce fluctuations due to a performance-based principle, which
may be particularly important in a transition period. The fixed amount could then
gradually be reduced (see Appendix 7 for an illustration).
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2. A time-horizon of more than one year (e.g .. three years as in Denmark) will promote
Long-Term Perspective and may reduce the need for NTOs to engage in political
processes every year in order to acquire economic resources'".
3. A fixed portion with a time horizon ofmore than one year will alleviate the concern
expressed by some of our practitioner respondents that performance-based principles
alone may demote Long-Term Perspective and/or Operational Freedom (see Tables
5.7 and 5.9).
4. The fixed portion of the budget could be included to cover the more programmable,
routine kind of tasks (see Section 2.1.5.6 for an explanation of which tasks these are).
These programmable tasks are also somewhat easier to price or cost-assess, and can
be cost-assessed for a longer time period than the less programmable tasks, since they
change less from year to year.
5. The fixed portion could also be designated to cover fixed cost ofNTOs' operation,
e.g., office rent, energy, base salaries etc. However, NTOs could be allowed to choose
from a variable "budget-menu" which combination of fixed/performance-based they
would like to operate under (see Section 2.4.5.5. for details and Appendix 7 for an
illustration).
• The NTO should be allowed to transfer funds from one budget year to another
1. Such a principle would encourage Long-Term Perspective, and reduce the need to
spend all available resources within one budget year. Excess funds accruing in
prosperous years could then be saved to counter adverse conditions other years A
related issue is when to set aside funds and why (e.g., see Table 2.6).
2. Such a procedure would also alleviate the concern expressed by some of our
practitioner respondents that performance-based principles alone may demote Long-
Term Perspective (see Tables 5.7 and 5.9).
• The NTO should be allowed to, but not required to, sell projects to the
tourism industry
1. A matching-principle may force the NTO to sell projects that may not necessarily be
compatible with its long-term strategies. Many countries (e.g., Denmark and Canada)
experience that projects initiated by the NTO itselfmay both serve their partners'
interests and help the NTO pursue its long-term goals.
2. We believe the initiation and sale ofprojects on a voluntary basis, and not as an
implementation of a matching-principle, could alleviate the concern expressed by our
40 E.g., CTC's (Canada' s NTO's) budget is multi-year (the government planning process forecasts fixed
appropriation ).
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international respondents that sale and participation of projects may discourage Long-
Term Perspective and reduce Operational Freedom (see Tables 5.7 and 5.9)
• The NTA should take steps to involve the tourism industry more in both
funding and ownership of the NTO
Although our empirical investigation reported in Appendix 7 suggests thatfunding source
may have an impact on NTOs' focus, we do not give absolute recommendations with
respect to the source offunding (either government or industry). The reason why we do
not is that we believe procedures such as the following will reduce the importance of the
source: a) A fixed sum portion of the budget granted for more than one year b) combined
with a relative performance-based portion of the budget - will allow NTOs to fully turn
their attention to the market regardless ofwhere the funding comes from. A system that
allows transfer of funds from one year to another may have the same effect, as will the
abolition of a matching principle.
We do not offer absolute recommendation with respect to ownership either, except that
we believe that more industry/private sector participation in NTOs' ownership/control
could be beneficial. To the extent that implementation of our recommendations above
will encourage more Market Focus and stronger market orientation, it may imply a
transfer of "ownership" from some ofNTOs' currently controlling stakeholders to the
market.
Rather than recommending either government- or industry/commercial funding and
ownership, we encourage the NTAs to involve the industry and private sector more than
they are as oftoday. Private-public sector partnership in funding and ownership/control
seems to be the best alternative. The reasons for this recommendation are as follows:
I. Both respondent groups agree that pure government funding and ownership is not
beneficial for NTO's Market Focus.Industry presence seems to be necessary to
promote this very important dimension. At the same time, the practitioners value
the government as the best funding source and owner in terms of Operational
Freedom. Joint funding also seems to be the best alternative to promote Long-
Term Perspective.
2. Governmentfunding and ownership may lend itselfto a more bureaucratic way of
operating NTOs. For instance, it may result in an organization laden with
"bureaucrats in business", rather than led by professionals with marketing and
industry experience. It can in some instances lead to an NTO organization where
decisions are made politically rather then professionally; an organization that is
rule-based and inflexible - characteristic of some government bureaus and
agencies; as well as an organization where budget-maximization, political career-
building, and government-lobbying effort becomes more important than
efficiency and market performance. -
3. Strengthening industry/private sector presence in NTO funding and control may
increase professionalism in the organization, as well as improve NTOs'
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legitimacy in relation to the industry it is set to promote, and increase the
industry's interest and commitment in NTOs' operation, activities and
performance.
• The government should still be involved in NTO funding and ownership, but
share this role with the industry/private sector.
1. On the other hand, government participation infunding and ownership may be
needed to provide a stable source ofincome (e.g., in a combined funding scheme),
to deal with needed financing due to the common goods-problem of generic
tourism marketing, and to secure that societal concerns (ref. Figure 3.5) are taken
into consideration in NTOs' activities and strategies.
2. Government presence in funding and control may also be beneficial to avoid that
NTOs over-prioritize special interest in the private industry; and to avoid that
NTOs become too product-oriented or sales-oriented rather than market-oriented.
3. Finally, a final reason for joint funding and ownership is fairness. The industry,
the government, and the taxpayers all benefit from sustainable tourism, as we
have pointed out in the introductory chapter and illustrated in FigureJ.3 in
Chapter 3. It is then a matter of fairness that all beneficiaries that have a stake in
NTO matters should contribute to NTOs' funding as well as being represented in
NTOs' governing bodies.
Table 6.1
Management implications
Recommendations: Our ideal "scenario"
• The NTO's budget - or some part of it, should be performance-based
• The NTO's budget should have a fixed component with a time horizon of
more than one year (e.g., three years)
• The NTO should be allowed to transfer funds from one year to another
• The NTO should be allowed to, but not required to, sell projects to the tourism
industry
• The NTA should take steps to involve the tourism industry more in NTO
funding and ownership/control
• The government should still be involved in NTO funding and ownership, but
share this role with the industry/private sector.
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7.0 Contributions, limitations, and suggestions for further
research
7.1 The thesis' contributions to practitioners' management
implications and to academic research
In the following section we will discuss the thesis' contribution on three main areas of
academic research and for practitioners, namely: practical, theoretical, and methodical.
7.1.1 Contributions to the development of policies in tourism
administration
We believe this study has value both within its specific research context, which is travel
and tourism, as well as beyond that. We consider it to have some value for both for
academics as well as for practitioners, which adds to the thesis' practical usefulness-
dimension. We believe that the study have some strengths related to external validity,
which has been an important consideration for this work.
7.1.1.1 Contributions to the development governing principles for
NTOs and governing stakeholders' policies
The unit of analysis ofthis study, NTOs, has so far not been subject to much academic
research. As we pointed out in Sections 1.1 and 3.1 the governing-process ofNTOs, and
thereby the efficiency and effectiveness ofthese organizations, certainly has a facet of
public interest also beyond the tourism industry itself.
Furthermore, since most NTOs are (at least partially) government-controlled and funded,
knowledge about sound NTO-governance principles is obviously important to the process
of developing sane government policies. Misgovernment of the NTO may in turn lead to:
waste of both public and private resources, loss of market opportunities, loss oftax
revenue and foreign currency; and in general have a negative impact on the tourism
industry and parts of the society in any given country involved with incoming
international tourism. In this thesis we offer recommendations for the governance of
NTOs. We believe these can help NTOs' stakeholders to foster organizations more
efficient and effective in the marketplace - with positive effects for both the domestic
tourism industry and society in general.
7.1.1 .2 Contributions to the development governance principles for
lower-level/local tourism organizations (LTO)-administration
Although the unit of analysis ofthis study is NTOs at the national level, a host of similar
organizations often exist on the regional and locallevel. The budgets ofthese lower-level
organizations combined often surpass the NTOs' budgets by far. It is not uncommon that
these organizations are also (at least partially) funded by municipalities or other Iocal-
level government bodies, and thus consume taxpayer monies. The research conducted in
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this thesis, and the recommendations derived thereof, may very well be applicable for the
lower-level organizations as well. The principles we suggest, if/when applied wisely, can
help a country in redeveloping its tourism organizational structure, with substantial
efficiency and effectiveness gains as the end result.
7.1.1.3 Contributions to administrative principles for industry
marketing organizations in other sectors and for ideal organizations
The tourism industry is not the only industry that has this type of central marketing
organizations. In many countries one can find central marketing organizations
responsible for promoting an industry's products and services to an international or
national market on behalf ofthat industry. Some ofthese are commercially/privately
owned/controlled/funded, while others are government organizations or some
combination of private or government entities. Some are commercial organizations
dependent on a commercial market as the source of income, while others are non-
commercial organizations. For instance, in Norway, there is a Trade Council for helping
domestic businesses to export products or establish themselves in foreign markets, as
well as a specialized Norwegian Seafood Export Council, which both are examples of
similar organizations. For instance, the sub-sectors of the agricultural sector often have
their own marketing organizations; in New Zealand there is a marketing organization for
the export of kiwi fruits, and another for the export of wool. In the US there are
marketing organizations for diary products, poultry, and meats. These (non-tourism)
organizations and NTOs have in fact several properties in common. These properties are,
for instance:
• they often (partially) government funded/sponsored and controlled,
• they are seldom directly dependent on market response for their survival and
growth, c) they often have several principals/stakeholders with potentially
conflicting goals,
• sometimes it is unclear what/who the "market" really is, and
• they promote products and services subject to the common/collective good
problem, etc. (See e.g., Section 3.1 for details).
Knowledge gained through this study with its principles and management implications
could come to use in the governance ofthis kind of (non-tourism) organizations as well.
The same can be said about some ideal or charity organizations (e.g., benefiting cancer
patients, disabled people, poor people, or the environment) promoting a cause or idea
rather than a commercial product. The focus ofthese organizations sometimes becomes
more geared towards administration and fund-raising than actually helping the
beneficiaries, which could be analogous to lobbying and justification vs. market-
performance in the NTO context. We believe some of the conclusions from this research
may be put to use in these cases as well.
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7.1.2 Theoretical contribution
As pointed out earlier, in order to assess how practical decisions about NTO
administration should be made, it is useful to investigate whether different areas of
established theory could provide any recommendations as to how these organizations can
be set up and governed. From the discussion in the theory framework in Chapter 2 it
becomes apparent that more than one area oftheory will be needed to gain sufficient
knowledge about the research questions we are investigating. The NTO context is
complex and in many aspects unique, and we do not think that any known area oftheory
by itself is capable of providing a sufficient, comprehensive understanding of all the
issues in question. Therefore, we have found it necessary to piece together several
different areas oftheory to try to find a basis for resolving the research problem. This
compilation of relevant theory represents a comprehensive theory framework made up of
theory areas that, to our knowledge, never been used in combination before.
This abductive approach is somewhat untraditional compared to the more common
approach in academic research, which is to chose one distinct area oftheory and apply
that one only. We hold that this "piecing-together-of-relevant-theory-process" is a
contribution to theory development on its own. This is because the theories, when put
together in a comprehensive framework, gain synergistic value that surpasses the value of
a single theory applied in isolation. This is in line with the abductive research approach
we have described in Section 1.5, where "theoretical models or constructs from one
research area can in this manner work as "heuristic tools" for theory development in
another area" (Troye, 1994).
Furthermore, this process also reveals some shortcomings of existing theory, which is
also theory-developing in itself. It certainly calls for further research in the areas of
theory we discuss in Chapter 2, and that we have commented on after each of the five
theory sections.
7.1.3 Methodical contribution
We think that the study ofNTOs has several aspects of more academic interest. At the
same time, we also aim to arrive at distinct recommendations that are useful for
practitioners worldwide as well. The NTO context is rather complex with its many
stakeholders with different interests and semi-public/private business environment.
Furthermore, the cross-cultural perspective of the study, as well as the obstacles caused
by too little natural variation in our independent variables, and even non-presence of
some of the suggested principles in existing practices, make the study methodically
challenging. Consequently, such a situation calls for a particular methodical approach
(see Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details).
Another concern in a study like this, involving data collection from respondents that may
have incentives to make statements and answer questions strategically, is to tind a
method to elicit responses that are based on truthfulness and professional judgments
rather than private interests. As we have pointed out earlier in Section 4.4.2, we believe
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we have found a method that can help mitigate this potential problem, and that can be
applied in settings where strategic responding may be of concern.
We have chosen to use a new and quite untraditional scenario-analysis approach to our
research problem, which we find to be potentially useful in other research settings as
well. Therefore, we believe the methodical approach ofthis thesis is a contribution to the
development ofresearch methods in academic research. We have recently successfully
applied the same scenario technique in a similar project involving a government
commissioned enquiry. This enquiry investigated the consequences ofa possible levy of
a tourism-tax versus other financing systems for funding of the NTO, as well as funding
of a host of other common tourism goods in Norway (Farstad, Skaipe and Troye, 2001).
This project provides some evidence that the method can be used in other settings as well,
especially when a situation, involving complex governance- and incentive problems, and
many stakeholders with several conflicting concerns, calls for distinct practical
recommendations that can lead to solutions that can be implemented in practice.
7.2 Limitations
There are severallimitations and challenges that should be pointed out and considered in
further research in this area.
External validity
The study reported here is quite ambitious in terms of trying to arrive at
recommendations that can be applied worldwide and not only for one single country or a
small group ofhomogeneous countries. We have chosen to use a sample of countries that
vary considerably with respect to national culture, geography, make-up and nature of the
tourism industry, political system/culture, and so forth. Moreover, whenever possible we
have also included respondents, not only from the NTO or NTA, but also industry
representatives and tourism consultants or researchers. These various respondents may
have different views of the issues in question, as well as influence on the decisions to be
made in NTO governance. External validity has therefore been a major concern in this
study, in order to make the results generalizable across national cases and across
stakeholder groups. However, some important tourism countries requested to participate
declined to take part in our study, e.g., Germany, Ireland, Italy, Australia, etc. Another
limitation of practical nature was that our sample was confined to OECD countries only
(as of 1999), which are all industrialized countries with certain economical and political
common features. Our sample did not contain countries from e. g., developing countries,
or transition economies outside the OECD. Many ofthese are also important tourism
countries e.g., China, Thailand, Singapore, Brazil, Egypt, etc.
Internal validity
As the theory discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 shows, the subject matter ofthis study can
be complex and complicated in certain areas. Some of the respondents may not be
familiar with e.g., the concept of Market Focus, or have substantial insight in and
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understanding of the proposed cause-and-effect relationships we investigate in this thesis.
We were also of course under time-, language-, and capacity-limitations during the data
collection sessions, and were not able to explain all the various principles in exhaustive
detail, and any possible implications thereof, to every single one of the various
respondents. Given the heterogeneous make-up of the respondent groups, and the
pragmatic discretion of the contact person in each country to select respondents, we do
not know for sure whether everyone of the various respondents have been sufficiently
qualified to give good estimates of the consequences of the scenarios they were presented
to. This could of course have tinted the data with some odd- or non-responses. However,
as we have shown in Chapter 5, the practitioners' evaluations seem to make sense from a
theoretical point ofview, and do concur well with the evaluations of the theory experts.
That should indicate that most of the practitioner respondents have in fact made qualified
judgments, rather than spurious responses.
A measurement-related concern, however, is that the number ofparticipants and make-up
of respondent groups were not exactly the same from one country to another. The number
ofrespondents could vary, e.g., in some countries there were only 3- 4 respondents
whereas in others there could be as many as 7-8. In a few countries we were not able to
include any industry representatives or researchers. Furthermore, since our contact
persons in the participant countries (usually a person form the NTO or NTA in each
country) were responsible for recruiting respondents in their country, some contact
persons could have deliberately excluded some potentially important respondents from
the national respondent group of e.g., political reasons. These were all conditions beyond
our control, which may have influenced the measurement reliability from one country to
another.
It was also quite difficult to keep the oral presentation of e.g., the research problem and
related issues, the principle decryptions, and the respondent instructions, exactly identical
from one country to another. In some sessions we had, for instance, on access to an
overhead projector, whereas in other sessions groups were too small to make a full
presentation practical. This could have influenced the way the respondents evaluated the
scenarios. However, we have no strong indications from the data that supports such
suspicions.
Furthermore, there may be other variables than the ones we have investigated here which
could have an important impact on NTOs' market performance. In Figure Ll in Chapter
] we have listed some of those possible factors, and there may be others that could be
interesting to investigate closer to gain more knowledge about the issues important for
NTO governance.
Construct validity
The governance principles we have used as our independent variables are developed
entirely by us. These principles are first and foremost based on real world observations of
current practice and alternative principles derived from the theory review. Of course, our
list of ]4 principles may not be exhaustive in terms of any such principles that may
already exist or be feasible. It is conceivable that other already existing, or potential and
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promising principles for budgeting.funding source, or ownership could be added to the
list and used in future research.
We have introduced several new measures in this study. For the Market Focus-
dimension, our measures are for the most part adopted from already existing empirical
research material in this area. The operationalizations and measures for Long-Term
Perspective and Operational Freedom are, however, developed entirely by us. They may
need to be validated, and possibly refined or modified, in future studies in similar
contexts. For instance, there might exist areas ofresearch where scales to probe Long-
Term Perspective and Operational Freedom or similar constructs are developed, and
those can contribute to refine our measures.
Statistical conclusion validity
We have pointed out earlier that the practitioner respondents vary quite a lot in
professional and cultural background, and this has resulted in some heterogeneity in how
a given scenario or principle has been evaluated from one respondent to another. On
some aspects, our concern for external validity and practicality - has maybe been
emphasized at the expense of internal validity and statistical power. The amount of
heterogeneity in the data could possibly have been reduced by conducting the study as
several samples in one single country, or in a small group of similar countries close in
culture and ways governing NTOs. Alternatively, one could have limited the empirical
work to include only academic experts, and left out the practitioners. That would
probably have made the data more homogeneous, and probably increased the statistical
conclusion validity on some aspects. However, one could then question whether these
results would have been sufficiently valid for the real-world international setting we are
interested in.
Due to practical reasons and limitations on economic and time resources, we had to settle
with 14 countries and one expert group session. Given the anticipated and actual
heterogeneity in respondent composition and hence the data collected, the optimal
number of countries, expert groups, and respondents is probably higher than we managed
to include in our samples. An increase in sample size may have yielded more statistically
valid results than we were able to obtain given our resource restrictions.
7.3 Suggested areas of further research on government of NTOs
We must remind the reader that although we consider this thesis complete in its present
form, our research on NTOs and other similar organizations or context is still a work
under progress. Further work on the subject matter could, e.g., concentrate on the
following:
Suggestions to improve the external validity of the results
• Include more countries, for instance outside the OECD, in future studies of
similar nature. This may improve the external validity even more.
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• Re-apply or validate the research method in other settings. We believe the
research method and the data collection procedures can be put to use in other
settings as well. Any such projects may also serve to validate the methodical work
completed in this thesis.
• Gain more knowledge of the issues at hand by applying the method developed
here on lower-level tourism organizations or even similar organizations in other
industries. That may help validate the results from the study reported here.
Suggestions to improve the internal validity of the results
• Standardize the respondent groups. One could with merit make efforts to balance
and heterogenize the respondent groups in future extensions ofthis study or
similar studies. This can be done by standardizing the number of respondents in
each group, and to include the exact same make-up of respondent sub-types of
NTA, NTO, industry, and researcher/consultant respondents. One could also
introduce a respondent qualification procedure to secure that all respondents have
a certain standard level of understanding of the concepts and issues relevant for
the study.
• Redevelop, modify, and validate measures and scales used in this study. As
mentioned in Section 7.2, some of the variables and their corresponding measures
are new as they are developed by us, and these variables and measures may need
some refinements or adjustments.
• Consider introducing other variables than may have an impact on NTOs'
performance. As pointed out in the preceding section, there may be other
variables (for instance those depicted in the white box on the left/center in Figure
1.1), which can be investigated with merit. Likewise, there may be other than the
dependent variables we have investigated that could be included in future models.
Suggestions to improve the construct validity of the results
• Develop the theory framework further. Hopefully, an even more comprehensive
theory framework can be constructed by including additional existing theoretical
and empirical research, possibly by using contributions from e.g., organizational
psychology, negotiations, and game-theory literature, etc.
• Develop and refine operalizations and measures for testing both thefunding
source 's and organizational control 's effect on NTOs' Long-Term Perspective
and Operational Freedom empirically (ref. variables not used in Appendix 7).
This means that measures for probing organizational control (independent
variable), and Long-Term Perspective and Operational Freedom (dependent
variables) will have to be developed if good measures cannot be found in current
literature. The reason for this suggested conceptual extension is twofold: 1) The
scenario evaluations offered few clear directions on these issues. 2) This will
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empirically compliment the data on Market Focus, and possibly add to the
empirical support our theory regarding the relationships between our dependent
and independent variables.
Suggestions to improve the statistical conclusion validity of the results
• Increase the sample of cases (respondent groups). This could increase statistical
conclusion validity or otherwise strengthen the empirical support. In future
extensions ofthis studyone can probably merit from more observations from
practitioners and (especially) from theory experts; possibly by including several
international theory expert groups.
• Investigate empirically the impact of the independent variables funding source
and organizational controlon the dependent variables Long-Term Perspective
and Operational Freedom. Among other issues, we have made some empirical
findings of the relationship between thefunding source and the organizations'
Market Focus in this thesis, as reported in Appendix 7. To strengthen the
statistical validity ofthese findings one may also in this case need to increase the
sample size somewhat.
Other suggestions to increase the practical applicability of the results
• Arrange for a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed scenario, as outlined in
Table 6.1 in our recommendations-section, by theory experts and practitioners. It
would be fruitful to have the recommended scenario re-evaluated in detail by a
group of theory experts and relevant practitioners to see if our recommended
scenario needs to be developed further to be readily implementable in practice.
• Investigate the practical and technical aspects of the implementation of
performance-based principles as outlined in Section 7.4.
• Extend the research on the common goods problem in tourism in general and in
the NTO context. Both theoretical and empirical research is needed to find ways
to motivate the private sector to participate infunding and ownership ofNTOs
(and similar organizations), and find solutions to make this politically attractive
and possible.
7.4 Further work on performance-based principles
Apparently, performance-based budgeting principles are not very common in the NTO
context and similar contexts. Thus little research has been done on the technicalities and
practical issues of implementation of such principles. We have attempted to start this
process in our simulations shown in Appendix 7. However, a number of issues still
remain to be investigated in more detail:
187
• What basic principle ofperformance-based revenues should be chosen?
• What kind of performance measures should be used?
• What relative size of the fixed portion versus variable portion in a fixed/variable
amount-model should be used?
• If a relative performance principle is chosen, what should be the exact criteria for
selection of countries to be included in the reference group for P2 -type models (Ref.
Appendix 7)?
• What should be the source of the performance-based portion of the budget, i.e., what
should be the "logistics" of payment to the NTO (e.g., how should the funds be
collected/transferred from the funding source(s))?
• What are the legal and administrative obstacles to an implementation of performance
based principles?
Of course, some of these issues should be a matter of discussion internally in the NTOs
or between the NTOs and the government or industry partners if such budgeting
principles were to be considered for implementation. We do not have sufficient insight in
internal conditions to be able to offer specific recommendations on these issues as of
today. In any event, these questions will have to be looked at more closely before any
country is advised to implement any of the principles as described and suggested above.
7.5 Conclusions on contributions, limitations, and suggestions
It is our opinion that this study has some contributions to research both on NTO
governance and in general with regards to: theory development, methodical development,
management applications, etc. However, there are some limitations and challenges that
should be considered when studying the results and/or applying them, e.g., with respect
to external, internal, construct, and statistical validity. Our suggestions to develop,
improve, specify, or amend the work of and findings from this study are listed in Section
7.5.
We realize that it is probably not possible to develop universal recommendations on NTO
governance that are both practically implementable and politically acceptable in every
single country. However, the OECD-project "Market Orientation of National Tourism
Organizations", which this thesis is partially based on, has sparked some international
interest about the issues at hand. The issues at hand have until now been an area of
limited research and discussion in most tourism administrations. With the results from the
current study, possibly along other studies that offer further development of relevant
theory and empirical results, we hope to offer an instrument for NTO governance that
will be accepted and implemented by administrations open to and willing to change to a
modern, efficient, and effective NTO governance-system.
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APPENDIX1: Studies on the effects of market orientation
Some selected empirical studies on the effects ofmarket orientation"
Authors (year) Theoretical prediction Empirical Sample
support
Narver & Slater Market Orientation has Partial support 84 SBUs * ofa
(1990) positive effect on Return On forest corporation
Assets
Narver, Jacobson & Market Orientation has Significant 35 SBUs ofa
Slater (1993) positive effect on Relative forest corporation
Sales Growth
Jaworski & Kholi Market Orientation has Significant 452 companies and
(1993) positive effect on Business SBUs
Performance
Desphande, Farley & Customer Orientation (as Significant 82 Japanese firms
Webster (1993) reported by customers) has
positive effect on Business
Performance
Ruekert (1992) Market Orientation has Significant 5 SBUs ofa large
positive effect on Long Run U.S. firm
Financial Performance
Pelham (1993) Market Orientation has Significant 160 industrial
positive effect on (business-to-
Marketing/Sal es business) firms
Effectiveness
Wood & Bhulan Market Orientation has Significant 24 not-for-profit
(1993) positive effect on hospitals
Performance
Pleshko (1993) Market Orientation has Significant 141 public and
positive effect on Business private firms
Performance
Balakrishnan (1992) Degree of Market, Research Significant 139 manuf. co. of
and Manufacturing machine tools
Orientation has positive /manufacturing
effect on Bus Performance machinery
Seines, Jaworski & Market Orientation has Significant 237 SBUs of
Kholi (1998) positive effect on Scandinavian
Performance companies
Sandvik (1998) Market Orientation has Significant 372 Norwegian
positive effect on hotels
Performance
* SBUs= Strategic Business Units
41 Adapted from "The effects ofmarket orientation", doctoral dissertation by Kåre Sandvik, Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration (1998)
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APPENDIX 2: Conceivable control principles for NTOs derived from
application of theory
Stakeholders Behavioral -Competent -Assures that agent -Curbs agent's
decide on plans and -based stakeholders acts in the interests of operational freedom. -
activities and control -Agreement among stakeholders Negotiation, monitoring
budget accordingly stakeholders and -Low agent risk and maladaptation cost
each period between -No outcome focus
stakeholders and incentive for agent
(Monitoring agent on plans and -Possible budget
structure # I) activities maximizing efforts
-Monitoring of
activities
Fixed sum Behavioral -Competent agent -Moderate to igh -No financial residual
("salary") is -based -Reporting agent operational claim = possible shirking
allocated each control procedures (auditing freedom -No outcome focus
period by stakeholders) -Efficient in large incentive for agent
complex organizations -Negotiation, monitoring
(Monitoring with many line items, and maladaptation cost
structure # I) severaloutputs and -No outcome-focus
stakeholders incentive for agent
-Predictability of -Legitimizing efforts
budget amount = long -Incentive for budget
term planning maximizing
facilitated
-Low risk
Specific project Behavioral -Competent -Stakeholder -Project selling effort
budgeting -based stakeholders commitment (i.e., budget maximizing)
according to control -Agreement between (legitimacy) -Low agent operational
activities/servi ces stakeholders and -Increases availability freedom
to be performed in (Long run: agent (and possibly of additional financial -Client lobbying
a given project Somewhat among several resources -Possibly focus on
outcome- project stakeholders) -Moderate agent risk special interests
(Monitoring based) on project content -Often short-term project
structure # I) and resources span = long term
-Monitoring of planning may suffer
project activities and -Low predictability of
outcome budget amount = long
term
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Appendix 2 (b) (continued)
Outcome-based budget control
Absolute market Outcome -Measurabilityof -Agent and stakeholders -High, agent risk
performance -based outcome (relevant have stake in the same -Lowpredictabilityof
("straight control statistics) outcome budget amount = long term
commission" -Competent agent -Curbs opportunistic planning hampered (unless
pay) -Agreement among behavior budget transfer to next
compensation stakeholders and -Agent focus is period is allowed)
paid in terms of between stakeholders concentrated on outcome -Possible resistance from
budgets each and agent on mediating activities both stakeholders and agent
period. measurement criteria -Low negotiation, (potential embarrassment)
-Some ability of monitoring and mal- -Exposure to agent-
Indirect market agent to influence adaptation cost uncontrollable elements
performance outcome -No incentive for budget affecting outcome
(% oftourism maximizing efforts -Non-market related tasks
taxes received) -No incentive for may be ignored (e.g.,
compensation lobbying or focus on sustainable tourism,
paid in terms of special interests environment, public
budgets each services)
Outcome -Measurabilityof -Agent and stakeholders -High agent risk
performance -based outcome (relevant have stake in the same -Low/moderate
("tournament control statistics) outcome predictability ofbudget
commission" -Competent agent -Curbs opportunistic amount = long term
pay) -Agreement among behavior planning hampered (unless
compensation stakeholders and -Agent focus is budget transfer to next
paid each period between stakeholders concentrated on outcome period is allowed)
and agent on mediating activities -Possible resistance from
measurement criteria -Low negotiation, both stakeholders and agent
-Some ability of monitoring and mal- (potential embarrassment)
agent to influence adaptation cost -Exposure to agent
outcome -No incentive for budget uncontrollable elements
-"Comparable" maximizing efforts affecting outcome
reference group -No incentive for -Non-market related tasks
members (i.e., lobbying or focus on may be ignored
reference group special interests -No incentive to cooperate
members have the -Reduces the impact of with members of reference
same/similar working chance events on budget group
Stakeholders Hybrid -Competent -Assures agent's and -Curbs agent's operational
decide on of stakeholders stakeholders' goals are freedom.
objectives and activity- -Agreement among aligned -Negotiation, monitoring
goals and and per- stakeholders and -Moderate/low agent risk and maladaptation cost
budgets on the formance between -Focus (goal orientation) -Stakeholder disagreement =
achievement of -based stakeholders and goal ambiguity = possible
these goals each control agent inefficiency
period on objectives and -Possible budget
(i.e., MBO) goals and then maximizing efforts
whether o & g are
achieved
-Monitoring of goal
achievement
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Organ
control by the groups may be ignored
industry control -Increased professionalism -Potential for industry
-Agreement -Industry stakeholder lobbing
(Monitoring among industry commitment (legitimacy) -Possible focus on special
structure #2) stakeholders on -Direct information interests
policy and actions feedback to the industry -May curb agent's
freedom
Organization -Competent IC agency
control by the -based government -Low special interest focus process, inefficiency,
government control stakeholders -Organizational stability budget maximization
-Agreement /survival (this can also be a -Potentiallack of business
(Monitoring among various negative aspect) professionalism
structure #2) government -Monitoring by media -Lack ofindustry
stakeholders on -Legitimate funding of a stakeholder commitment
policy and actions common good (NTO) (legitimacy problem)
-Potential for
Organizational Outcome -Competent board -Financial residual claim -Likely that non-market
control by -based of directors (curbs shirking) related tasks will be
shareholders control -Procedures for -Decision flexibility/speed ignored
reporting to -Agent operational freedom -Financial risk (the
(Monitoring (Behavioral shareholders -Agent focus is concentrated organization may go
structure #2) -based -(Sellable) income on outcome-mediating activo bankrupt)
control producing -Low negotiation, -Moderate/low
traits if services monitoring and mal- predictability ofbudget
monitoring adaptation cost amount (i.e., income).
structure # -Little incentive for budget -Risk that shareholders
1,2 &3 is maximizing efforts, could pressure NTO to
applied) lobbying, or focus on focus on short-term
special interests
Funding by -Auditing of agent
industry behavioral -Cooperation resources - may be ignored
control among industry -Stakeholder commitment - Potential for industry
(Monitoring (through stakeholders, (legitimacy) lobbying
structure #3) financial -Lack of stakeholder
auditing) -Only moderate consensus may hamper
predictability of budget decision making, long term
amount (possibly not planning and thus increase
sufficient funding due to ncertainty and agent risk
"free riding" by some
Funding by the Indirect -Agent -Non-market related tasks - Potential for government
government behavioral monitoring may be receive attention lobbing
control -Budget -Moderate to high -Possible budget
(Monitoring (through negotiations and predictability ofbudget maximizing efforts
structure #3) financial approval by gov. amount - Bureaucratic financial
auditing) -Procedures for -Reduces special interest auditing (time and resource
reporting to focus consuming)
mi etc.
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APPENDIX 3: List of Items, Factor Analysis, Cluster analysis, and
Scenario Evaluation Questionnaire
ITEMS USED FOR DATA COLLECTION in SCENARIO EVALUATIONS
(Operationalizations of the 3 dependent variables)
This scenario (# 1-22) ...
Market Focus
1. will motivate the NTO to systematically collect and analyze information about the market's
current and future needs and preferences
2. will motivate the NTO to communicate information about the market's current and future needs
and preferences to the travel and tourism industry
3. will encourage the NTO to influence the travel and tourism industry to develop or improve their
products and services based on information about the market's current and future needs and
preferences
4. will motivate the NTO to systematically collect and respond to information about key competitors
in the market (e.g., their products/services, strengths and weaknesses and strategies)
5. will motivate the NTO to use information about the market's current and future needs and
preferences and about competitors in the market in the NTO's communication with the market
(e.g., promo. & PR)
6. will cause the NTO to be selective (e.g., about the quality) as to what tourism products and
destinations they will market
Long-Term Perspective
7. will motivate the NTO to adopt a long run perspective in their marketing plans and activities
8. will make it difficult for the NTO to pursue its long term goals
9. will not provide sufficient funds for NTO's budget
10. wililead to long-term market performance for the industry and the NTO
Operational Freedom
11. will cause the NTO to over-prioritize on activities endorsed and sponsored by special interests
(e.g., not for the good of the overall travel and tourism industry)
12. will cause the NTO to spend too much resources on selling its services to the travel and tourism
industry to secure NTO's funding
13. will cause the NTO's budget to fluctuate too much and make operation difficult for the NTO
14. will give the NTO freedom to make its own decisions
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Factor analysis
(Practitioners' sample, ref. items in Scenario Evaluation Form)
R t t d Coae omponen a nx
Component
Market Operational Long-Term N/A Usedl
Orientation Freedom Perspective (deleted) Deleted
F# 1 2 3 4
S01 ,BH ,122 4,239E-02 -4,764E-03 U
S02 ,B1S -,116 ,114 ,249 U
S03 ,B5:! 8,665E-02 ,11§ 9,248E-02 U
S04 ,B39 -3,203E-03 3,164E-02 ,18 U
S05 ,B63 6,414E-03 5,930E-02 1,543E-03 U
S06 ,409 ,584 ,341 -,221 U
S07 ,444 -8,723E-02 6,096E-02 ,144 U
S08 -6,115E-02 ,794 -7,914E-03 ,27S U
S09 -,161 ,732 ,145 1,258E-02 U
S10 ,211 -,153 4,919E-02 ,734 D
S11 ,171 ,258 8,506E-02 ,73 D
S12 5,078E-02 ,230 ,70S 4,247E-02 U
S13 -,169 ,617 ,431 -,13 U
S14 N/A N/A N/A N/A D
S15 ,167 ,564 ,206 -3,465E-02 U
S16 ,373 ,362 ,497 -,145 U
S17 -1,613E-02 ,270 ,705 2,225E-02 U
S18 ,282 -6,601E-02 ,654 ,30 D
t Mt'
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 6 iterations.
Cluster analysis
Market Focus
(Cases in bold type are deviant cases in the 4-cluster trial)
Cluster Membership
Case Country Cluster Distance
Number
5 NOR 1 5,226
8 SWE 2 4,040
11 ENG 1 3,833
14 CZH 1 4,084
17 SLO 1 4,328
20 AUT 4 3,520
23 LUX 2 4,040
26 SPA 1 4,134
29 POR 4 3,520
32 KOR 1 3,894
35 JAP 1 4,691
38 CAN 1 4,105
41 FIN 1 4,250
44 DAN 3 ,000
47 EXPERTS 1 4,315
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Long- Term Perspective
(Cases in bold type are deviant cases in the 4-c1uster trial)
Cluster Membership
Case Country Cluster
Number
6 NOR 2
9 SWE 2
12 ENG 3
15 CZH 3
18 SLO 4
21 AUT 3
24 LUX 1
27 SPA 3
30 POR 1
33 KOR 3
36 JAP 1
39 CAN 4
42 FIN 2
45 DAN 3
48 EXPERTS 3
Distance
4,564
4,656
5,603
5,070
3,627
4,948
4,157
4,234
4,600
4,480
3,521
3,627
4,392
4,294
3,308
Operational Freedom
(Cases in bold type are deviant cases in the 4-c1uster trial)
Cluster Membership
Case
Number
7
10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
34
37
40
43
46
49
Country Cluster
NOR
SVE
ENG
CZH
SLO
AUT
LUX
SPA
POR
KOR
JAP
CAN
FIN
DAN
EXPERTS
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
2
4
3
1
Distance
3,338
4,071
3,873
4,626
4,297
5,940
3,254
2,172
3,427
2,783
3,936
3,322
5,509
3,873
3,338
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Scenario evaluation questionnaire
(Questionnaire used for the practitioners' sample. A slightly modified questionnaire was
used for the theory experts' sample, i.e., questions 11 and 14 removed in the scenario
evaluation form.)
Introduction
The main purpose of National Tourism Organizations (NTO) is to market a
country as a tourist destination. The objective ofthis project is to evaluate
how such organizations can be organized and financed in order to enhance
their performance and strengthen their role as a promoter of tourism. In the
following you will be asked to evaluate alternative scenarios for financing
and organizing the of NTOs in terms of the likelihood that each scenario will
affect the NTOs ' effectiveness and efficiency, improve the NTOs ' working
conditions - and a number of other practical implications.
More specifically, our goal is to identify arrangements that may improve
NTOs 'performance with respect to their ability to
• increase the number offoreign tourists in the long and short run
• increase the economic value of tourism in the long run and the short run
• increase the attractiveness of the country as a destination in international
markets
• etc.
By "scenarios" we refer to the several combinations of various principles
for funding and organizing the NTO we have identified to be applicable.
Each principle is explained on thefollowing page. It is important that you
read the explanations of the various principles carefully.
First, you will also be asked to evaluate to which degree the listed principles
are in effect in your country, using the SIMILARITY EVALUATION FORM
Second, you are asked to proceed to evaluate the scenarios assigned to you,
using one SCENARIO EVALUATION FORMfor each scenario.
Please indicate your evaluation on each item by circling the number that
best corresponds to your opinion.
Thank you in advance!
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Principle Explanation/comments
l. NTO 's budget one year is based on last l. This can be based on a certain percentage (e.g., 0.05%) of the estimated money spent
available estimates of the amountof by incoming visitors. This principle is analogous to the percentage-of-sale rule used in
money spent by incoming visitors and/or companies to determine advertising budgets. A substitute for (or a supplement to)
estimated number of incoming visitors visitor expenditure measures can be the number ofincoming visitors (or number of bed
the previous year nights, port arrivals etc) the previous year
2. NTO 's budget one year is tied to the 2. This can be based on an amount per percentage point increase or decrease in estimates
increase/decrease in the amount of of amount ofmoney spent by incoming visitors or in the number incoming of visitors. lt
money spent by incoming visitors (or the will only lead to decreases (increases) in the NTO 's budget to the extent that economic
number ofvisitors in NTO 's country) value of tourism in the country or number of incoming visitors falls behind what was
relative to .. comparable" countries the achieved in "comparable" countries.
previous year
3. This budget allocation depends on the NTO 's sale of projects to the industry or the
3. NTO 's budget is based on sale and government. These projects can both be initiated by the industry (e.g., hotel chains,
participation in specific projects regions, resort areas), the NTA (government body dealing with tourism), and the NTO
itself
4. NTO 's budget is negotiable and funded 4. This principle involves negotiations between the NTO and the NTA and/or the industry.
based on overall evaluation of the The budget is determined for one year at the time (or any other time period agreed
NTO's marketing plans each year upon) based on assessments of needs and plansfor NTO's activities.
5. NTO 's budget is based on afixed sum 5. This principle is similar to principle 4 - but is not directly linked to the NTO 's
decided each year marketing plans.
6. NTO 's budget is tied to the achievement 6. This principle involves setting a set of prioritized goals (e.g., overall increase in visitor
of a number of goals that are agreed traffic, increases for certain types of visitors, increases in desired visitor traffic in
upon each year prioritized regions or in industry segments etc.)
7. NTO 's budget is based on the revenue 7. This principle channels government revenue (portions ofit or infull) generatedfrom
generatedfrom taxation on visitors and taxation on consumers of travel and tourism products and services to the funding of
the traveling public NTO 's budget. (Such taxes and fees can be hotel tax, flight seat fees, arrival/departure
tax, port fees etc.)
8. The NTO 's budget is based on the 8. This principle channels government (portions ofit or infull) revenue generatedfrom
revenue generatedfromfees and taxes payments receivedfrom operators of travel and tourism businesses to the funding of
paid by the travel and tourism industry NTO's budget. (Such taxes andfees can be mandatory marketingfees, casino taxes,
aviation taxes or operating permit-dues etc.)
9. NTO isfunded by tl,e government 9. The NTO 's budget isfunded by the government- including local
governments/municipalities/provinces.
10. NTO isfunded by the travel ancl tourism la. The NTO 's budget isfunded by the industry, including contributions from public sector
industry t & t enterprises.
11. NTO isfunded jointly by the industry Il. Both the industry and the government contribute significantly to the NTO 's budget.
and the government
12. NTO is a non-profit organization owned 12. This implies that the travel and tourism industry is the "owner" or principal.
by and responsible toward the travel and
tourism industry
13. NTO is a non-profit arg. Owned by and 13. This implies that the government is the "owner" or principal.
responsible toward the governm.
14. NTO is a limited corporation owned by 14. This implies that the NTO is run similar to a regular enterprise in the private sector that
shareholders within and outside the is only responsible to the shareholders.
travel and tourism industry
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(Used for the prctitioners' sample only)
SIMILARITY EVALUATION FORM
Please, indicate the degree to which the principles are descriptive
Principle of the situation in your country
NTO 's budget one year is based on last Does NOT describe Describes Don't
available estimates of the amount of money the situation the situation know
spent by incoming visitors (and/or estimated J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
number of incoming visitors) the previous year
NTO 's budget one year is tied to the Does NOT describe Describes Don't
increase/decrease in the amount of money the situation the situation know
spent by incoming visitors (or number of J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
visitors in NTO 's country) relative to
"comparable" countries the previous year
NTO 's budget is based on sale and Does NOT describe Describes Don't
participation in specific projects the situation the situation ~ know
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO's budget is negotiable andfunded based Does NOT describe Describes Don't
on overall evaluation of the NTO's marketing the situation the situation know
plans each year l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO 's budget is based on afixed sum decided Does NOT describe Describes Don't
eachyear the situation the situation know
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO 's budget is tied to the achievement of a Does NOT describe Describes Don't
number of goals that are agreed upon each the situation the situation know
year l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO 's budget is based on the revenue Does NOT describe Describes Don't
generatedfrom taxation on visitors and the the situation the situation know
traveling public J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO 's budget is based on the revenue Does NOT describe Describes Don't
generatedfromfees and taxes paid by the the situation the situation know
travel and tourism industry l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO isfunded by the government Does NOT describe Describes Don't
the situation the situation know
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO isfunded by the travel and tourism Does NOT describe Describes Don't
industry the situation the situation know
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO isfunded jointly by the travel and tourism Does NOT describe Describes Don't
industry and the government the situation the situation know
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO is a non-profit organization owned by Does NOT describe Describes Don't
and responsible toward the hospitality industry the situation the situation know
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO is a non-profit organization owned by and Does NOT describe Describes Don't
responsible toward the government the situation the situation know
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NTO is an limited corporation owned by Does NOT describe Describes Don't
shareholders within or outside the travel and the situation the situation know
tourism industry J 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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SCENARIo B¥4LUA{C10N1?OJIlfJ, f, ", ;gfhifsetmtric.: ..
I) will motivate the NTO to systematically collect and analyze
information about the market's current and future needs and
preferences
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
2) will motivate the NTO to communicate information about the
market's current and future needs and preferences to the travel
and tourism industry
Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
3) will encourage the NTO to influence the travel and tourism
industry to develop or improve their products and services based
on information about the market's current and future needs and
preferences
Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Strongly
Strongly
Don't
know
8
Don't
know
8
4) will motivate the NTO to systematically collect and respond
to information about key competitors in the market (e.g., their
products/services, strengths and weaknesses and strategies)
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
5) will motivate the NTO to use information about the market's
current and future needs and preferences and about competitors in
the market in the NTO's communication with the market (e.g.,
promotion & PR)
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
6) will motivate the NTO to adopt a long-run perspective in
their marketing plans and activities
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Don't
know
8
7) will cause the NTO to be selective (e.g., about the quality) as
to what tourism products and destinations they will market
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
8) will cause the NTO to over-prioritize on activities endorsed
and sponsored by special interests (e.g., not for the good of the
overall travel and tourism industry)
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
9) will cause the NTO to spend too much resources on selling
its services to the travel and tourism industry to secure NTO's
funding
Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Strongly
Don't
know
8
Don't
know
8
ReSiuJ:iUipt;lliJtiaJs~'~'._'h"": •....Scærm:#~:,~:;;':~(1';:'2!)
10) will cause the NTO to spend too much resources on
"lobbying" the government to secure NTO's funding
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
Il) will cause a negative reaction (e.g., from the t & t industry or
the visitors)
Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Strongly Don't
know
8
12) will not provide sufficient funds for NTO's budget
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
13) will cause the NTO's budget to fluctuate too much and make
long-term planning difficult for the NTO
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Don't
know
8
14) will increase the commitment of the travel and tourism
industry as a whole to the work of the NTO
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
15) will give the NTO freedom to make its own decisions
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
16) williead to improved long-term international market
performance for the t & t industry in NTO's country
Strongly Strongly Don't
disagree agree know
1234567 8
17) will make it difficult for the NTO to pursue its long-term
goals
Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Strongly Don't
know
8
18) will create a system that is not resource-efficient (e.g., costs
more than it pays)
Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
Strongly Don't
know
8
Any other potential positive or negative consequences?
Positive .
Negative . (For more
comments,
please use
backside
of form)
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APPENDIX 4: Sample of scenarios
4 out of 22 different scenarios are shown here
(Scenarios are representing the operalizations of the independent variables)
Scenario 1
• NTO's budget is
negotiable and funded
based on overall
evaluation of the
NTO's marketing
plans each year
8/10/00 OECD
• NTO isfunded by the
travel and tourism
industry
• NTO is an unlimited
corporation owned by
shareholders within or
outside the t & t
industry
Scenario 2
• NTO 's budget one
year is tied to the
increase/decreasein
the amount of money
spent by incoming
visitors (or the number
of visitors in NTO 's
country) relative
to "comparable" coun-
tries the previous year
8/10/00 OECD
• NTO isfunded jointly
by the industry and
the government
• NTO is a non-profit
organization owned by
and responsible
toward the travel and
tourism industry.~
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Scenario 8
• NTO 's budget is based
on the revenue
generated from
taxation on visitors
and the travelling
public
8/10100 OECD
• NTO isfunded by the
government
• NTO is a non-profit
organization owned by
and responsible
towardthe
government
Scenario 10
• NTO 's budget is based
on a fixed sum
decided each year
8/10100 OECD
• NTO isfunded jointly
by the industry and
the government
• NTO is a non-profit
organization owned by
and responsible
toward the travel and
tourism industry-- 4
208
Appendix 5: What determines organizational focus and market
orientation of the NTO?
We have emphasized earlier that we are not interested in testing oftheory in this
particular study. The main reason is because in the context we are working with, this is
not practically possible, as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. However, it is still
interesting to investigate ifthere is any empirical relationship between any of our
variables that could support our assumptions, such as that the funding source will have an
impact on the organization's focus as theorized in Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.
Ideally we would want to investigate any empirical relationship between the three
independent and the three dependent variables. The reasons why we have chosen to
concentrate on only the relationship between the independent variablefunding source and
the dependent variable Market Orientation (Market Focus) are as follows:
l. There is too little statistical variation in the two other independent variables
budgeting principle and ownership in terms of how current practices ofNTOs are
described by the respondents (Ref. Table 5.1 in Chapter 5).
For instance, there are virtually no countries that have implemented any of the direct or
indirect performance-based principles PI, P2 and P7, P8. These are, for instance, the
most interesting in terms of impact on Market Orientation. The only ones that are used in
current practice are the behavior-based principles like P5 (majority) and P3 and P4 (a
few). The latter two are seldom the leading principle, merely used to some limited degree
of e.g. project-based funding. Thus it would be meaningless to run a statistical analysis
with the budgeting principle as an independent factor.
Likewise, there is little variation in how NTOs are owned/controlled. Almost all are for
the most part government controlled (P 13), a majority 100% government controlled.
Only a few NTOs are subject to any significant degree oftourism industry ownership
(PI2). None are completely organized as a limited company and thus as commercial
entity (P 14).
The only one of the independent variables that has sufficient variation to make a
meaningful statistical analysis is thefunding source. There is quite a lot ofvariation in
the ratio of government versus industry funding. Some NTOs are 100% government
funded, while a few are about 50%/50% in terms of government and industry funding.
Most are somewhere in-between, the average is about 72% government and 28% industry
funding.
2. Ofpractical reasons we had to select one dependent variable only, because we did
not want to overload our NTO respondents. In terms ofthe dependent variables,
we think that Market Orientation is the most important.
Ifwe were to measure all three dependent variables, the extra questionnaire would have
been too long, and we could risk that we got a low response rate, poor data and to alienate
the respondents (ref. also the data collection procedure in Section A7.1.1 below).Ofthe
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three dependent variables, Market Orientation is probably the most important, because it
measures the focus of the organization, which we believe is the most important in terms
of the NTO's efficiency, effectiveness and market performance. Without market
orientation, it does not matter how long-term oriented or operationally autonomous the
organization is. We wanted to measure the construct in more detail than only through the
scenario evaluations. A separate study and questionnaire was then necessary.
3. Of the three dependent variables we only had access to tested, validated and
recognized measures from previous literature for the Market Orientation-
construct. We had no pre-developed equivalent measures for the Long-Term
Focus and Operational Freedom-constructs available.
This is the reasons why we chose to concentrate on the Market Orientation-dimension
only and left out the two others in this separate study.
A5.1 Results: NTOs' self-evaluation
Thus, in this section we will empirically address two issues:
• How do the NTOs perceive their own orientation to the market?
• To what extent does the organizational focus of the NTO reflect the importance of
government and/or the industry as source of income?
A5.1.1 Procedure
To assess the Organizational Focus and Market Orientation of the NTOs in the sample,
we developed a questionnaire for NTO key personnel consisting of two parts:
l. a section addressing Organizational Focus (i.e. prioritization ofvarious stakeholders)
of the NTO in the preparation ofits strategic plans (see Appendix 6, part A)
2. a section intended to tap NTO's degree of Market Orientation (see Appx. 8, part B)
We asked a representative(s) from NTO staff (e.g. general manager or others with
thorough knowledge of the organization) to complete a four page questionnaire dealing
with Organizational Focus and Market Orientation of the NTO. The questionnaires and
scales are developed in earlier published studies and were modified to fit the NTO
context. The questionnaire was handed out to selected NTO representatives in each
country at the end of the interview session and then submitted to us by fax after the NTO
representatives had completed the questionnaire. 13 of the 14 participating countries
completed and returned the questionnaire. Many of the aspects covered in the I
Organizational Focus and Market Orientation-questionnaire correspond to (but are not
identical with) the items used to tap Market Orientation/market focus in the scenario
evaluation earlier in this report.
The construct, Organizational Focus, reflects the NTO's attention to and prioritization of
• the market
- Needs and preferences of end users
- Increase the long-term potential ofT&T products/services
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- Priorities and strategies of competitors
• the government,
- Interests and opinions of national and local governments
• the industry
- Interests and opinions of biggest T&T companies
- Interests and opinions of small- and medium sized T&T companies
Market Orientation covers the following dimensions:
• Information Generation
Collect information about the market, competitors, and the business environment
• Information Dissemination
Distribute/exchange information within the NTO and the industry
• Market Orientation Domain-width
Make efforts to identify and respond to new markets, new segments, and new
competitors
• Information Responsiveness
Change strategies as markets, competitors, and business environment change
The data representing the distribution of government versus industry/private budget
portion were collected from informational material (e.g. annual reports, fiscal budgets
etc.) given us by the respondent NTOs/NTAs themselves.
A5.1.2 NTOs' self-assessment of Organizational Focus and Market
Orientation
Byfocus we refer to market-, industry'i-, or government-orientation as the dominating
strategic focus of the NTO in question. Figure A7.1 shows the self-assessment of
organizational focus and market orientation for Canada and the other 12 countries in the
study. We have picked Canada as an illustrative case because of the Canadian NTO's
apparent high degree of market orientation compared to other countries in our sample.
Canada has the lowest portion of government funding 50%, while the average cross-
sample portion is 72%. As we see, the Canadian respondent perceives the Canadian NTO
to have a stronger focus on the market than the 12 other respondents perceive their
respective NTOs to have.
While other NTO representatives in the practitioners' sample rate the interests of
government and the market as about equally important and more important than industry
interests in strategic planning, the Canadian respondent clearly reports emphasis on the
market as the dominant focus. Figure A7.1 shows that the Canadian respondent reports
stronger focus on the market than the other respondents do and relatively less focus than
the others with respect to both industry and government interests. We believe that this is a
quite positive pattern with respect to a proper focus of a NTO (i.e. that the main-focus
should be on the market). This is because both the government and the industry would
eventually benefit from a market-focused NTO.
42 By the term industry we refer to non-government business stakeholders with interests in the tourism
sector (i.e., tourism (as a demand-based phenomenon) cuts across many traditional industries».
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Compared to the other respondents, the Canadian respondent also perceived the NTO as
more market-oriented in terms of all four market orientation-dimensions. Since these
scores are based on one observation per country, we should not exaggerate the
significance ofthis finding. Intuitively, however, the findings seem to have face validity.
A5.1.3 The relationship between importance of government as source
of revenue and NTOs' organizational focus and market orientation
Is it so that NTOs that receive a larger percentage oftheir total budget from the
government also have a stronger focus on government and lower scores in terms of
market focus and market orientation?
. Figure AS.1
Organizational Focus and Market Orientation of Canada and other countries
Organizational Focus
III Canada D Other
45
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Market Orientation
Industry Government
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This issue was addressed by correlating the percentage of government funding with the
scores on each of the various dimensions of organizational focus and market orientation.
The results are shown in Table AS.la and b.
Table AS.la
Correlation between percentage of NTO's budget from government
and different foci of the NTO
Percentage of budget
from g_overnment
Market focus (0.18)
Industry_focus (-0.11)
Government focus +0.58
( ) = non- significant at p<O.15 level
Table AS.lb
Correlation between percentage of NTO's budget from government and
dimensions of Market Orientation of the NTO
Percentage of budget
from government
Information (-0.10)
generation
Information -0.48
dissemination
Information -0.33
responsi veness
Domain Width (-013)
Total index -0.35
( ) = non- significant at p<O.15 level
As we see, the amount of government funding appears to be positively related to the
organizations' tendency to have a government focus. There is, however, no systematic
tendency that the magnitude of government funding is negatively related to market and
industry focus.
Unfortunately, since the majority ofNTO funding worldwide comes from government
sources, it appears that government funding is negatively related to important facets of
market orientation. A negative correlation was observed between the percentage of
funding from government and the self-assessed tendency to
• disseminate information to the industry (r=-0.48, p<O.1O)
• respond to information (r=-0.32, p<O.IS)
It is also interesting to note that government funding apparently is not related to
information generation. While both information dissemination and responsiveness are
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more involving activities and probably require a strong motivational basis in the
organization, it might be easier for an external stakeholder to instruct the NTO to carry
out certain information generation activities (e.g. collection of census data, surveys, etc).
The correlation with the overall market orientation index (based on all items across sub-
dimensions combined) was fairly high (-0.35) and negative, suggesting that high
government involvement may not promote market orientation.
A5.1.4 Conclusion: Does source of revenue matter?
Again, a caveat is in order: We must bear in mind that
• the findings are only based on 13 observations,
• and the measures of organizational focus and marketing orientation are only based on
one observation per country.
There are, however, at least three reasons why we should have some confidence in the
results:
• One reason is methodological: The two sets of measures, budget on one side and
evaluations on the other, are collected independently of each other'". We can have
more trust in the correlations between the two sets ofvariables than what is warranted
ifboth sets had been based on the same data source.
• A second reason is that some of the correlations are fairly high
• A third reason is that the findings corroborate our initial preposition and also the
results of our theory experts' and practitioners' scenario evaluations.
We therefore interpret the findings to imply that the source of income may influence the
NTOs approach to the market and their stakeholders. This finding does not imply that the
government should not provide the necessary means for the NTO's existence. What the
results do imply is that an important consideration for the government is to avoid that the
NTO diverts its attention from the most important stakeholder: The tourist market.
43 Consequently the correlations are not artificially inflated due to common method variance
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APPENDIX 6: Organizational Focus and Market Orientation Assessment
Questionnaire
6A O ti IFf: rgamza iona ocus ques ionnaire
*Statement Please indicate to which degree you agree to the
claims
In the preparation of our market/strategic plans, to make sure Strongly Strongly Don't
that none of our owners or sponsors would feel unfairly disagree agree know
treated or set aside is among our most important I 2 3 4 5 6
considerations.
In this organization, we consider the needs and preferences of Strongly Strongly Don't
the end-users of our country's travel and tourism products disagree agree know
and services (e.g. visitors/tourists) to be among our most I 2 3 4 5 6
important considerations in the preparation of our
market/strategic plans.
We consider the interests and opinions of the biggest Strongly Strongly Don't
companies of our country's travel and tourism industry to disagree agree know
be among our most important considerations in the preparation 1 2 3 4 5 6
of our market/strategic plans.
We consider the interests and opinions of the small or Strongly Strongly Don't
medium sized companies of our country's travel and disagree agree know
tourism industry to be among our most important 1 2 3 4 5 6
considerations in the preparation of our market/strategic plans.
To increase the long-term market potential of our country's Strongly Strongly Don't
t & t products and services in general is among our most disagree agree know
important considerations in the preparation of our I 2 3 4 5 6
market/strategic plans.
The interests and opinions of the national and local Strongly Strongly Don't
governments are among our most important considerations in disagree agree know
the preparation of our market/strategic _plans. I 2 3 4 5 6
How we can maximize our financial support from national Strongly Strongly Don't
and local governments is among our most important disagree agree know
considerations in the preparation of our market/strategic plans I 2 3 4 5 6
The priorities and strategies of competitors from other Strongly Strongly Don't
countries are among our most important considerations in the disagree agree know
preparation of our market/strategic plans. I 2 3 4 5 6
Whatever we can do that will generate the greatest amount Strongly Strongly Don't
of visitor/tourism receipts (i. e., sales/traffic) for our disagree agree know
country in general will be among our most important I 2 3 4 5 6
considerations in the preparation of our market/strategic plans.
"Adapted from Jacobsen, Erik W. (1998), Finansiering og styring av fellesgodeprodusenter: områdeorganisasjoner I reiselivsnæringen
som empirisk arena", Doctoral dissertation, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Norway.
*NOTE:
"End-users" is in this questionnaire referring to tourists/visitors (i.e. individuals, groups or organizations)
that have traveled, or will (actually or potentially) travel, to your country.
"The industry" or "t & t industry" is in this questionnaire referring to the travel and tourism industry in
your country (including companies owned both by the private and public sector).
"Competitors" or "competitor countries" is in this questionnaire referring to organizations or companies
from other countries, which promote (or sell) travel and tourism products and services in competition with
your organization - or any other organizations and companies from your country.
Please proceed to answer the questions on the following two pages.
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6B M k t Ori t ti ti: ar e en a Ion ques ronnarre
*Statement Please indicate to which degree you agree to the
claims
In this organization we meet with the (most important) Strongly Strongly Don't
end-users of our country's travel and tourism products disagree agree know
and services at least once a year to tind out what they I 2 3 4 5 6
will need in the future.
We arrange for representatives from the travel and Strongly Strongly Don't
tourism industry in our country to meet with end-users disagree agree know
to tind out how we can serve the end-users better. I 2 3 4 5 6
In this organization we plan and conduct market Strongly Strongly Don't
research ourselves. disagree agree know
I 2 3 4 5 6
We are fast to detect changes in the end-users' product Strongly Strongly Don't
preferences regarding the travel & tourism (t & t) disagree agree know
products and services of our country. I 2 3 4 5 6
We poll end-users of our country' s travel and tourism Strongly Strongly Don't
products and services at least once a year to assess the disagree agree know
quality ofthese products and services. I 2 3 4 5 6
We often talk with those that can influence our end- Strongly Strongly Don't
users' purchases (e.g. travel agencies, travel disagree agree know
secretari es ) I 2 3 4 5 6
We collect industry information through informal Strongly Strongly Don't
means (lunch with t & t industry friends, hotel disagree agree know
managers, tour-operators, government officials etc.) I 2 3 4 5 6
We are slow to detect fundamental shifts in the travel Strongly Strongly Don't
and tourism industry (e.g. new competitors, new disagree agree know
technology, regulation) I 2 3 4 5 6
We periodically review the likely effect of changes in Strongly Strongly Don't
our business environment (e.g. VAT/taxes, new disagree agree know
alliances new patterns of travel) on end-users. I 2 3 4 5 6
A lot of informal "hall talk" in our organization Strongly Strongly Don't
concerns competitor countries' tactics or strategies. disagree agree know
I 2 3 4 5 6
We have meetings with representatives from our Strongly Strongly Don't
country's travel and tourism industry and our disagree agree know
government at least once a year to discuss market 1 2 3 4 5 6
trends and developments.
Marketing personnel in our organization spend time Strongly Strongly Don't
discussing end-users' future needs with represen- disagree agree know
tatives from our country's travel and tourism industry. I 2 3 4 5 6
Our organization regularly exchanges documents (e.g. Strongly Strongly Don't
reports, analyses) that provide information on end- disagree agree know
users with the t & t industry. I 2 3 4 5 6
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*Statement Please indicate to which degree you agree to the
claims
When we find out that something important happens to Strongly Strongly Don't
a major group of end-users or market, we will tell our disagree agree know
contacts in the t & t industry about it right away. 1 2 3 4 5 6
We make sure that data on end-user satisfaction are Strongly Strongly Don't
disseminated in the t & t industry at all levels on a disagree agree know
regular basis. 1 2 3 4 5 6
There is minimal communication between our Strongly Strongly Don't
organization and the t & t industry. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
There is minimal communication between our Strongly Strongly Don't
organization and the government. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
When we find out something important about the end- Strongly Strongly Don't
users, we are slow to alert the t & t industry. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
When the t & t industry finds out something important Strongly Strongly Don't
about the end-users, the t & t industry is slow to alert disagree agree know
us. 1 2 3 4 5 6
It takes us forever to decide how to respond when our Strongly Strongly Don't
competitors from other countries' change their prices. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
Principles of market segmentation are always taken Strongly Strongly Don't
into consideration when we discuss new product disagree agree know
development with the t & t industry. 1 2 3 4 5 6
For some reason or another, we tend to ignore changes Strongly Strongly Don't
in our end-users' product and service needs. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
We periodically review product and service Strongly Strongly Don't
development efforts with the t & t industry to ensure disagree agree know
that they are in line with what the end-users want. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Our business plans are more driven by resource Strongly Strongly Don't
advances than by market research. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
We periodically get together with representatives from Strongly Strongly Don't
the t & t industry and the government to plan a disagree agree know
response to changes taking place in our business 1 2 3 4 5 6
environment.
The products and services we promote depend more on Strongly Strongly Don't
politics or special interests than on real market needs. disagree agree know
1 2 3 4 5 6
The activities of our organization are well coordinated Strongly Strongly Don't
with the activities of the government and the t & t disagree agree know
industry. 1 2 3 4 5 6
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*Statement Please indicate to which degree you agree to the
claims
We have no formal routine to alert the t & t industry Strongly Strongly Don't
when we learn about dissatisfaction among end-users disagree agree know
concerning the t & t products and services of our l 2 3 4 5 6
country.
Even ifwe came up with a great marketing plan, we Strongly Strongly Don't
would probably not be able to implement it in a timely disagree agree know
fashion. l 2 3 4 5 6
We are quick to respond to changes in our competitor Strongly Strongly Don't
countries' products and services offerings. disagree agree know
l 2 3 4 5 6
When we find out that end-users are unhappy with the Strongly Strongly Don't
quality of our products or services, we take corrective disagree agree know
action immediately. l 2 3 4 5 6
When we find out that the end-users would like a Strongly Strongly Don't
modified product or service, the t & t industry would disagree agree know
make concerned efforts to make the required l 2 3 4 5 6
modifications.
The people in this organization frequently discuss how Strongly Strongly Don't
we can discover the end-users' needs. disagree agree know
l 2 3 4 5 6
We collect information about potential end-user Strongly Strongly Don't
groups/segments not currently being served by the t & t disagree agree know
industry of our country. l 2 3 4 5 6
We concentrate all marketing attention toward current Strongly Strongly Don't
end-users and current competitor countries. disagree agree know
l 2 3 4 5 6
Thank you for your effort!
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Appendix 7: What if NTOs' budgets were performance-based?:
Performance-based budgets simulations
As the scenario evaluation results discussed earlier in Chapter 5 indicate, the respondents
generally viewed some of the performance-based budgeting principles to 'encourage
Market Orientation ofNTOs. Notwithstanding, the respondents expressed more
skepticism when they evaluated the effect of the performance-based principles on Long-
Term Focus.
One reason for this skepticism could be a concern for timing: Decisions are made for the
present or future, incentives are tied to achievements in the past. Another concern that
was expressed by some of the respondents is that the impact of the NTO is small or
negligible compared to the effects of a host of other factors over which the NTO has little
or no control. Consequently, wise decisions in difficult times may harvest little or no
rewards, while unwise decisions when conditions are favorable may lead to few or no
negative consequences for the organization.
In this section we will address one objection against performance based budgets. It can be
argued that fluctuations in the market demand would lead to unwanted fluctuations in
NTO's resources, making long-term planning difficult. Based on data on tourism receipts
for Canada and some other countries for the years 1995 to 1998 (see end of this
Appendix 7), we have applied two different performance principles in combination with a
fixed sum component to calculate the impact on the budget of the CTC44. This is done
only for illustration and the calculated revenue for the NTO would only correspond to the
actual revenue ifthe budgeting principle itselfhad no effect on market demand. The
I potential incentive effect of the performance-based principle is therefore ignored.
A7.1 Factors that affect performance-based budgets
It is obvious that the size of performance based budgets is affected by at least the
following three factors:
• the kind of performance on which the budgets are based
• the type of procedure used for linking budget to performance, and
• the degree to which the budget is based on performance alone or in addition contains
e.g. a fixed amount
44 The actual amount of the Canadian Tourism Commission's (CTC, Canada's NTO) budget for the budget
year 1998-1999 is "moved back" to the budget year 1995-1996, which is the base year in our simulations.
This is done to see what would have happened ifthe various models had been implemented with the current
budget amount in effect from the base year. The calculations are not adjusted for inflation and currency
fluctuations. The principles are conceptually explained in Table 5.1.
219
Kind of performance
One reason for choosing one performance measure over another is obviously that the
preferred measure is closely related to the goals we might have for the NTO. Thus a
measure ofvalue creation (e.g. tourism receipts) may be preferable to a performance
measure that only reflects number oftourists. However, the more alternative performance
variables correlate, the less it matters which is chosen as basis for determining budgets.
Table 7.1
Correlation between various performance-measures, Canada
Tourism receipts Tourist arrivals Guest nights
Tourism receipts 1.00
Tourist arrivals 0.87 1.00
Guest nights 0.99 0.79 1.00
Figure A7.l
Pattern ofvarious performance-measures. Canada
Variations in different tourism performance measures (tourism receipts, arrivals, and nights) Canada
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As Figure A7.1 and Table A7.1 show, the pattern of various performance variables is
fairly similar. As we see the correlation between number of guest nights and tourist
receipts is as high as 0.99 and the lowest (between guest nights and arrivals) is still as
high as 0.79. It is therefore not very important which performance measure is chosen.
Some of the principles reflect relative performance of country X in the sense that the
market performance of country X (in this case Canada) is weighted by the market
performance of "comparable" countries. To the extent the pattern of performance differs
between country X and the other countries in the pool, the performance-based budget can
deviate considerably from what would be the case ifthe performance ofthese
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Figure A7.2a
Growth rate in tourism receipts for various countries
Growth rates (in tourism receipts) for Canada and "comparable" countries
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Figure A7.2b .
Relative growth rate in tourism receipts for various countries45
Relative performance (tourism receipts) for Canada and "comparable" countries
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45 "Relative performance" is calculated as the growth rate (% change in the performance measure from the
previous year) for the country less the average performance (average growth rate) of the other countries in
the reference group. For countries with stronger growth than the average growth of the reference group,
relative performance will be positive, while weaker growth will yield negative relative performance.
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Table A7.2
Overview of the different principles that are applied to calculate consequences for
the NTO's budget
ed component as
ercentage of CTC's
budget in 1995
+VARIABLE COMPONENTTYPE OF PERFORMANCE -
BASED PRINCIPLE
20%
30%
PIa:ABSOLUTE
Variable part ofbudget based on absolute
growth in tourism receipts the previous year
70%
80%
Pl :
Variable part of budget
based only on NTO's
performance the previous
year
20%
30%
PIb:
Variable part of budget based on 1.25% of sales
taxlV AT paid 8 by incoming tourists the
previous year (here a proxy for sales taxes paid
is used 9).
70%
80%
20%
30%
RELATIVEIBENCH-
MARKING
P2a:
Variable part ofbudget based on growth in
tourism receipts relative to average growth
obtained in comparable countries the previous
y_ear
70%
80%P2:
Variable part based on
performance the previous
year relative to perfor-
mance of six "comparable"
countries
20%
30%
P2b:
Variable part ofbudget based on growth in
tourism receipts relative to a weighted average
(to reflect relative similarity) of growth
obtained in comparable countries the previous
year
70%
80%
countries were not considered. Figure A7.2a and b show that the growth rate in tourism
receipts varies considerably from one country to another. Canada has the most stable
growth of the countries listed and is the only country that has sustained positive growth
rates over the entire period.
8 Countries that have established a tourism economic impact system (e.g. TSA), usually have sufficient
statistical tools to estimate the amount of sales taxes/VAT paid by foreign tourists.
9 For Norway, the amount ofsales tax paid by international tourists is about 15% of incoming tourism
receipts. Sales-tax rates are somewhat lower in Canada. In this hypothetical example, let's say this figure
would be 12.5% for Canada. Then, for instance, 10% (the fraction which would equal 142 million in the
1995-1996 budget with a 50/50% fixed/variable-alternative) of 12.5% (=1.25%) would be multiplied by the
portion of the budget made variable (80-20%) to calculate the amount of the variable portion. This amount,
plus the fixed portion (e.g. 20% to 80%), could be transferred to the NTO budgets each year.
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The type of procedure used for linking budget to performance
Table A7.2 provides an (non-exhaustive) overview of various conceivable performance-
based principles that were applied. As we see two of the principles are "absolute" in the
sense that the performance component is only based on the specific country in question
(in this case Canada) and is not made relative to performance in other countries. The first
of the absolute procedures (PIa) rewards the NTO for yearly change in the performance
variable. The second principle ties the budget directly to a certain percentage of the sales
tax revenue oftourism.
Two of the procedures are based on relative performance and thus reflect a benchmark
principle. The performance is related to the performance of "comparable countries". P2a
differs from P2b in that the performance of the countries in the pool is weighted to reflect
relative similarity to the country in question. The justification for using relative measures
is that the procedure helps control for the effects of exogenous factors that influence all
countries in the reference.
The degree to which the budget is based on performance alone or in addition contains
e.g. afixed amount
Performance based budgeting does not imply that the entire revenue for the NTO must be
tied to some performance measure. Adding a fixed amount to the performance-based
revenue can mitigate the effects of a performance-based principle. In the simulations we
used a constant component that varied from 20% to 80 % as shown in the third column of
Table A7.2.
A7.2 Simulated budgets
The results from applying three of the four principles listed in Table A7.2 are shown in
Figure A7.3a-c for the Canada illustrative case. The following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Different performance principles have very different consequences for NTO 's
revenue. It is therefore important to evaluate potentially negative consequences of a
given principle before implementing it.
2. A performance based principle can result in considerable variations from one year to
another unless
• the NTO is able to counter such variation or
• a large portion (e.g. using 80% percent of the base year revenue) is fixed
3. Jf the performance-based principle is tied to growth in market performance, the
revenues for the NTO may be particularly volatile. This is demonstrated in Figure
A7.3a, which illustrates the consequences of principle 1a. This principle ties the
4.
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Figure A7.3a: Budgets based on Principle 1a (tourism receipts) Canada
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Figure A7.3b: Budgets based on Principle 1b (% of sales tax paid by visitors) Canada
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Figure A7.3c: Budgets based on Principle 2a (tourism receipts) Canada
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revenues for the NTO to the increase in the performance measure (in this case change
in tourist receipts) the previous year. The example shows a base year budget for
1995-1996 of CAN $142.4 million. The increase in tourism receipts from 1995 to
1996 was 9.5%, giving a corresponding increase in budget size for the 1996-1997
budget. Ifa 80% variable + 20% fixed alternative (dark green line) had been chosen
the budget gains (about Il million CAN $) would of course have been the greatest,
while a 20/80 alternative (dark blue line) would have yielded only minor changes
(about 3 million). From 1996-1997 the increase in receipts was 1.6%, resulting in a
drop in budgets from the year before, but still above the 1995-1996 level, since there
is continued positive growth. The budgets would only fall below the base year budget
ifthe growth in receipts were negative. The following year, there is a growth of 4.2%
from the year before, which is more than the growth from 1996-1997, resulting in an
increase again in the budget. Since Canadian tourism has had positive growth in for
all years in the simulation period, the CTC would have increased their budgets with
such a system, and the highest gains would have resulted from a high relative variable
portion (that also has the greater budget "risk"). This kind of system will work best
when funds can be transferred from one year to the next. For instance, some of the
extra funds gained the 1996-97 budgets could have wisely been put to use for
increased marketing effort to counter the drop in growth level the following year in
this simulation example.
5. Using relative performance as a base for determining NTO 's revenues may have
some desirable and some unwanted consequences. A possible outcome ofthis model
is that a country can actually get an increase in its budget even ifthe absolute change
in the performance measure in a given year is negative, given that the average
corresponding change for the reference group is relatively more negative. Likewise,
the NTO may experience a cut in the budget even with a positive growth in the
performance measure ifthe reference group's performance is relatively better. The
simulation shows that countries that deviate much from the reference group in terms
of performance will be relatively higher "rewarded" or harder "punished" than in the
models with Principle l. Countries that generally only deviate a little from the
average of the reference group will only experience minor changes in the budget from
year to year. This is not unlike the situation for Canada for the simulation period. Still
P2(a) is less "riskier" (less likelihood ofsubstantial variance in budgets than for Pl(a
and b).
The selection of countries to be included in the reference group will obviously have to
be done carefully, because it is necessary to include only countries that are infact
really comparable by some measure (see end ofthis Appendix7). The simulations
generally show that the more countries included in the reference group, the smaller
the group's average changes in the performance measure. This is analogous to a
balanced stock portfolio; some stocks will decrease in value, while others will
increase accordingly. The average change of the portfolio will approach zero (i.e. that
the "risk" will be reduced). A "large number" of countries included in the reference
group (7-8 or more countries) will approach a situation much similar to the case for
Principle I(a).
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Table A7.3
(Tourist arrival data used/or Principle 1& 2 illustrative budget simulations/or Canada)
Number of international arrivals in 1998 for Canada
and some other comparable countries
"Comparable?" Number of international arrivals 1998
countries~ (in thousands)
Common I (Canada) US Switzerland Netherlands Australia Ireland Spain
markets "l
(Canada)+ - 13421 157 90 70 79 79
VS 14880 - 1904 850 374 759 1207
VK 749 3975 1633 1530 467 3668 4460
Ja (l_an 486 4885 868 200 750 379 713
France 403 1013 1130 460 43 301 1932
Germany 379 1902 6431 2680 148 390 4457
Italy 102 610 953 310 48 137 1335
Sub total (incl. 16999 25806 13076 6120 1900 5714 14183
Canada)
Total 18825 46395 18712 9080 4160 6073 20217
% ofmarket 90% 56% 70% 67% 46% 94% 70%
Sub total (excl. 16999 12385 12919 6030 1830 5634 14104
Canada)
Total 18825 32974 18555 8990 4090 5994 20138
% ofmarket 90% 38% 70% 67% 45% 94% 70%
46 "Comparable" is used in the sense that these countries to a large extent share the same geographical
international markets. Other supplementing definitions of comparability may be feasible.
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